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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, THE BURGER COURT,
AND THE LEGACY OF THE WARREN COURT
Jerold H. Israel*
During the 1960s, the Warren Court's' decisions in the field of
criminal procedure were strongly denounced by many prosecutors,
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.B.A. 1956, Case Western
Reserve University; J.D. 1959, Yale University. -Ed.
1. As the title suggests, this article is devoted largely to a comparison of criminal
procedure decisions of the Supreme Court during the respective tenures of Chief
Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger. In comparing these decisions, I have followed, somewhat reluctantly, the usual "ground rules" for discussions of this type.
First, the composition of the Supreme Court is described by reference to the Chief
Justice presiding at the particular time; i.e., the Court is referred to as the "Burger
Court" or the "Warren Court." This reference is used as a matter of convenience
and is applied without regard to the degree of influence the Chief Justice may or
may not have exerted upon his brethren. See Kurland, Earl Warren, The "Warren
Court," and the Warren Myths, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 353 (1968).
Second, the Court is treated as a single entity during the tenure of each Chief
Justice, notwithstanding significant changes in its composition over each period.
Thus, all decisions during Chief Justice Warren's tenure are described as decisions
of the Warren Court, and all decisions during Chief Justice Burger's tenure are described as Burger Court decisions. This unitary treatment presents obvious difficulties when trying to characterize the trend of the Court's decisions over a period
of years. During Chief Justice Warren's tenure, for example, there were seven
changes in composition on a Court that was so closely divided in philosophical viewpoint that the replacement of a single Justice could have resulted in a dramatic shift
in the majority position. There were significant shifts, in particular, following the
replacement of Justice Burton by Justice Stewart in October 1958, and the replacement of Justice Frankfurter by Justice Goldberg in October 1962. The so-called
"criminal law revolution" of the Warren Court era arguably did not start until the
1960 term, two years after Justice Stewart's arrival, and it certainly did not reach
its pinnacle until after Justice Goldberg's accession. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTON 1960-68 (1968). Following Justice Goldberg's appointment, there was a definite "liberal" majority in criminal procedure
cases, consisting of the Chief Justice, Justice Black, Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan,
and Justice Goldberg or his successor, Justice Fortas. Justice Marshall, replacing
Justice Clark, provided additional support during the last two years of Chief Justice
Warren's tenure.
To offset somewhat the overgeneralization involved in treating the Court as a
single entity throughout the Warren and Burger periods, I have made certain accommodations in selecting the decisions cited as illustrative of the performance of each
Court. Thus, in reviewing the work of the Warren Court, my major emphasis is
upon decisions during the period of 1960-1969, since it is primarily to those decisions
that the civil libertarians point in their comparison of the Warren Court and Burger
-Court. A similar approach is followed in analyzing the work of the Burger Court.
While the civil libertarian criticism of the Burger Court generally covers all of the
Court's decisions since Chief Justice Burger's appointment, the criticism has concentrated primarily on the rulings of the Court since it has felt the full influence
of the four "Nixon appointees." Accordingly, in discussing Burger Court decisions
favoring civil liberties, I have emphasized decisions of the same period-that is, decisions rendered after 1972, when Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined Justice Black-
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police officers, and conservative politicians.

Some of these critics

were careful in their description of the Warren Court's record.

Others let their strong opposition to several of the Court's more
highly publicized decisions destroy their perception of the Court's
work as a whole.

They characterized the Court's record in terms

that can only be described as grossly exaggerated.2

They accused

the Warren Court of ignoring totally the "balanced approach" to

criminal procedure that had been taken by its predecessor, the Vinson Court. They claimed that the Warren Court's decisions were

concerned only with the protection of the suspect. The Court had
ignored, they argued, the fact that encroachment upon liberty could

come from two sources; while the government interferes with our
liberty when it misuses its law enforcement authority, as the Warren
Court's opinions constantly noted, criminals also interfere with our
liberty when they commit crimes that deprive us of life, liberty, and
property. The Warren Court, the critics asserted, in seeking to deter
governmental violations of individual liberty, had failed to give any

weight to society's need to combat effectively this criminal element
that poses an even greater danger to individual liberty.

As a result,

the critics claimed, the Warren Court had continuously imposed new
limitations on police and prosecutors that had handcuffed those law
3

enforcement officials in their efforts to control crime
While there may have been some cause for the basic concerns
of these critics, they so overstated their case as to create a grossly

inaccurate and unfair image of the Warren Court. Fortunately, various civil libertarians, particularly those in academe, sought to set the
mun and Chief Justice Burger. I also felt justified, however, in relying upon those
earlier decisions of the Burger Court that have been reaffirmed since 1972.
I have followed a third ground rule for discussions of this type by not distinguishing between unanimous decisions (e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))
and divided decisions (e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). In measuring the degree of deviation of the current Court from the Warren Court, each ruling
is given equal weight without regard to whether it might reflect a change in the position of a single Justice or several Justices. The emphasis is solely on end results
without regard to strength of support within the Court.
Finally, it should be noted that this article is limited largely to cases involving
criminal procedure that are based on constitutional grounds, see notes 10-11 infra,
and I have not considered cases decided after April 1, 1977.
2. For a survey of this criticism, see Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Court, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964); Kamisar, How To
Use, Abuse-And Fight Back with-Crime Statistics, 25 OKLRA. L. REV. 239 (1972).
Cf. Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics,45 MINN. L. REv. 305 (1961).
3. Thus, Emmet L. Jones, supervisor of the police training unit of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, stated in 1965 that he could not recall "anything in the history of legal procedure in the last ten years that has benefited law
enforcement." See Grafton, What Do We Want from Our Policemen?, McCALL'S,
May 1965, at 110.
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They did not necessarily defend the Court.

In-

deed, many expressed concern over the quality of the Court's opinions.
But they stressed that the critics had greatly exaggerated the extent

of the Warren Court's departure from past precedent. The Court had
not consistently ignored precedent; indeed, many of its decisions
simply built upon past decisions.

Neither had the Warren Court

decisions looked solely to safeguarding the rights of the accused.
The critics had ignored various decisions in which the Warren Court
had accepted as constitutional the expansion of police authority to
permit more effective law enforcement.5 Moreover, many of the
"liberal" decisions cited by the critics were the product of a doctrinal

shift that was related to individual rights generally and not just to
the interests of the accused.'
Today the tide has turned. The Court of the 1970s-the Burger
Court-also is being denounced by various commentators, but now
the challenge comes from the civil libertarians. Again some of the
critics present a fair portrayal of the Court's record.7 But others are
showing that gross exaggeration is a quality that can be shared by

criticisms coming from both sides of the political spectrum. As with
the Warren Court critics, many of the Burger Court critics are claim-

ing that the Court has discarded precedent and tradition and has
looked to only one aspect of the criminal justice process. They portray
the Burger Court as steadily rejecting or "whittling down" the great
civil libertarian advances of the Warren Court. They contend that the
4. See, e.g., Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments
on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MicH. L. REV.
59 (1966); Kamisar, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, supra note 2; Pye, The Warren Court
and Criminal Procedure,67 MIcH. L. REv. 249 (1968); Rosen, Contemporary Winds
and Currents in Criminal Law, with Special Reference to Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: A Defense and Appreciation, 27 MD. L. REV. 103 (1967). Other articles, while less favorable to the Court, nevertheless also sought to create a more
balanced perception of its decisions. See, e.g., Packer, The Courts, the Police and
the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238 (1966).
5. See, e.g., the materials cited in notes 2 & 3 supra. For Warren Court decisions
accepting expanded police authority, see the cases discussed in the text at notes 10212 infra. Consider also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (probable
cause for warrantless arrest may be based on hearsay). Other major decisions rejecting constitutional objections to state procedures include the cases discussed in the text
at notes 113-14 infra; Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) (recidivist prosecution
does not require bifurcated trial); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (separate
state and federal prosecutions permitted based upon same activities).
6. See F. GRnAAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 13, 176-77 (1970)

(quoting

Justice Fortas); Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, June 17,
1962, § 6 (Magazine), at 7; Pye, supra note 4, at 256-57.
7. See, e.g., A. Goldberg, The Burger Court 1971 Term: One Step Forward, Two
Steps Backwards?, 63 J. C iM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1972); Mason, The Burger Court
in Historical Perspective, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 27 (1974); Scheingold, Undermining Adversary Justice, 221 THE NATION 231 (1975).
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Burger Court is substituting narrow, technical interpretations of constitutional guarantees for the expansive interpretations of those
guarantees adopted by the Warren Court. The current Supreme

Court, they argue, shows only a "law and order" orientation-an interest in promoting the enforcement of the law without regard to protecting the rights of the accused. As they see it, the Burger Court
has brought the criminal law revolution of the 1960s to a halt and
has, indeed, started a counterrevolution."
8. Admittedly, most of the criticism in this category, like similar criticism in the
1960s, has come from persons who do not claim to be experts on the decisions of
the Supreme Court. Typically, these critics have been reporters or spokesmen for
local civil liberties groups who are willing to assume, based on one or two current
decisions, that the Burger Court is strictly a "law-and-order" Court bent on overturning all of the Warren Court precedent in the area of criminal procedure. Several
academicians have made similar claims, however. Consider, e.g., L. LEVY, AGAINST
THE LAW 439, 441 (1974):
All four [Nixon appointees], and White too, vote for the rights of the criminally accused about as often as snarks are sighted alighting on the roof of
the Supreme Court building. . . . The lawyers who today constitute the majority of the Court in most criminal-justice cases are no damn good as judges.
They are more like advocates for law enforcement's cause. . . . A hieromancer
can read the entrails of a sacrificial chicken for portents of the future. Anyone
adept at that art knows that the Nixon Court will continue to undermine many
criminal-justice achievements of the Warren Court. Those not skilled at reading
entrails predicted that the Nixon appointees, being conservative jurists, would
respect not subvert precedents. All of us who possess perfect hindsight can
now decipher the writings in the ashes of an increasing number of opinions
that for all practical purposes are dead.
Also consider The Board of Governors of the Society of American Law Teachers,
The Burger Court's Efforts To Close the Federal Courthouse to Public Interest Litigation (Oct. 10, 1976) (unpublished policy statement on file at Michigan Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Board of Governors]:
The Burger Court's most vigorous effort to cut down the protections for the
constitutional rights erected by the Warren Court has come in the criminal
area. This effort has involved not only a whittling down of the substance of
various first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights, but
also the denial of a federal forum to remedy violations of these rights, no matter
how egregious or clear the violation.
Also see Miller, The Court Turns Back the Clock, PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1976, at 22,
24-25:
[B]eginning not later than 1971 the rights of criminal defendants have been
eroded. The Miranda v. Arizona landmark decision on the right to counsel
is being chipped away, as are protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures. . . . The "harmless error" doctrine, which ignores small procedural
errors, has been loosened so much that criminal trials are reverting to the status
quo ante Chief Justice Earl Warren.
See also Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60
GEo. L.J. 249 (1971) (arguing that "major expansions of procedural rights have been
slowed or halted entirely"); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 423-24 (1974) (contending that the Burger Court record evidences the Court's intent "to reverse the trend
of the past decade and to constrict rather than expand the rights of the accused,"
but also noting various "liberal" decisions of the Court). Compare A. Goldberg,
supra note 7 (noting the Court's tendency to confound both its civil libertarian critics
and strict constructionist protagonists through a mixed record of decisions, including
several expanding the rights of the accused); Scheingold, supra note 7, as discussed
in note 415 infra. As Professor Francis Allen has noted, articles on the work of
the Burger Court in the criminal procedure field have "frequently [taken] on angry
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Criticism of this type appears to me to be as overstated as was
much of the criticism of the Warren Court. The record indicates that
the Burger Court has not undermined most of the basic accomplishments of the Warren Court in protecting civil liberties; neither has

the Burger Court consistently ignored the interests of the accused.
The current critics fail, I believe, to put in proper perspective what
the Warren Court did and what the Burger Court has done (or even

threatens to do). Certainly, to one who was a strong supporter of
the Warren Court decisions in the criminal procedure field, 9 the Burger Court may be somewhat disappointing. But it strikes me that
the civil libertarians who describe the current Court as a disaster and
a threat to the liberties of individuals are allowing their disappoint-

ment to blur their vision.
Perhaps the easiest way to support my position would be to
attempt a tedious analysis of each of the Burger Court's decisions and
its relationship to Warren Court precedent. Such an analysis would
take more space than I have (and the subject is worth). Moreover,
it would risk the possibility that we would lose sight of the forest
while concentrating on the growth of individual trees. I therefore
prefer to advance my case by examining the Burger Court's treatment of what I view as the three major themes presented in the Warren Court's decisions. 10 The examination will not scrutinize all of
and apocalyptic tones." Allen, Foreword-Quiescence and Ferment: The 1974
Term in the Supreme Court, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 391, 396 (1975). My concern,
however, is not so much with the strident tones, see, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris
v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971), as with general characterizations that
fail to consider the full range of the Court's decisions and rely on misstatements of
the scope of the decisions that are considered. See, e.g., the treatments of Burger
Court precedent discussed in notes 203, 303, & 340 infra.
9. I must acknowledge that I was not a staunch supporter of the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions, although I also was not a severe critic. See, e.g., Israel,
Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. Rnv. 211; Israel,
Police Interrogation and the Supreme Court-The Latest Round, in A NEw Looi
AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDo-THE SEcoND ROUND 15 (B. George ed. 1967). I also
acknowledge that I favor several (but not all) of the Burger Court decisions that may
be viewed as narrowing the reach of the Warren Court precedent.
10. The three themes, as I see them, are similar, though not identical, to the
themes discussed in Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court
and Criminal Cases, 1975 ILL. L.F. 518; Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the
Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 784 (1970); Rosen, supra
note 4.
I have considered the Burger Court's treatment of these themes only as it relates
to developments within the traditional boundaries of the field of criminal procedure,
thus excluding de;elopments relating to quasi-criminal proceedings, substantive criminal law, and similar subjects. This limitation, which is largely imposed to keep the
size of the article within reasonable limits, led me to leave aside the Burger Court
decisions dealing with juvenile procedures, prisoner's rights, allocation of burdens of
proof, and limitations upon the imposition of capital punishment. It should be noted,
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the trees, but it will, I hope, keep the basic terrain in mind.",
I start in Section I of this Article with an examination of the first

major theme of the criminal procedure decisions of the Warren Court,
the selective incorporation of Bill of Rights' guarantees into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. My conclusion is that the

selective incorporation principle, which provided the doctrinal basis
for many of the "liberal" decisions of the Warren Court, remains

firmly established today under the Burger Court. Section II of the
Article then analyzes the theme of equality and the role it played

in Warren Court decisions in the criminal procedure area. It is my
conclusion that the Burger Court has not undermined, and in some
cases has actually expanded upon, the equality theme. Section III
compares the records of the Warren and Burger Courts in adopting
expansive interpretations of constitutional rights that protect the ac-

cused. It begins by noting that the Warren Court record in this area
must be placed in proper perspective; while the Court did display
a strong preference for expansive interpretations, it also refused to

adopt expansive interpretations in numerous key cases.

Section III

then analyzes the Burger Court decisions and finds a rather mixed

record. It concludes that in most areas outside of police practices
the Burger Court has tended either to expand upon the Warren
however, that the pattern of the Court's rulings in these areas is not substantially
different from that of its rulings in the traditional criminal procedure field. In certain respects, the Burger Court has extended the protection afforded the individual
beyond that specifically granted by Supreme Court precedent as it stood at the end
of Chief Justice Warren's tenure. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(capital punishment); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy in
juvenile cases); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (burden of proof in juvenile
cases); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoner's rights). Of course, on
several of the issues decided by the Burger Court, the Warren Court probably would
have gone even further if the same questions had been presented to it. See, e.g.,
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (factfinding hearing not required for discretionary transfer of prisoner to substantially less favorable prison); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (due process does not require jury trial in juvenile
cases). On the other hand, in at least the capital punishment area, the Warren
Court's failure to rule on the issue indicates that the Court lacked majority support
for going as far as the Burger Court has gone. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138- (8th Cir. 1968), remanded on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970), discussed in McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 185 n.1 (1971); State v. Johnson, 34 N.J. 212, 168 A.2d 1, appeal
dismissed, 368 U.S. 145 (1961).
11. That terrain largely has been limited by the critics of the Burger Court to
constitutional decisions in the criminal procedure area. Accordingly, aside from
the habeas corpus cases, see note 99 infra, I have excluded consideration of decisions
based on statutory grounds. I also have not considered changes in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure that have been adopted by the Burger Court. As noted by
Professor Allen, the "cumulative importance" of these nonconstitutional decisions "is
very great, and [their] actual impact may well rival that of the more celebrated
[constitutional] adjudication." Allen, supra note 10, at 521.
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Court interpretations or to leave the governing guidelines largely as
they stood under Warren Court decisions. The one or two exceptions involve departures from Warren Court precedent that had little
substantive impact in protecting civil liberties. Section III does conclude that the Burger Court decisions on police practices have restricted the scope of various Warren Court rulings. Some of these
restrictions, however, might well have been accepted by the Warren
Court if the appropriate factual situations had been at issue before
it. Also, the restrictions imposed so far have related primarily to
collateral matters that do not substantially affect the practical impact
of the major Warren Court decisions on police practices. Section
III further concludes that the restrictions most likely to be imposed
by the Burger Court in the future also would not undermine the basic
functions of those Warren Court rulings. Finally, Section IV of the
Article examines the image of the Burger Court and suggests that,
if proper attention is paid to the Court's actual holdings, as opposed
to the style of its decisions, civil libertarians would discover that they
could better serve their cause by avoiding wholesale attacks on the
Burger Court and lending their public support to the various Burger
Court rulings that stress the continuing need to safeguard the basic
rights of the accused.
I.

SELECTIVE INCORPORATION

The first and perhaps foremost advance of the Warren Court
precedent was the extension of the Bill of Rights' guarantees to defendants in state criminal cases. This extension was achieved primarily through application of the so-called "selective incorporation
doctrine."'" The Bill of Rights does not, of course, apply directly
to the states; it was designed as a restriction solely upon the federal
government.'- Prior to the 1960s, the Supreme Court had held that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which does apply to the states, afforded to state defendants some of the guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights. 4 The Court also had held, however,
that those guarantees did not necessarily have the same content in
their application to state proceedings under the fourteenth amend12. The development and adoption of the selective incorporation doctrine is reviewed in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J.ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1927 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; Rosen,
supranote 4.
13. Adamson v.California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Barron v.Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243 (1833).

14. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.s. 45 (1932).
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ment as they had in their application to federal criminal proceedings
under the Bill of Rights. The fourteenth amendment due process
clause applied only to rights deemed to be "fundamental" to the
achievement of justice. 5 While a particular guarantee found in the
Bill of Rights, such as the sixth amendment right to counsel, might
include some aspects that could be viewed as fundamental, application of its full content ordinarily would not be necessary to achieve
fundamental fairness. Thus, although the sixth amendment guaranteed indigent defendants the assistance of appointed counsel in all
federal felony cases,' 6 the fourteenth amendment was held to
guarantee appointed counsel only in a limited class of state felony
cases, because only in that group of cases was the assistance of coun17
sel viewed as a "fundamental right.'
A.

Selective Incorporationand the Warren Court

The Warren Court, in a series of decisions beginning with Ker
v. California,' rejected the concept that a Bill of Rights' guarantee
might be only partially fundamental. It adopted instead the selective
incorporation doctrine, a notion originally advanced by Justice
Brennan.'
Under that doctrine, once it is decided that a particular
guarantee is fundamental, that guarantee is incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment "whole and intact" and is enforced against
the states by the same standards applied to the federal government.
Utilizing the selective incorporation doctrine,2 0 the Court held applicable to the states the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures and the right to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence obtained in violation thereof, 21 the privilege against self-incrimination,22 the guarantee against double jeopardy,28 the right to assist15. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism,66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957), and the cases cited therein.
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. See Israel, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 211, supra note 9, at 249-61, and the cases
cited therein.
18. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
19. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
20. Because majority support for the selective incorporation doctrine included
Justices Black and Douglas, both of whom preferred a position of "total incorporation," the majority opinions commonly did not refer to selective incorporation as
such, but they made it clear that the doctrine was being applied. See J. ISRAEL &
W. LAFAvE, CRIMMAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 18-19 (2d ed. 1975).
21. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (fourth amendment standards governing searches).
22. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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ance of counsel, 24 the right to a speedy trial, 25 the right to a jury
trial,20 the right to confront opposing witnesses, 2 7 and the right to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.28 Moreover, in light
of these rulings, two earlier cases relating to the rights to a public
trial and to notice of the nature and cause of the accusation were
viewed as incorporating those rights within the fourteenth amendment.29 At the end of the Warren Court period, the only guarantees
in the Bill of Rights relating to criminal procedure that were not specifically incorporated within the fourteenth amendment were the
eighth amendment prohibition against excessive bail and the fifth
amendment requirement of prosecution of infamous crimes by grand
jury indictment. The Warren Court had not had occasion to rule
directly on the bail clause, but the Court's general approach suggests
that it probably would have held the clause to be incorporated had the
issue been squarely presented. 0 Prosecution by grand jury, on the
other hand, had been held not to be a fundamental right in a series
of cases decided over the years,3 ' and the Warren Court showed no
inclination to overrule those decisions.8 2
It should be noted that many of the Warren Court decisions most
highly praised by civil libertarians involved no difficult issues aside
from application of the selective incorporation approach. 3 These
decisions did not present any need to consider possible expansion
of the content of the particular guarantee being applied; they raised
only the issue as to whether its full content should be applied to the
states. Cases like Malloy v. Hogan,3 4 involving the privilege against
24. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
26. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
28. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
29. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.
196 (1948) (notice).
30. See Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963); United States
ex rel.Siegel v. Follette, 290 F. Supp. 632, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
31. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Lem Woon v. Oregon,
229 U.S. 586 (1913); Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928).
32. See, e.g., both the majority and dissenting opinions in Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1962) (majority); 369 U.S. at 579 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. See Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 794-95; Hartman, The Burger Court-1973
Term: Leaving the Sixties Behind Us, 65 J. CGRIM. L. &C. 437-39 (1975).
34. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). With fifth amendment self-incrimination standards applicable to the states, Malloy was controlled by the federal standard developed in
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). See 378 U.S. at 11-14. But see
378 U.S. at 33 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Malloy expands the Hoffman
standard).
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self-incrimination, Benton v. Maryland,3 5 involving the guarantee
against double jeopardy, and Gideon v. Wainwright,3 6 involving the
right to assistance of appointed counsel, presented easy issues once
the Court concluded that those Bill of Rights' guarantees should
be applied fully to the states. Once that decision was reached,
the issue before the Court could readily be resolved in the defen-

dant's favor by referring to prior decisions applying the particular
right in federal proceedings.

Thus, in Gideon, once the Court

decided that the sixth amendment right to counsel was fully incorporated in the fourteenth amendment, it could readily resolve
the issue of providing appointed counsel for an indigent state felony
defendant by reference to Johnson v. Zerbst,3 7 where the Court had

held that the sixth amendment required such an appointment in all
federal felony prosecutions. Similarly, once it was decided that the
double jeopardy prohibition applied to the states through the four-

teenth amendment, the reprosecution in Benton was clearly invalid
in light of prior interpretations of the double jeopardy clause as ap-

plied in federal proceedings.

8

8

From the viewpoint of the civil libertarian, the significance of the
Warren Court's adoption of the selective incorporation doctrine
should not be underestimated. 9 It was a doctrinal change of great
practical impact. It made applicable to the states a wide range of

prior federal decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights as applied in
federal prosecutions. 40

Even if the Court had not later adopted

35. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Applying fifth amendment double jeopardy standards,
Benton was controlled by the ruling in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
See 395 U.S. at 796-97.
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), which held that counsel need be appointed only where the circumstances of
the case indicated that the absence of counsel would result in a trial lacking "fundamental fairness."
37. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963);
Israel, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 211, supra note 9, at 271 n.337.
38. See note 35 supra.
39. Indeed, Justice Brennan has suggested that the series of selective incorporation decisions may be the most "significant" of the Warren Court rulings in all fields
"in preserving and furthering the ideals we have fashioned for our society." Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HA~v. L. REv.
489, 492-93 (1977). Adoption of the selective incorporation doctrine has been
recognized as a primary achievement of the Warren Court in various scholarly reviews of that Court's criminal procedure decisions. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 10,
at 527; Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 794-96.
40. Of course, there was far more federal precedent defining some constitutional
rights than others. But even in those areas that had been the least frequent subjects
of federal litigation, there typically were at least a few discussions at the Supreme
Court or federal court of appeals level that described the basic content of the particular guarantee. This was true even of the sixth amendment compulsory process
clause, which had sometimes been described as a "dead letter" in terms of federal
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more expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights, those selective
incorporation cases, as they stood, gave the accused substantially

greater protection than was previously afforded in most states.4 '
B.

Selective Incorporationandthe Burger Court

Where does selective incorporation stand today under the Burger

Court? Without doubt, it remains firmly established.42 Indeed, in
Schilb v. Kuebel,43 the Burger Court indicated that it was prepared
to incorporate the eighth amendment bail guarantee-the one

criminal procedure guarantee that had not been treated by the Warren Court. 41 Justice Powell, in Apodaca v. Oregon,45 did suggest
that the fourteenth amendment should give the states more leeway
precedent. For a discussion of the compulsory process cases prior to Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), particularly United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (No. 14,692d), see Westen, The Compulsory
Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1974). Moreover, in those areas with which
state courts were most frequently concerned, such as search and seizure, self-incrimination, and double jeopardy, there was a very well-developed body of federal precedent. See, e.g., 1 & 2 J. VARON, SEARcHEs, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES (1961). As
various Supreme Court decisions indicate, many states were following standards prior
to the adoption of selective incorporation that were inconsistent with the federal
precedent. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See generally the description of state law governing arrests and searches prior to Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963), in 1 J. VARoN, supraat39-450.
41. It must be remembered that the investigation and prosecution of crime is
largely left to the states, and it is before the state courts that we find the great bulk
of all persons charged with crime. Federal felony prosecutions ordinarily will account for less than 10% of all felony prosecutions throughout the country, and the
federal share of misdemeanors is even smaller. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 12, at 1. Thus, in terms of its practical impact upon civil liberties safeguards, the adoption of the selective incorporation doctrine might well have been the
single most important development in the criminal procedure area during the Warren
Court era. While the decisions adopting expansive interpretations of individual rights
and those developing the equality theme were important, no other development may
have so substantially altered the criminal justice process as applied in the states.
42. See Wilkes, supra note 8, at 424.
43. 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
44. The opinion noted:
Bail, of course, is basic to our system of law, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.
1 (1951); Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351, 99 L. Ed. 1299, 1301
(1955) (opinion of Douglas, J.), and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (CA8
1963); see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962), and id., at 675
(Douglas, J., concurring). But we are not at all concerned here with any fundamental right to bail or with any Eighth Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment
question of bail excessiveness.
404 U.S. at 365.
The cited discussions in Robinson, though they referred to the selective incorporation of the eighth amendment, dealt only with the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.
45. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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in setting the acceptable prerequisites of jury decisionmaking than
the sixth amendment gives the federal government. 46 But Justice
Powell stood by himself on that issue. Moreover, he has not sought

to apply this federal-state dichotomy to other areas of criminal procedure. 47 When Justice Powell wrote Barker v. Wingo,48 for example,
he did not suggest that a lesser speedy-trial standard should apply
because the case involved a state prosecution. Similarly, in the
fourth amendment area, he has relied on Ker,4 9 which holds that the

same constitutional standards apply to searches by state and federal
Yet, if there is any area in which
law enforcement officers.5
one could persuasively argue that different standards should apply
because of different circumstances facing state and federal officials,

it probably is the area of police practices. 5 '
II. EQUALITY
A.

Equalityand the Warren Court

A second major theme of the Warren Court's decisions was the
state's obligation to afford equal treatment to the indigent accused.5"

The Warren Court stressed that the availability of fair procedures
should not be dependent upon the defendant's ability to pay. This

emphasis was reflected doctrinally in two lines of decisions.

First,

there were decisions that utilized the equal protection clause to strike
down standards that discriminated against indigent defendants.
Griffin v. Illinois,53 an early Warren Court decision, marked the first
use of the equal protection clause in this fashion. In that case, a

state law gave every defendant the right to appeal, but then it conditioned appellate review on the availability of a trial record that
46. 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring). Similar sentiments were expressed
in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366
(1972).
47. Justice Powell suggested in Apodaca that he might reject the selective incorporation notion only as to the various elements of the constitutional provision for
jury trial. See 406 U.S. at 375-76, particularly n.15.
48. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
49. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
50. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-13 (1975), where Justice
Powell's opinion for the Court treated probable cause standards developed in federal
courts as fully applicable to the states.
51. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, 'at 142-43; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for
Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 RocKY MT. L. REv. 150, 166-71
(1962).
52. See P. KuRLAND, PoLrrics, THE CONSTrrUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT, 98169 (1970); Pye, supra note 4, at 256-60.
53. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L REv. 151 (1957).
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often could not be prepared without a stenographic transcript.

De-

fendant, who could not afford to purchase a stenographic transcript,
demanded that he be given one free of charge.

The state refused,

and the Supreme Court held that this refusal resulted in a denial
of due process and equal protection.

"In criminal trials," Justice

Black's plurality opinion noted, "a State can no more discriminate
on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color" because "the ability to pay costs in advance bears no relationship to
a defendant's guilt or innocence."5 4 The state had to provide all

defendants, rich or poor, equal access to the appellate process, and
under the state's practice that required furnishing the transcript
needed to perfect the appeal.
While Griffin dealt only with the right to a trial transcript for
appellate purposes, the Warren Court soon applied its equal protection analysis to other areas. Initially, Griffin was extended to state
requirements that denied the indigent defendant access to other proceedings, such as filing fees required for challenging a conviction
through a state post-conviction proceeding. 5 Later, however, Griffin was held to invalidate financial requirements that restricted the
indigent defendant's ability to press his claim but fell short of totally
denying him access to the proceedings. 56

Thus, Roberts v. La-

54. 351 U.S. at 17-18. Justice Black's opinion, which was joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Douglas and Clark, also contained another, perhaps more farreaching statement that is frequently quoted: "There can be no equal justice where
the kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 351 U.S.
at 19. See L. Luvy, supra note 8, at 9 (arguing that the Warren Court's equal protection decisions failed to achieve the promise of the "truly radical principle" expressed in this statement).
55. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 .(1961). See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959) (state cannot require indigent defendant to pay a filing fee before permitting
him to appeal).
56. See Kamisar, Poverty, Equality, and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v.
Illinois and Douglas v. Californiato Ross v. Moffit, in NATIONAL COLLEGE OF Dis"Ricr ATToRNEYs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw DEsKBOox 1-79, 1-93 (1977):
[The subsequent] free transcript cases made it plain that so long as this
Supreme Court sat Griffin could no longer be read narrowly as an "access to
the courts" decision: Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966)
(indigent entitled to a free transcript of state habeas corpus hearing for use
on appeal from denial of habeas corpus, although availability of transcript not
a sine qua non to access to appellate court); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S.
367 (1969) (indigent entitled to free transcript of lower court habeas proceeding
for use in preparing an application de novo in a higher state court, although
entirely new application need contain only a "brief statement" of prior proceedings and need not assign errors or refer to testimony in prior proceedings);
Roberts v. LaValle, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (indigent entitled to free transcript
of preliminary hearing for use at trial, even though as dissenting Justice Harlan
stressed, "petitioner and his lawyer were both present at the preliminary hearing,"
"were furnished a firee transcript of the grand jury testimony of the state witness
in question but made no use of this transcript at trial," and petitioner failed
to indicate "any use to which the preliminary hearing transcript could have been
put"); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (recognition that under
ordinary circumstances indigent facing retrial would be entitled to free transcript
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Vallee'1 7 held that an indigent defendant was entitled to a free pre-

liminary hearing transcript where the transcript would be useful
0
(though not essential) in preparing for trial."8 Douglas v. Californiad
went even further: the Warren Court there carried the Griffin concept beyond the area of transcripts by requiring the appointment of

free counsel to assist the indigent defendant on appeal. Moreover,
to ensure that the appointed appellate counsel rendered full assistance, the Court then held unconstitutional a California procedure
that would have permitted appointed counsel to cut short their efforts
upon their unsubstantiated determination that the appeal was without

merit.00
Equality was also stressed in a second line of decisions-e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright,"1 Miranda v. Arizona,62 and United States v.

Wade

3

which were themselves not based upon the equal protec-

tion clause but clearly were influenced by the equality concept of

Griffin.0 4 These decisions, relying on the sixth amendment and the
fifth amendment, held that appointed counsel must be available to

the indigent accused in various situations where the non-indigent accused would have a constitutional right to seek the assistance of

retained counsel. Thus, in Miranda,the Court held that, to preserve
the individual's fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination, custodial interrogation could not proceed until the suspect was

afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel. The Court stressed
that this requirement applied to indigent as well as non-indigent stis-

pects, and, to ensure that this point was recognized, the Court required
that the suspect be informed that, if he could not afford counsel, a
of previous trial ending with a hung jury because such a transcript would be
"valuable to the defendant" as a discovery device and "as a tool at the [second]
trial itself for the impeachment of prosecution witnesses").
57. 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
58. Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's dissent, as quoted by Kamisar in note 56
supra, the majority obviously viewed the transcript as an instrument "needed to vindicate [defendant's] legal rights." 389 U.S. at 42. Roberts involved a denial of a
free transcript under a New York statute that had been held to deny equal protection
by the New York Court of Appeals while Roberts' case was pending in the federal
courts. 389 U.S. at 41.
59. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
60. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Cf. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963).
61. 372 U.S. 335 (1963), discussed in text at notes 36-37 supra.
62. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
64. The equal protection aspects of these decisions are discussed in Choper, On
the Warren Court and JudicialReview, 18 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 20, 34-36 (1967); Israel,
1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 211, supra note 9, at 245-48; Kamisar, Has the Court Left the
Attorney General Behind?-The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality,
and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 KY. L.J. 464 (1966).'
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lawyer would be appointed to represent him. Similarly, in Wade,
in holding that an indicted defendant had a right to the assistance
of counsel while being presented in a lineup, the Court emphasized
that this right applied also to indigent defendants, who would be entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel at the lineup.
B.

Equality and the Burger Court

Has the Burger Court departed substantially from the Warren
Court's emphasis upon equality? In two instances the Burger Court
has refused to extend the Griffin concept.

The first, Ross v.

Moffit,0 5 rejected a proposed expansion of the right to appointed
counsel on appeal. As noted earlier, 60 the Warren Court held in
Douglas v. Californiathat the equal protection clause guaranteed the
indigent defendant appointed counsel on appeal, but Douglas was

limited specifically to an initial appeal automatically granted to the
defendant under state law. 7 In Ross the Burger Court held that
Douglas would not be expanded to require appointed counsel to as-

sist the indigent in preparing an application for a second- or thirdlevel appellate review that could be granted only at the discretion
of the appellate court.

While the Warren Court might have been willing to extend
Douglas to the Ross setting, 6 the Ross ruling hardly placed a major
65. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
66. See text at notes 59-60 supra.
67. In Douglas the Court stated:
We are not here concerned with problems that might arise from the denial
of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims have once
been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We are
dealing only with first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor
alike.. . , from a criminal conviction. We need not now decide whether California would have to provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary
hearing from the California Supreme Court after the District Court of Appeal
has sustained his conviction . . . . or whether counsel must be appointed for
an indigent seeking review of an appellate affirmance of his conviction in this
Court by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ of certiorari which lies
within the Court's discretion. But it is appropriate to observe that a State can,
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long
as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an "invidious discrimination" . . . Griffin v. Illinois . . . . Absolute equality is not required;
lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them... . But where the
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has of right are decided without
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between
rich and poor.
372 U.S. at 356 (emphasis original).
68. The three remaining members of the "liberal" wing of the Warren Court,
Justices Douglas (who wrote the majority opinion in Douglas), Brennan and Marshall, all dissented in Ross. On the other hand, even strong supporters of Douglas
have recognized that the Douglas analysis could readily support the position eventually reached in Ross. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9-14

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1334 1976-1977

June 1977]

The Burger Court

1335

limitation on the extension of the Griffin-Douglas doctrine. The
Court's opinion emphasized that the decision of an appellate court

to grant discretionary review rests largely on factors readily apparent
from the record below, and therefore counsel's services are not
nearly as significant in preparing the application for discretionary review as in presenting the initial appeal, which was treated in Douglas.69
(1963). Before Ross there was considerable question-particularly in light of the
Warren Court's failure to extend the right to appointed counsel to misdemeanor trials,
see note 117 infra-whether that Court would indeed require appointment of counsel
"everywhere a rich man may appear with counsel." Kamisar & Choper, supra at 8
(emphasis original). The Supreme Court's own practice had long been to appoint
counsel for an unrepresented indigent petitioner only after the Court had decided
to review his case; counsel was not appointed to assist in the preparation of the petition for certiorari or the memorandum in support thereof. See Boskey, The Right
to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783, 797 (1961).
69. 417 U.S. at 612-16; see note 70 infra. The special nature of the decision to
grant discretionary review, which involves considerations beyond the merits of the
defendant's claim, and the availability of an adequate presentation of relevant issues
in the record below make the Ross situation quite different from other areas in which
claims have been recognized as to the need for appointed counsel. Admittedly, the
Ross majority did note that especially skilled counsel could be helpful, that the indigent therefore was disadvantaged as opposed to the wealthy, and that this differential did not violate equal protection so long as the indigent defendant still has "an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly." 417 U.S. at 612; see note 70
infra. I do not view that analysis, however, as suggesting anything more than what
was acknowledged directly in Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356, as discussed in note 67 supra,
and indirectly in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), discussed in text at
notes 74-76 infra-that "absolute equality is not required." I therefore disagree with
my colleague, Yale Kamisar, who sees Ross as a far more significant case in which
the Burger Court "put. . . on the brakes" and barred future extension of the Warren
Court's equal protection analysis. See Kamisar, supra note 56, at 1-97 to 1-110. See
also Hartman, supra note 33, at 442 (describing Ross as "the end" of the equal protection doctrine for the indigent).
Professor Kamisar notes that (1) the Ross opinion "never quotes from or even
refers to Justice Black's famous and much-quoted plurality opinion in Griffin,"
Kamisar, supra note 56, at 1-97, (2) "never mentions Long, Gardner, Roberts, or
Britt," id. at 1-98, (3) speaks of Douglas in a way that, as he sees it, "does not applaud Douglas, but tolerates it," id. at 1-99, and (4) talks of preserving "meaningful"
or "adequate" opportunities to present claims. Id. at 1-102. These features of the
opinion, plus others, suggest to him that Ross has converted the equal protection analysis of Douglas into what is, in effect, a due process analysis, and thus the future
will find that the appointment of counsel is upheld under equal protection only where
due process would otherwise require the appointment of counsel. The equal protection clause under the Burger Court, he suggests, "may add nothing to what the indigent defendant or prisoner already has in his legal arsenal." Id. at 1-109 (emphasis
original).
I reject this view of Ross for two reasons. First, I place less reliance on what
Professor Kamisar perceives to be the "tone" of Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
court in Ross. It seems unlikely that, in a case of this type, the Justices joining the
majority would be inclined to write separate opinions simply to disagree with that
tone where they accepted the heart of the opinion's analysis as to the limited role
of counsel in presenting an application for discretionary review. Accordingly, even
if Justice Rehnquist's opinion does appear, as Professor Kamisar suggests, to "echo"
the philosophy of Justice Harlan's dissent in Douglas, it does not follow that
Justices White, Powell, or Blackmun necessarily accepted that view. Furthermore, the fact that Justice Stewart, who was also a member of the Ross majority,
had joined the Harlan dissent in Douglas is no sure indication that he would adhere
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This emphasis could readily be used to distinguish various other

aspects of counsel's services that are much more commonly recognized
as needed for meaningful access to the judicial process than "the
somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review. ' 70
Indeed, if a state supreme court or the United States Supreme Court
exercised its discretion to grant a second- or third-level review, the

equal protection clause still would appear to require that the indigent
defendant be provided the assistance of counsel in presenting that

appeal, since there is much greater need for counsel to present the
merits on an appeal than to perform the narrower function involved
71
in Ross.
In United States v. MacCollom,72 the Burger Court also refused
to Justice Harlan's view today. Second, the Burger Court has already shown a willingness to extend the equal protection analysis to require some forms of assistance
where due process might not apply. Notwithstanding that Argersinger does not require appointment of counsel to try a misdemeanor where only a fine may be imposed, see text at note 75 infra, the Court in Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971),
held that the indigent defendant appealing a conviction for such a misdemeanor was
entitled to a free transcript. Four Justices who joined the majority in Ross-Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun-also joined the Mayer
opinion. (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun each wrote a separate opinion
in Mayer, but those opinions were concerned with the need for a complete transcript,
not with the application of an equal protection analysis to a case not involving a jail
sentence.) Consider also Wainwright v. Cottle, 414 U.S. 895, 895-96 (1973), where
Justices Douglas and Blackmun urged the Court to grant review in order to decide
whether the equal protection clause requires the appointment of counsel in a parole
revocation proceeding in which due process does not impose such a requirement
under Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Consider also the text at note 71
infra.
70. 417 U.S. at 616. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "a skilled lawyer, particularly one trained in the somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review" would be "helpful," and the indigent therefore is "somewhat handicapped
in comparison with a wealthy defendant," although not nearly so handicapped as the
defendant seeking to present a first appeal on the merits without counsel. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion is not so bold as to state what many persons experienced in reading petitions for certiorari would quickly acknowledge: while the lawyer skilled in
the "arcane art" of preparing petitions can be helpful, the average lawyer lacks that
skill and adds little of use to the higher appellate court beyond what is contained
in the opinion of the court below. Boskey argues that the indigent defendant will
not be able to call to the higher court's attention such relevant factors as whether
there is a conflict in the decisions of the lower courts or whether the lower court
has departed from decisions of the higher court. Boskey, supra note 68, at 797. The
possibility that such conflicts or departures exist should be apparent either from the
opinion below or the briefs below. Of course, the opinion below often will not acknowledge the conflict or departure, but the presence of the conflict or departure
ordinarily will be determined by reading the other relevant opinions, not by relying
upon what is said in the typical certiorari petition, where every case that is remotely
relevant is described as conflicting with the opinion below.
71. This equal protection analysis would apply without regard to whether due
process required the appointment of counsel to argue the appeal, compare Kamisar,
supra note 56, although it is entirely possible that due process would require such
an appointment. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
72. 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
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to expand the Griffin analysis, but again the Court's ruling was quite
limited. MacCollom held that it was constitutionally permissible to
require, as a condition for providing a free trial transcript on a collateral attack of a conviction, that the trial judge certify that the defendant's claim is not frivolous. The Court stressed, however, that
the defendant could have obtained a transcript automatically on
direct appeal, without trial court certification. It therefore seems unlikely that MacCollom will have significance aside from the special
situation presented there, in which the defendant fails to appeal but
subsequently seeks to obtain review by collateral attack.73
In contrast to Ross and MacCollom, the Burger Court has
approved substantial extensions of the equality theme in other contexts. Most significantly, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,74 the Court extended the Gideon ruling to require appointed trial counsel in all
misdemeanor cases in which any jail sentence is imposed. More-

over, the opinion of the Court left open the possibility of further expanding the right to counsel to encompass some cases in which jail
sentences are not imposed. 75 The practical impact of the Argersinger decision has been greater than Gideon. Not only are many
more cases presented at the misdemeanor level, but there also were
many more states that had not been appointing counsel in misdemeanor cases involving jail sentences prior to Argersinger than
73. Indeed, an even narrower position is likely. The Court was divided 5-4 in
MacCollom, and there was no opinion for the Court. Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Powell, stressed that the "respondent chose to forgo his opportunity for direct appeal with its attendant unconditional free transcript," and "[tlhis choice affects his later equal protection claim
as well as his due process claim." 426 U.S. at 325. Justice Blackmun, concurring
in the judgment, wrote separately "to emphasize the narrowness of the constitutional
issue that is before us." 426 U.S. at 329. He stressed that the indigent petitioner
had made no showing that the transcript was needed to present his claims on collateral attack. Therefore, the petitioner had "a current opportunity to present his
claims fairly," and there was no need "to consider the constitutional significance of
what he might have done at the time a direct appeal from his conviction could have
been taken." 426 U.S. at 329 (emphasis original). Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissented on equal protection grounds. 426 U.S. at 330. Justices White and Stevens,
also dissenting, did not reach the constitutional issue since they viewed the relevant
federal statute as authorizing issuance of at least a partial transcript. 426 U.S. at
334. Thus, depending upon the views of Justices White and Stevens on the constitutional issue, a majority of the Court may be willing to go no further than Justice
Blackmun's opinion. Under this view, even where the defendant fails to appeal, the
state would be required to provide him a transcript without a prior determination
as to possible frivolousness so long as he is able to show that a transcript is needed
to present the issue he intends to raise on collateral attack.
74. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
75. "We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards
the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, . . . for here petitioner was
in fact sentenced to jail." 407 U.S. at 37. See also Duke, The Right to Appointed
Counsel: Argersingerand Beyond, 12 AM. Cium. L. REv. 601, 610-12 (1975).
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there were states that had not been appointing counsel in felony

70
cases before Gideon.

The Burger Court also has approved other extensions of Gideon.
In Coleman v. Alabama,7 7 the Court held that, although the state

was not required to provide a preliminary hearing, it had to provide
appointed counsel when such a hearing was available under state

law-even in a jurisdiction that prosecuted by indictment so that the
preliminary hearing bindover was not essential.78 In Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,70 the Burger Court held that the indigent person also had
a right to the assistance of appointed counsel in various probation
and parole revocation proceedings.

In Procunier v. Martinez,8 0 the

76. There is some dispute as to the impact of Gideon upon the then-current state
practice. A survey reported in Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1962), noted only five states in which appointment of counsel in
felony cases was not either a legal requirement or an "almost invariable" court
practice. Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965), found that, while five states refused
counsel when requested, other states had been held not to have met Gideon standards
because they had not provided counsel where defendant failed to request counsel.
Professor Van Alstyne concluded that,-when these "request only" states are included,
the "then current practice of thirteen states was substantially affected by the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright." Id. at 606 n.5. The Kamisar reference to an "almost
invariable" court practice might suggest, however, that most judges in the additional
eight states were, in fact, giving defendants the opportunity to request appointed
counsel, so that Gideon only altered the practice in a few courts in those states. In
any event, meeting the Gideon requirement generally was not viewed as a difficult
administrative task, aside from the problems raised by the retroactive application of
the decision.
At the time of Argersinger, there was no clear count as to the number of states
then appointing counsel in all cases where a jail sentence was imposed, but certainly
less than half of the states met that standard. See 407 U.S. at 27 n.1 (citing a postGideon study that listed 31 states as appointing counsel in some misdemeanor cases,
with 12 of those states limiting appointment to misdemeanors in the "serious crime"
category); Goldberg & Hartman, Help for the Indigent Accused: The Effect of
Argersinger, 30 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 203, 205 (1972) (noting, as of 1972, nine
states that did not require appointment of counsel in any misdemeanor case, ten requiring appointment only for offenses punishable by six months imprisonment or
more, five using some other "serious crime" dividing line that did not include all cases
involving jail sentences, and at least three that left appointment to the trial court's
discretion). Implementation of the Argersinger ruling was viewed as a massive
project. See S. KRANmZ, C. SMrri, D. ROSSMAN, P. FaoYD & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE OF ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN (1976);
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN,
A PRESCRIPTIVE PROGRAM PACKAGE (1974).

77. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
78. Coleman was decided in 1970, when Chief Justice Burger was the only Nixon
appointee on the Court. Arguably, a different result might be reached by the Burger
Court today, since only three members of the Coleman majority (Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and White) still sit on the Court. The current Court has shown no disposition to overrule Coleman, however. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 12223 (1975).
79. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
80. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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Court held that a prisoner could not be kept from utilizing the legal
assistance of law students and paraprofessionals.
Of course, these decisions do not move entirely in one direction.

Liberals may complain that the Burger Court has not gone as far
as the Warren Court would have gone on these issues. Maybe so,
but maybe not. For example, in Gagnon, the Court admittedly did not

hold that the indigent had an automatic right to counsel in all parole
and probation revocation proceedings; rather, it held that the circum-

stances of the case would control under an analysis similar to the
Betts v. Brady"' analysis that the Warren Court rejected in Gideon

when it established an automatic right to appointed counsel at trial."'
Yet it should be noted that Justices Brennan and Marshall, who were
both stalwarts of the liberal majority of the Warren Court, accepted
the Gagnonstandard."
In sum, considering Ross and MacCollom on the one hand, and

Argersinger, Gagnon, and related cases on the other, the civil libertarian critics appear to be on less than firm ground if their broadside

condemnation of the Burger Court's treatment of Warren Court
precedent is meant to suggest that the Burger Court has undermined,
or even generally refused to extend, the equality theme of the

Warren Court."
81. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), discussed in note 36 supra.
82. The Court in Gagnon held that due process required appointment of counsel
where, under the facts of the particular case, counsel is needed to assure "effectiveness" of the "hearing rights" that are constitutionally required under Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). It distinguished in particular between cases in which
there are disputed issues of fact (and a trained advocate is needed) and those in
which the revocation is based on the commission of another crime for which
the probationer or parolee already has been convicted. See 411 U.S. at 787-88.
Adoption of such a "case-by-case" analysis was not viewed as inconsistent with
Gideon, where the Court rejected such an approach in favor of a per se rule. The
Gagnon Court argued that "critical differences" between the functions and nature of
criminal trials and revocation hearings justified adoption of a case-by-case approach
in the latter proceedings, though not in the former. See 411 U.S. at 788-90.
83. The Warren Court obviously was inclined to adopt "flat" or "per se" rules
that required reversal in certain general situations and avoided a case-by-case examination of the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether prejudice
or unfairness existed. See J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 81-82 (noting
illustrative cases); Allen, supra note 10, at 532. This policy did not always prevail,
however, and in many areas the Court retained a case-by-case analysis. See, e.g.,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965) (televised proceedings); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (pre-trial publicity).
84. It also should be noted that the Burger Court decisions have not affected the
movement towards bail reform, which is, perhaps, the most important development
favoring the indigent accused that occurred during the era of the Warren Court.
Some aspect of bail reform, which has been achieved primarily through legislative
action rather than judicial decision, is now found in almost every state. Release-onrecognizance programs are common throughout the country. Indeed, in at least three
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II. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A.

The Warren Court Record

A third theme reflected in the Warren Court decisions was the
promotion of expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights' provisions protecting the accused. Of course, it was to be expected that,
with the adoption of selective incorporation, more constitutional
guarantees would apply to state proceedings than had been applicable under the traditional "fundamental rights" analysis. But the
Warren Court also expanded the scope of many of those guarantees
-giving them a broader interpretation than they previously had
been given even as applied to federal proceedings. The Court's
general premise seemed to be that an expansive interpretation of individual rights should be taken unless adoption of such an interpretation presented exceptional difficulties.8 5
states (Kentucky, Illinois, and Oregon), the bondsman has been eliminated entirely.
See Snouffer, An Article of Faith Abolishes Bail in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. Rav. 273
(1974). Also, in many states the use of "ten per cent programs" has at least removed the bondsman from the misdemeanor area. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 110-7 (1964), discussed in Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
From a defense perspective, bail reform has been a far more significant development than many of the most noted decisions of the Warren Court. To a person accused of a crime, the consequences of awaiting trial in jail tend to be far more serious
than the consequences of a state's refusal to grant a jury trial in a misdemeanor case,
as required in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), or a police officer's failure
to provide self-incrimination warnings prior to custodial interrogation, as required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For the majority of defendants, whether
or not the Miranda or Duncan safeguards exist, the defendant still is likely to be convicted; the availability of pretrial release, on the other hand, is likely to have a substantial favorable impact upon his future, insofar as it affects job retention, family
relationships, and even the eventual sentence. Indeed, even for that minority who
will be acquitted as a result of decisions like Miranda and Duncan, bail reform still
may be more significant. Many defendants view the avoidance of jail as more important than the avoidance of conviction. Release pending trial, though followed by
a conviction and probation, is preferred to jail pending trial, though followed by an
acquittal. This preference is particularly true where the record of conviction, as
with some misdemeanors, can later be erased. Cf. F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 289.
Arguably, the bail reform movement was heavily influenced by Gideon, Griffin,
and Douglas, although it certainly was not spurred by any Supreme Court decision
directly threatening judicial supervision unless the states took action to eliminate inequities regarding bail. In any event, the thrust towards eliminating discrimination
against the indigent defendant is well implanted in the bail area. Even if the Burger
Court were to limit dramatically the Griffin concept, which it has not done, the
equality movement in the bail area is not likely to be turned around.
85. Arguably, this view of the Warren Court decisions may give that Court more
credit (from a civil libertarian viewpoint) than is justifiably due it. Consider, for
example, Professor Amsterdam's view of the Warren Court's achievements. See
Amsterdam, supra note 10. Professor Amsterdam suggests that most of the civil
libertarian advances of the Warren Court were engineered through selective incorporation, through the extension of constitutional guarantees into new areas, as in
Griffin, and through the expansion of procedural avenues for challenging convictions, as in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The Warren Court was not "similarly
progressive," he argues, when it came to determining "the content of constitutional
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The Warren Court'sExpansion of ConstitutionalRights

The Warren Court's inclination toward adopting a broad reading
of the Bill of Rights' guarantees was reflected in various aspects of
its rulings. First, individual guarantees were extended into new
areas that previously were viewed as beyond the scope of constitutional regulation. Thus, the fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches was held to apply to electronic eavesdropping,
although such eavesdropping involved no physical invasion of the
premises." 6 Similarly, administrative searches and health inspections
were held to be subject to the reasonableness requirements of the
fourth amendment. 87 The basic theme of the Court in these and
similar cases was that the scope of a constitutional guarantee should
be determined in light of the actual impact of a particular governmental activity upon the individual rather than upon technical, "legalistic" distinctions of the type that commonly are employed in
defining less basic rights. 88 This approach was perhaps best illusguarantees." Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 797 (emphasis original). Thus, he
notes:
The advances of the recent past have been engineered through a wholesaling
process that has created more the possibility of rights (and the appearance of
rights) than actual rights. Such a line of advance would plainly have peaked
out in the 1970's, even without any change in the Supreme Court personnel
. . .because the Court, by 1969, had just about run out of new constitutional
guarantees to proclaim [as applicable to the states]. Further advance would
require a different approach-the giving of expansive content to the guarantees
and the Court has shown no consistent disposition in that direction.
Id. at 803 (emphasis added). See also L. LEvY, supra note 8, at 9: "The Warren
Court was not equally innovative [as compared to its adoption of selective incorporation] in expanding the meaning of old rights to new situations."
Most of the current critics of the Burger Court take a somewhat different view
of the Warren Court's achievements. In comparing the Burger Court's record to that
of the Warren Court, they almost always assume that the Warren Court would have
favored an expansive interpretation had it decided the cases that later came before
the Burger Court. Consistent with the position of these critics, I have assumed
arguendo that the Warren Court did display a strong tendency to favor expansive interpretations, although that inclination did not always prevail. I believe that this
probably is a fairer summary of the Warren Court's approach than that suggested
by Amsterdam. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It also should be noted that various cases
that Professor Amsterdam places in a separate category as extending constitutional
guarantees into new areas also reflect what I characterize as an expansionist interpretation of the content of the guarantee. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964).
86. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) ).
87. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), an earlier Warren Court decision).
88. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967), discussed in
note 331 infra. Consider also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) (rejecting similar "property-law distinctions" in developing the law governing standing
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trated in In re Gault. 9 The Warren Court there held that the
privilege against self-incrimination applied to a typical juvenile delinquency proceeding. Rejecting the contention that juvenile proceedings traditionally are classified as civil in nature, the Court looked to
the charge underlying the particular proceeding (an alleged violation
of a state criminal provision) and the possible consequences of an adverse adjudication (commitment to an institution). It concluded that
such proceedings
must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the privilege against
self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-ofconvenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. 90
The Warren Court's inclination toward expansive interpretation
also was reflected in its shaping of new prohibitions in areas that had
long been held subject to constitutional regulation. Thus, in Griffin
v. California,9 ' it held that a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand constituted a violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Similarly, in Bruton v. United States,9"
the Court held that the prejudice created by the reference in one
defendant's confession to actions of his co-defendant could not be
cured by instructing the jury to consider the confession only as it related to the person confessing; according to the Court, the only constitutionally acceptable. procedures here were either to delete all
references to the co-defendent from the confession or to try the two
defendants separately so that the confession would not be before the
co-defendant's jury. Two major decisions also broke new ground
in the long-beleaguered area of police interrogation to obtain confessions.

In Massiah v. United States,9 3 the Court held that, in

using an undercover agent to obtain a statement from an indicted
defendant, police had violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel by failing to inform him of his right to consult with
his attorney before making the statement. Mirandav. Arizona,94 relying on the fifth amendment, similarly held that various warnings
to raise fourth amendment objections); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-67
(1966) (rejecting technical definition of "compulsion" in determining scope of the
fifth amendment).
89. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
90. 387 U.S. at 49-50.
91. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
92. 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (overruling Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232
(1957), an earlier Warren Court ruling).
93. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
94. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1342 1976-1977

June 19771

The Burger Court

1343

were necessary prior to police interrogation of a suspect held in
custody.
Another important feature of the Warren Court's expansive view
of the Bill of Rights was the Court's emphasis upon protecting pro-

cedural avenues for raising constitutional objections. Thus, in Jackson v. Denno,96 the Court held that a jury was too likely to ignore

standards requiring exclusion of a reliable, yet involuntary confession; accordingly, a state could not allow the voluntariness of the con-

fession to be evaluated by the jury without an initial determination
of admissibility by the trial court. Similarly, Simmons v. United
States"0 held that lower courts imposed an unconstitutional burden

on a defendant moving to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence when they later permitted his testimony on the motion to be

used against him at trial. Finally, and most significantly, the Court
held in Fay v. Noia9 7 that state prisoners who were collaterally chal-

lenging their convictions through federal habeas corpus had not forfeited their right to habeas review by their failure to have raised their
constitutional claims in the state courts. 98 The Warren Court also
expanded the habeas corpus remedy through a flexible interpretation
of the requirement that the defendant be "in custody" at the time

he files his habeas petition. 99 As a result the habeas remedy became
available to a larger group of state defendants, including those who

were no longer serving prison sentences but were still on parole. 100
95. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
96. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)
(providing "automatic" standing in possession"cases).
97. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
98. Fay did grant the federal courts discretion to refuse to consider those claims
where the petitioner's failure was a product of a deliberate bypass of state procedures. 372 U.S. at 439. However, a deliberate bypass was viewed as the equivalent
of a waiver, 372 U.S. at 439, and it was not likely to encompass most of the failures to raise constitutional issues before state courts. See Hill, The Inadequate State
Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 983-84 (1965).
99. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), discussed in text at note
100 infra; Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (petitioner who filed his petition
while in prison may continue his challenge although released unconditionally after
his case had been decided by district court); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968)
(defendant serving the first of two consecutive sentences is "in custody" for the aggregate term of both sentences and therefore can challenge the conviction underlying
the second sentence). Technically, these decisions involved no more than statutory
interpretations of the federal statute governing habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. §§
2241(c), 2254 (1970). Indeed, Fay itself technically involved no more than a statutory interpretation. See 372 U.S. at 405-06. Yet the habeas decisions are so commonly considered along with the Warren Court's major constitutional decisions, and
they are so closely related to the implementation of those constitutional decisions,
that I have included them in this discussion notwithstanding the ground rules noted
in note 11 supra. See also Allen, supra note 10, at 528-29.
100. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
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Warren CourtDecisions Rejecting
Expansive Interpretations

2.

Before considering the extent to which the Burger Court has
departed from the Warren Court's expansionist view of constitutional
guarantees, it should be emphasized that we are dealing only with
a general inclination of the Warren Court, not a rigid standard that
controlled the outcome of all of its decisions. Civil libertarian critics
of the Burger Court sometimes forget that the Warren Court deci-

sions did not all move in a single direction.

At various points the

Warren Court refused to adopt expansive interpretations of individ-

ual guarantees.

This was particularly true in its decisions dealing

with the fourth amendment. 1

1

In McCray v. Illinois,0 2 the Warren

Court rejected the contention that a defendant who was challenging
the validity of his arrest had the right to obtain the name of the
anonymous tipster who provided the information that served as the
basis for that arrest. Similarly, in Alderman v. United States,'03 the
Court refused to accept the concept of third-party standing-that is,

the right of the defendant to challenge a search of the premises of
another. In Terry v. Ohio,'04 it rejected the view that a frisk must
be viewed as a full-fledged search, permitted only when supported
by probable cause.

In Hoffa v. United States, 0 5 it rejected the no-

101. See Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 798-99, characterizing certain fourth
amendment decisions of the Warren Court as "notably regressive." Professor Amsterdam is particularly critical of the following decisions: Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293 (1966), discussed in text at note 105 infra (described as refusing
to limit "police espionage"); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), discussed
in text at note 102 infra (described as disavowing "a requirement, which lower courts
in increasing numbers had drawn from its earlier decisions"); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58 (1967), discussed in note 324 infra (described as "incredibly" holding
valid a search "without legal authorization"); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967), discussed in text at note 107 infra (described as a "double-header" that
both rejected the mere evidence rule and "for the first time in the history of the
Court, gives the support of a holding [previously announced in some loose dicta]
to the proposition that a dwelling may be searched without a warrant where 'exigent
circumstances' make it impracticable to obtain one"). In addition to these four
cases and those discussed in the text at notes 102-09 inra, consider also the fourth
amendment cases discussed in the text at notes 286-91 & 383-85 infra.
102. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
103. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
104. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry held that an officer could undertake a frisk
for weapons where "he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual." 392 U.S. at 27.
105. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)
(fourth amendment not violated where agent misrepresented his identity as a known
narcotics dealer and gained access to premises where he witnessed an illegal narcotics transaction).
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tion that either the fourth or the fifth amendment prohibited the use
of undercover agents who seek to gain a suspect's confidence and
thereby acquire evidence against him. In Katz, v. United States,les
it rejected the concept that all wiretapping was a per se violation of
the fourth amendment. Finally, in Warden v. Hayden,10 7 the Court
overturned an expansive interpretation of the fourth amendment that
had been well established for over forty years. Warden overruled
the Gouled'08 prohibition against searches for "mere evidence" and
thereby opened up the possibility of using search warrants to bypass
self-incrimination limitations on obtaining documents through grand
jury subpoenas.10 9
The fourth amendment area was not the only one in which expansive interpretations were rejected. In several cases involving
fifth amendment claims, the Warren Court adhered to the traditional
view that the self-incrimination clause provides protection only
against testimonial incrimination. The self-incrimination clause accordingly was held not to bar. forced appearance in a lineup, 110 or
the taking of blood tests"' or handwriting samples.1 2 And, in the
sixth amendment area, the Warren Court upheld a Florida provision
that made women eligible for jury duty only when they volunteered
to serve."' The Court also held that a defendant had not been deprived of his right to an impartial jury on the issue of guilt where
the state excluded all prospective jurors generally opposed to capital
punishment." 4
The Warren Court also was willing to accept various doctrines
that limited the impact of the expansive interpretations it gave to
106. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also text at note 86 supra. An earlier Warren
Court decision, Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), had held that any
constitutional restrictions on "eavesdropping" did not apply to the secret electronic
recording of a conversation by a party to the conversation. See Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
107. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
108. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
109. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Bennett,
409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
110. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
111. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
112. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplars).
113. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). A due process case, Hoyt was overruled on sixth amendment grounds in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
See note 138 infra.
114. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Witherspoon did hold, however, that the exclusion of such jurors rendered constitutionally invalid the jury's
determination to impose capital punishment.
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various Bill of Rights' guarantees." 5 Thus, it recognized that some
constitutional violations could constitute harmless error and not require reversal on appeal."' Similarly, it held that many of its newly
established constitutional interpretations would not be applied retroactively." 7
3.

A Late Retreat from Expansionism?

Another point that must be considered in evaluating the Warren
Court's record is the possibility that the Court's inclination toward
expansive interpretations had largely dissipated by the late 1960s.
My colleague, Francis Allen, has suggested that the Warren Court
had lost its "impetus" for imposing new constitutional standards towards the end of Chief Justice Warren's tenure."" He notes in particular the decision in Terry v. Ohio,"0 decided during Chief Justice
Warren's next-to-last term. Terry's significance arguably extends

beyond the Court's specific ruling that a frisk justified by less
115. See Allen, supra note 10, at 529-30; Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of
CriminalProcedure: 1968-1969 Edition, 1969 Sop. CT. REV. 155.
116. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
117. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (collecting and discussing
the various Warren Court decisions on retroactive application). Consider also Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV.
1557 (1975).
In various areas the Warren Court arguably bypassed some prime opportunities
to consider possible extension of the Bill of Rights. These included the extension
of Gideon to misdemeanors, see DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966)
(denial of certiorari); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966) (denial of certiorari);
and the constitutional regulation of negotiated guilty pleas, see Shelton v. United
States, 365 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam reversal and remand without discussion of
merits).
118. Allen, supra note 10, at 538, 535-39. See also F. GRAHAM, supra note
6, at 4, 65-66.
119. 392 U.S. 1 (1968), noted in Allen, supra note 10, at 538. Terry is cited
as the last in a series of cases evidencing a change in the Court's view of the exclusionary rule. See note 120 infra. According to Professor Allen, another illustration
of the Court's "changing mood" was its failure to "revisit" Miranda and remedy
"defects in the Miranda opinion" that became apparent from studies revealing the
limited impact of the Miranda warnings in achieving the objectives of that decision.
See Allen, supra note 10, at 537-38. Professor Allen further notes that "[o]ther
evidences of the waning of the Warren Court's impetus are ambiguous but may include the Court's articulation of the harmless error rule in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967)," the acceptance of stop and frisk on less than probable cause
in Terry, and the acceptance of "a broad version of the informer's privilege" in
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), discussed in text at note 102 supra. Allen,
supra note 10, at 538 n.103. Graham similarly contends that "the Court-under
withering criticism because of Miranda-gave ground on electronic surveillance, informers, and searches." F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 65. The "climactic test,"
Graham suggests, came in Terry, where the Court's decision "backpedaled" by opening a "gap in the fourth amendment's restrictions against unreasonable searches."
Id. at 65, 24. But compare note 122 infra.
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than probable cause is permissible under the fourth amendment.

Through its recognition of the practical limitations that undermine
the deterrent impact of the exclusionary sanction, Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in Terry may have laid the groundwork
for future challenges to that sanction by the Burger Court.120 . Terry
also may be viewed as reflecting new doubts within the Warren
Court's liberal majority as to the wisdom of adopting expansive
"prophylactic" standards to preserve basic guarantees. Professor

Allen suggests that Terry and other Court decisions in the late 1960s
may indicate that the Court was being forced back into the main-

stream of a community consensus primarily concerned with effective
law enforcement.' 2' Such a shift would have been quite understandable in light of the intense reactions to violent crime and riots during

the late 1960s. If the Warren Court had indeed started such a shift,
then the Burger Court might be viewed in a quite different light

when compared with its predecessor.
The civil libertarian may justifiably argue, however, that the
decisions of the late 1960s did not reflect any overall change in the

posture of the Warren Court.

While Terry may be viewed as an

illustration of the Warren Court's eventual retreat from its earlier

"expansionist phase," it also may be viewed as just another example
of the Warren Court's special difficulties in dealing with fourth

amendment issues.' 2 '

During Chief Justice Warren's last term, the

120. See 392 U.S. at 13-15. As Professor Allen notes, Terry is significant not
only because it reveals a much more "measured evaluation" of the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule than earlier decisions, but also because it "tended to view
the exclusionary rule solely as an instrument to deter police behavior." See Allen,
supra note 10, at 535-36. The alternative justification for the rule-the judicial
integrity rationale, see text at note 380 infra-is largely ignored. However, as Professor Allen also notes, see Allen, supra note 10, at 536, this emphasis upon deterrence as the primary justification for the exclusionary rule had been initiated in
an earlier decision, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (denying retroactive
effect to Mapp).
121. Allen, supra note 10, at 538-39. See also F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at
22-25 (suggesting the possibility that the Court was compensating for a "tough decision" (Miranda) by accepting the constitutionality of "planted informers" (Hofa)
and stop and frisk (Terry)).
122. See text at notes 286-96 & 421 infra and at notes 101-09 supra. Search
and seizure decisions taking both expansive and narrow views of fourth amendment
limitations are spread throughout the Warren Court era. Thus, Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969), discussed in text at note 293 infra, and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), discussed in text at notes 295-96 infra, two major "liberal" decisions, were decided after Terry. Earlier decisions cited as evidencing the
Court's retreat from an expansionist mood-e.g., Hoffa, McCray, and Warden v.
Hayden, discussed in text at notes 102-09 supra-were decided during the same term
that the Court extended the fourth amendment to administrative searches in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Moreover, it was in that same term
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Court rendered several decisions that adopted expansive interpreta123
tions of Bill of Rights' guarantees. Both Bruton v. United States,
which was discussed previously,124 and North Carolina v. Pearce125

set forth new and quite broad standards in areas that previously had
been subjected to minimal constitutional restraints. Pearce was particularly significant because it imposed upon judicial authority a
constitutional standard that admittedly went beyond prohibiting the
particular judicial misconduct that violated the Constitution. The
Court initially found that due process was violated when a trial court
imposed an increased sentence for the purpose of punishing a de-

fendant for having appealed an earlier conviction. It then not only
prohibited such improper sentencing, but also imposed certain additional restrictions designed to prevent the trial court from masking
a due process violation by claiming its sentencing decision was based
on other grounds.' 2 Thus, though the Warren Court had been
sharply criticized for imposing "prophylactic" constitutional requirements in earlier decisions like Miranda and Wade, the Court in 1969
was still willing to impose a prophylactic safeguard in Pearce, although here the safeguard was applied to the trial courts rather than
to the police.
that the Court decided United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), one of its major
"expansionist decisions" in the area of police practices.
Decisions in other areas that are cited as evidence of a general retreat during
the late 1960s, see note 119 supra, also are attributable to earlier trends. Thus,
the adoption of a harmless error standard for constitutional violations was suggested
in a pre-Miranda decision, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). Moreover,
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), adopting the harmless error rule, was
decided in the same term as Wade, Camara, and, inter alia, Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), discussed in text at note 60 supra, and In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), discussed in text at note 89 supra. Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250 (1969), an opinion by Justice Douglas that arguably expanded the harmless
error exception, came down during the same term as the expansive decisions of
Chimel, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), discussed in text at note
92 supra, and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), discussed in text
at notes 125-26 infra.
123. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
124. See text at note 92 supra.
125. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
126. Pearce involved a defendant who successfully challenged his initial conviction on appeal and then received a more severe sentence following his conviction
upon a retrial. The majority of the Court held that due process was violated if
the heavier sentence following the second trial had been designed to discourage defendants from exercising their statutory right to appeal. Moreover, to ensure that
such violations did not occur, Justice Stewart's opinion imposed two prophylactic
standards: (1) when a judge imposes a higher sentence -following a retrial, the reasons for that higher sentence must affirmatively appear on the record, and (2) those
reasons must relate to "objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the
part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."
395 U.S. at 726.
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In light of cases like Bruton and Pearce, a civil libertarian has
considerable basis for maintaining that the Warren Court strongly
favored expansive interpretations of constitutional guarantees right
up to Chief Justice Warren's retirement. I am willing to accept that
thesis and take Terry and other decisions of the late 1960s that rejected expansive interpretations as illustrating no more than the obvious fact that the Warren Court decisions never did move entirely
in the same direction. Unfortunately, many civil libertarians appear
unwilling to make a similar concession in examining the Burger
Court's record: they seem unwilling to recognize that the Burger
Court decisions also have not moved entirely in one direction. The
Burger Court's leanings towards expansionist interpretations obviously have not been as strong as the Warren Court's, but the Burger
Court certainly has not taken a position of consistent opposition to
the extension of the Bill of Rights' guarantees. Indeed, if one puts
aside the area of police investigatory practices, the Burger Court's
inclination towards expanding the scope of constitutional guarantees
is not substantially weaker than that of the Warren Court. One cannot reasonably contend, as some critics have, that the majority of Justices on the Court today, or even the four Nixon appointees, are
'127
simply "advocates for law enforcement's cause.
B.
1.

The BurgerCourt Record

Expansionism and the Burger Court

There are at least two areas where the Burger Court has taken
the lead from the Warren Court and adopted constitutional standards
that are as protective of the individual as any the Warren Court
would likely have adopted. The Court's interpretation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel is one such area. I have already noted
the Burger Court decisions in Argersingerand Coleman.128 In addition, there is Faretta v. California,129 where the Court held that the
right to counsel included a supplemental right of the defendant to
proceed pro se at trial, even if he has no special legal knowledge
or skill.

0

127. L. LEvy, supra note 8, at 439.

128. See text at notes 74-78 supra.
129. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

130. Other expansionist Burger Court decisions involving the right to counsel
are Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (conviction obtained in violation of Gideon
may not be used for impeachment purposes), and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972) (conviction obtained in violation of Gideon cannot be considered in
imposing sentence for a subsequent conviction).
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Morrissey v. Brewer13 1 is another illustration of a ruling at least

equally as expansive as many of the Warren Court rulings so warmly
praised by civil libertarians. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger's opinion
in Morrissey, in its extension of basic guarantees beyond the criminal
32
trial, is reminiscent of the Warren Court's ruling in In re Gault.1
Morrissey required, as an element of due process, that significant
hearing rights be afforded convicted persons in parole and probation
revocation proceedings. Those hearing rights included not only a
final hearing (in which the individual is entitled to written notice,
disclosure of the evidence against him, a general right of confrontation, and a written statement by the factfinder), but also a preliminary hearing, which has to be provided promptly and must include a
limited right to confrontation and notice.'
Admittedly, in most areas the Burger Court's record does not show
as consistent an emphasis on expansive interpretations as is found in
Morrissey or in the right-to-counsel cases. Instead, the pattern of
the Burger Court decisions tends to be more like that of the Warren
Court in dealing with search and seizure problems: expansive interpretations of a particular constitutional guarantee have been adopted
in some cases and rejected in others. Nevertheless, a close analysis
of its decisions suggests that the Burger Court, on balance, has
tended to favor somewhat expansive interpretations of constitutional
guarantees in areas other than those involving police investigatory
practices. The Court's decisions dealing with the right to a jury trial,
double jeopardy, the right to a speedy trial, and the procedural forfeiture of constitutional objections are discussed below as illustrative of
the Court's record in areas marked by this mixed pattern of decisions.
2.

The Right to Jury Trial

The Burger Court's interpretations of the sixth amendment right
to a jury trial, though not consistently expansionist, probably provide
an overall extension of that right as compared to its constitutional
position at the end of the Warren Court era. On the one hand,
the Court arguably narrowed the protection afforded the defendant
131. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
132. 387 U.S. 1 (1967), discussed in text at note 89 supra.
133. In Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976), the Court held that a parolee
who was in custody for another offense was not entitled to an immediate Morrissey
hearing while he still had not been taken into custody as a parole violator. In
that case, the petitioner was convicted and imprisoned for the second offense while
on parole, that offense constituted a clear parole violation, and the parole authorities
had not yet executed (though they had issued) a parole violation warrant based
on the commission of that offense.

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1350 1976-1977

June 1977]

The Burger Court

1351

in Williams v. Florida"4 and Apodaca v. Oregon.a" But Williams,
which upheld the use of a six-person jury in non-capital felony cases,
was a decision that easily could have been reached by the Warren
Court, as evidenced by the concurrences of Justices Black, Douglas,
and Brennan.' 3 6 Apodaca upheld the constitutionality of a less than
unanimous verdict in a felony case, and that result is far less likely
to have been reached by the last Warren Court majority, although
it should be noted that the plurality in Apodaca assumed that allowing
split verdicts would not favor either the prosecution or the defense. 3" 7
On the other hand, balanced against Apodaca, the Burger Court
overruled a Warren Court decision in holding that a state could not
discriminate against the selection of women for jury duty by limiting
women jurors to those who volunteer. 3 s The Court also clearly established that a community cross-section concept was part of the sixth
amendment right to a fair jury. 3 9 Moreover, it recognized, in Ham
v. South Carolina,140 that the defendant had a constitutional right to
voir dire examination relating to the issue of racial prejudice where
race was significantly involved in the case. The Court's decision in
Ristaino v. Ross' 4 1 arguably cut back on the implications of Ham by
134. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
135. 406 U.S. 404 (1971).
136. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in Williams, 399 U.S. at 106 (Black,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but their dissent was based on other
grounds. They concurred in the majority's treatment of the jury trial question. Only
Justice Marshall dissented on that issue. 399 U.S. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part).
137. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall all dissented in Apodaca.
406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 406 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
406 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 406 U.S. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, 406 U.S. at 366, distinguishing between
federal and state cases. See text at notes 45-46 supra. Only two states were noted
as accepting less than unanimous verdicts in felony cases at the time of Apodaca,
Brief for Petitioners at 19-20 & n.34, Apodaca v. Oregon, and there has been no significant movement to adopt that procedure since it was held constitutional. See E.
PREscoTT, FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM 9, 79, 97, 98, 104 (Natl. Center for State
Courts 1976) (Louisiana and Oregon remain the only two states permitting nonunanimous verdicts in felony cases).
138. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Taylor clearly overruled Hoyt
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), discussed in text at note 113 supra, although the
Court said only that Hoyt no longer was relevant since that decision was based
on a due process analysis and had not considered defendant's sixth amendment
rights. 419 U.S. at 536-37.
139. 419 U.S. at 530. The constitutional status of the cross-section requirement
was uncertain prior to Taylor, although the Taylor ruling was not unexpected. See
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1317-18.
140. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
141. 424 U.S. 589 (1976). See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
138-40 (1974) (Ham does not require the Court in obscenity cases to ask voir dire
questions as to whether the juror's educational, political, and religious beliefs may
affect their judgment).
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holding that the defendant's constitutional right to voir dire examination as to racial prejudice did not extend to every case in which the
races of the defendant and the victim or jurors differed. Yet the Ham
ruling still constitutes a significant advance in establishing the basic
concept that there is even a limited constitutional basis for challenging restrictions upon voir dire examination. 142 And, while the civil
libertarian may contend that Ristaino should have extended Ham to
all cases involving racial differences, 143 he should remember that the
Warren Court also failed to adopt a single-minded approach in providing avenues for eliminating racial discrimination in the jury selection process. In Swain v. Alabama,'44 the Warren Court held that
a black defendant had no constitutional objection to the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all prospective black jurors
in his case, although the Court left open the possibility that the use
of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from all juries would be
subject to constitutional objection.
The Burger Court, in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,145 also expanded
upon earlier rulings treating criminal contempt proceedings as criminal prosecutions for sixth amendment purposes. Under those rulings,
the right to jury trial did not apply to a contempt charge if the sentence imposed was not greater than six months, since the contempt
would then be viewed as a "petty offense.' 40 Codispoti held that,
where the defendant was charged in a single proceeding with a series
of related contempts arising out of the same trial, he was entitled to
a jury trial if his aggregate sentence exceeded six-months imprisonment, even though the individual sentence for each act of contempt
was less than six months.
3.

Double Jeopardy

Double jeopardy is another area in which the decisions of the
Burger Court show a somewhat mixed approach. In dealing with
retrials following mistrials, the Court has adhered to the "manifest
necessity" standard. 147 Admittedly, the Burger Court's application
142. See 409 U.S. at 526-27.
143. See generally Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27
STAN. L. REv. 545 (1975).
144. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain prompted numerous critical commentaries.
See, e.g., Comment,Swain v. Alabama: A ConstitutionalBlueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
145. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
146. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968).
147. While jeopardy attaches when the jury has been selected and sworn, a subse-
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of the manifest necessity standard in Illinois v. Sommerville1 48 may
be viewed as inconsistent with the Warren Court's application of the
same standard in Downum v. United States, 49 but then the manifest necessity cases have always been decided on a case-by-case

analysis that invites some appearance of inconsistency. 150 Thus, the
Downurn decision itself may be viewed as inconsistent with the
earlier Warren Court decision in Gori v. United States.15 1 Certainly
quent mistrial over defendant's objection will not violate the fifth amendment when
"there is manifest necessity for the act [i.e., the mistrial], or the ends of public
justice would otherwise be defeated." United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579 (1824). See Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461-66 (1973).
148. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
149. 372 U.S. 734 (1963). Both Downum and Sommerville involved mistrials
declared after the jury had been impaneled, but before the trial had begun. In
each case, a mistrial was declared upon request of the prosecution without the concurrence of the defendant, compare United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976),
and in each case the mistrial was produced by prosecutorial error. In Downum,
the Court held that the mistrial was not justified by manifest necessity, but in Sommerville, the mistrial was found to be so justified. The two cases are distinguishable,
however.
In Downum, the mistrial was declared when the prosecutor had discovered that
his key witness-who had not been served with a subpoena-was not present. Without that witness, Downum would have been assured of an acquittal on two of six
counts in the indictment against him. In Sommerville, the mistrial was declared
when the prosecutor discovered a fatal defect in the indictment-the absence of an
allegation of scienter. As the majority read Illinois law, if the trial had continued
in Sommerville and the defendant had been convicted, he would have been entitled
automatically to a reversal on appeal because of this "jurisdictional" defect in the
indictment. Cf. FED. R. CRiM. P. 12(b)(2); but see 410 U.S. at 479-80 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). The majority in Sommerville noted two factors that distinguish Sommerville from Downum. First, the trial in Sommerville would have been a totally
wasted effort from the prosecution's viewpoint. Because of the jurisdictional defect,
no possibility existed to achieve a sustainable conviction. In Downum, the prosecution also lacked the capacity to obtain a sustainable conviction as to two of the
counts (because of lack of evidence), but not as to the others. Second, even as
to those two counts, there was a potentially significant difference in the nature of
the prosecution "error" that made it impossible to obtain a sustainable conviction.
In Downum, the prosecution's error was in an area where the potential existed for
manipulation to obtain a second chance at conviction when the case looked weak;
indeed, the mistrial was granted for the very purpose of granting the prosecution
"an opportunity to strengthen its case." 410 U.S. at 469. Sommerville, on the
other hand, involved a correction of a mechanical error. It was not the type of
error that "would lend itself to prosecutorial manipulation" to obtain a second chance
at building a case. See 410 U.S. at 464. While the actual error in Downum was
not the product of manipulation, once the Court accepted that type of error as a
basis for a mistrial, it might be difficult to distinguish those cases that actually did
involve manipulation. Compare Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
Arguably, the distinctions noted above may not support the different results
reached in Downum and Sommerville, but they are relevant distinctions. But see
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293, 350-52
(1976).
150. See the cases cited in Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461-66 (1973).
See also MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1442-49.
151. 367 U.S. 364 (1961). As to the inconsistency of Downum and Gori, see
Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HAxv. L. REv. 1272, 1278-
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Sommerville does not suggest any major retreat in this area, as the

decision hinged largely on the unique "jurisdictional" nature of the
defect that produced the mistrial there. 15' 2 It should be noted that
the Burger Court also decided United States v. Jorn,1 3 where the
divided, held that a retrial was barred by
Court, again sharply
54
double jeopardy.1

In its treatment of another aspect of double jeopardy, the
authority of the government to appeal, the Burger Court also has a
mixed record. In United States v. Wilson, 5 5 the Court clearly rejected the suggestion that a state appeal could be allowed following

a jury acquittal. 156 On the other hand, it also held that a trial judge's
ruling directing a dismissal of a charge following a jury verdict of
guilty could be made appealable by statute. 1 57 While Justices Bren-

nan and Douglas dissented from this ruling, it is noteworthy that the
remaining member of the Warren Court's liberal wing, Justice Marshall, wrote the majority opinion. 58
Finally, in Ashe v. Swenson,1'5 the Burger Court significantly ex79 (1964); 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 407, 410-11 (1963). Compare L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1969) 122223.
152. See note 149 supra.
153. 400 U.S.470 (1971).
154. Sommerville arguably may be viewed as a retreat from Jorn, but the two
cases are readily distinguishable in terms of the availability of acceptable alternatives
to a mistrial. In Jorn, a mistrial was declared when the trial court concluded that
the prosecution witnesses needed time to consult with attorneys in light of the selfincriminating nature of their testimony. The Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the trial judge's totally proper motivation, the mistrial was not justified by manifest necessity. The Court noted that the trial judge had acted abruptly, without
considering the alternative of a continuance or in any other way assuring that the
mistrial was required by manifest necessity. In Sommerville, the majority assumed
that the only alternative was to continue with a trial that would inevitably be subject
to a successful challenge if the defendant were convicted. See note 149 supra.
The Somnerville majority considered and distinguished Jorn. It noted that while
it was "possible to excise various portions of the [Jorn] plurality opinion to support"
the defendant's position, Jorn could only assist the defense by "divorcing the language" of Jorn from the facts of that case. 410 U.S. at 469. Justice White, who
dissented in Jorn, claimed that Sommerville was inconsistent with Jorn. 410 U.S.
at 477 (White, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger, who concurred in the Jorn ruling (although noting that he did so "not without some reluctance," 400 U.S. at 487), joined the majority in Sommerville.
155. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
156. See 420 U.S. at 351-53; United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 368-69
(1975). Compare Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
157. 420 U.S. at 335-53. See also United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976).
158. In Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), which allowed a government appeal from a pretrial dismissal based on the merits of the case, only Justice
Douglas dissented.
159. 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (overruling Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464
(1958)). Although Chief Justice Burger, the only Nixon appointee on the Court
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tended the reach of the double jeopardy clause by holding that the
concept of collateral estoppel was incorporated in double jeopardy.
Thus, the defendant there could not be tried for a second robbery
offense where the prosecutor would have to prove facts inconsistent

with those necessarily found by the jury at defendant's prior acquittal
for a robbery that had occurred at the same place and time. Once
again, the Court may not have gone as far as the civil libertarians

would have liked. The majority did not find it necessary to consider
Justice Brennan's view, expressed in his concurring opinion, that,
without regard to collateral estoppel, double jeopardy barred separate prosecutions for separate offenses arising out of a single trans-

action. 160 Still, a decision like Ashe can hardly be classified as less
than "expansionist" in its basic approach. 161 The same is true for
Waller v. Florida,161 which barred successive state and municipal

prosecutions for the same criminal acts. In this case, moreover, the
Burger Court was unanimous, and the majority opinion was written

by Chief Justice Burger, who had dissented in Ashe. 68
4.

The Right to Speedy Trial

Consider also the area of speedy trial. In Barker v. Wingo,'
the Burger Court rejected the suggestion, advanced by some civil

libertarians, that the Court adopt a prophylactic rule requiring that
trials be brought within a six-month time period.' 65 On the other
when the case was decided, dissented in Ashe, the Burger Court has accepted Ashe
in later cases, with only Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist
suggesting that Ashe should be reexamined. See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366
(1972) (per curiam), 407 U.S. at 370 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971) (per curiam), 404 U.S. at 55 (Burger, CJ., and Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971) (per curiam), 403 U.S.
at 387 (Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. 397 U.S. at 448-49 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court subsequently has
denied certiorari in a series of cases involving possible adoption of Justice Brennan's
single transaction standard. See, e.g., Ragano v. United States, 427 U.S. 905, 90507 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari) (collecting citations).
161. It is estimated that less than half of the states applied the collateral estoppel
doctrine in criminal cases prior to Ashe. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203, 228-30 (1966).
See also 50 B.U.L. REV. 604 (1970); 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 321 (1971).
162. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
163. Prior to Waller, about half of the states allowed successive state and local
prosecutions for essentially the same offense. See 397 U.S. at 391 n.3; 68 MIcro
L. Rnv. 336, 337 (1969).
164. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
165. 407 U.S. at 523. Arguably the Court could have imposed such a time limit
as a constitutional standard in much the same manner as it imposed the "prophylactic" requirements of Miranda (see text at note 94 supra; text following note 238
infra) and Pearce (see text at notes 125-26 supra), although the adoption of a specific time limit might more clearly appear to be "legislative or rulemaking activity."
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side, it also rejected the view that a defense demand for a prompt
trial was a prerequisite for finding a denial of a speedy trial. 100 It
further rejected the contention that a speedy trial violation could only
be established by showing that the delay had caused actual prejudice
at trial. 16 7 Barker employed a balancing test that arguably went as
far as the Warren Court would have gone-as evidenced0 by the fact
that Justice Marshall joined the Barker majority opinion.1 8
In United States v. Marion,0 9 also involving a speedy trial claim,
the Burger Court held that the speedy trial guarantee did not apply
to prosecution delays in arresting or otherwise initiating charges
against a defendant. Arguably, the Warren Court would have taken
a contrary position. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas concurred in the Marion result, but they urged adoption of a broader
interpretation of the speedy trial requirement that would have
reached pre-charge delays. Presumably other members of the
Warren Court's liberal majority would have agreed with their view,
although it should be noted that Justice Black did not concur in Jus170
tice Brennan's earlier concurring opinion in Dickey v. Florida,
which also advanced that view.
Assuming the Warren Court would have applied the sixth
amendment to pre-charge delays, it still is not clear, however, that
defendants would have received substantially greater protection than
that Marion noted as potentially available through another route.
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Marion did not accept the
position that pre-charge delay was totally unregulated by the Constitution. It noted that such delay could constitute a violation of due
process if the defendant could show that the delay had actually
prejudiced the presentation of his case.' 7' Various lower courts have
407 U.S. at 523. See generally J.ISRAEL & W. LAFAvE, supra note 20, at 82-83;
Allen, supra note 10, at 523-24.
166. 407 U.S. at 528. The demand rule had been accepted by a substantial
majority of the states and every federal court of appeals that had considered the
issue. 407 U.S. at 524.
167. 407 U.S. at 532-33.
168. There was some dictum regarding the significance of crowded dockets and
prosecutorial caseloads as justifications for delay that brought forth a separate concurring opinion by Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan. 407 U.S. at 536. The
analysis of the majority is not necessarily inconsistent, however, with the emphasis
of Justice Whites concurrence. Notwithstanding Barker's acquiescence in most of
the continuances in his case, the Court still described his case as "close." 407 U.S.
at 533.
169. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
170. 398 U.S. 30, 39 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
171. 404 U.S. at 324,
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Arguably, a speedy trial standard ap-

plied to pre-charge delays would be more rigorous, but Marion does
provide a basis for at least barring "deliberate governmental delay
designed to harm the accused," which Justice Brennan had cited as
the primary evil requiring extension of the sixth amendment to pre-

charge delays.'
5.

Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights

What I have suggested so far is that, in those areas that do not
deal directly with police investigative practices, the Burger Court de-

cisions generally have reflected either a decided inclination towards
expansive interpretations of Bill of Rights' guarantees, as in Morris-

sey,' 74 or at least a pattern that accepts an expansive interpretation as
frequently as it rejects such a view. Arguably, there may be one or
two exceptions to this pattern. 75 In particular, the Burger Court has
172. See, e.g., Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965); People
v. Hernandez, 15 Mich. App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1968).
173. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 46 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). In
his concurring opinion in Marion, Justice Douglas similarly justified application of the
speedy trial guarantee to pre-charge delays on the ground that "[t]he impairment
of the ability to defend oneself may become acute because of delays in the preindictment stage." 404 U.S. at 331. However, Justice Douglas further suggested
that a substantial, "unexcusable" pre-charge delay could establish a sixth amendment
violation without a specific showing of prejudice. 404 U.S. at 333.
174. See text at notes 128-33 supra.
175. Aside from the area of police practices, the three groups of decisions most
frequently cited as illustrations of the "regressive tendencies" of the Burger Court
are the decisions applying the privilege against self-incrimination, the decisions applying the harmless error rule, and the decisions involving procedural forfeiture of constitutional rights. See, e.g., L. LEvY, supra note 8, at 139-96 (criticizing the selfincrimination rulings); McDonald, Has the Supreme Court Abandoned the Constitution?, SATURDAY REvmw, May 28, 1977, at 10 (criticizing the forfeiture cases);
Miller, supra note 8 (criticizing the harmless error cases). The forfeiture cases
are discussed in the text at notes 176-213 infra, and the harmless error cases are
discussed in note 264 infra. The cases involving application of the self-incrimination
privilege outside the area of police investigatory practices are noted below. Those
decisions reveal, I believe, another instance of a mixed record.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), clearly represents the deepest
blow to the civil liberties cause among the self-incrimination decisions not involving police investigatory practices. In Kastigar the Court held that use-and-derivativeuse immunity (immunity from use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived
therefrom, but not from prosecution upon evidence derived from an independent
source) was a constitutionally satisfactory substitute for the privilege against selfincrimination, and a witness so immunized therefore could be compelled to testify
notwithstanding his invocation of the privilege. The Warren Court majority most
likely would have insisted upon transactional immunity (immunity from prosecution
for all offenses to which the compelled testimony relates), although that Court
deemed use-and-derivative-use immunity safisfactory for protecting state witnesses
against federal prosecution in Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Two cases involving self-incrimination objections to the compelled production
of documents are more difficult to evaluate. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973), held that the fifth amendment rights of a taxpayer were not violated by
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been criticized for having consistently taken a more restrictive position on procedural forfeitures of constitutional claims than that taken
by the Warren Court.176 The key cases in this area are McMann v.
0
7 7
Tollet v. Henderson,18 and Francisv. Henderson.1
Richardson,1
the enforcement of a summons directing her accountant to produce business records
she had given to him for preparation of her tax returns. The Couch ruling was
consistent with the traditional view of the fifth amendment privilege as a personal
privilege, and Justice Brennan concurred in the opinion of the Court, although Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented. Cf. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974) (privilege held not available to production of partnership papers where partnership had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in his representative capacity; Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion in which Justice Brennan
concurred, with only Justice Douglas dissenting). In Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976), the Court suggested that the privilege applied to the production
of documents only insofar as the communicative aspects of the act of producing
the documents were incriminating. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the ruling in this case, but argued that consideration must also be given
to communication presented in the documents themselves. While the Warren Court
presumably would have accepted Justice Brennan's analysis, there is a distinct possibility, as Justice Marshall has noted, that the Court's theory will provide "substantially the same protection as . . . [Justice Brennan's] focus on the contents of the
documents." 425 U.S. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Finally, in contrast to Kastigar (and possibly Couch and Fisher), there is a
series of Burger Court decisions applying the fifth amendment that are entirely consistent with the likely product of the Warren Court. Thus, in Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Court held unconstitutional a state requirement that a
defendant desiring to testify on his own behalf had to do so before any defense
witnesses testified. The majority found that requirement imposed an unjustifiable
burden upon defendant's self-incrimination right not to take the stand since, prior
to the testimony of his own witnesses, the defendant would not be able to evaluate
accurately whether he should or should not testify. In Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld a state requirement that defendant give advance
notice of an alibi defense, including a listing of alibi witnesses. Justices Marshall
and Brennan both joined the majority opinion, although Justices Black and Douglas
dissented. Moreover, in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), the Court held
that a state alibi-notice provision met due process standards only if, as in the Williams case, it provided for reciprocal discovery to the defense.
The view of the self-incrimination cases noted above should be compared with
L. LEvy, supra note 8, at 196:
The notice-of-alibi [Williams], the illegalconfessions [Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971), discussed in text at note 241 infra], the hit-and-run [California
v. Beyers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), which upheld a statute that required a driver
in an automobile accident to stop at the scene and give his name and address],
the immunity [Kastigar], the tax records [Couch] and the voice-sample [United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), which upheld compulsory production of
voice samples as non-testimonial evidence] cases, when taken together, revealed
that the new Court majority had an abiding faith in the fundamental need to
strait-jacket the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself criminally. Age cannot wither nor custom stale the
monotony with which the Fifth Amendment claim is now rejected.
176. Civil libertarian critics of the Court frequently view these cases as part
of an overall program of the Burger Court to restrict access to the federal courts.
See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 175, at 11; Board of Governors, supra note 8, at
19-22.
177. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
178. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
179. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). Cf. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), discussed in note 211 infra.
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A close examination of these cases, however, reveals far less retraction
80
than suggested by some civil libertarian critics.

Several Burger Court decisions hold that guilty pleas generally
bar objections to antecedent constitutional violations that may have
led to the plea. 181 The leading decision in this group is McMann
v. Richardson.182 The defendant there argued that the conviction
based upon his guilty plea should be overturned because his decision

to plead guilty had been based upon an erroneous assumption that
the state would have been able to use against him a confession that

actually was involuntary (and therefore inadmissible). The majority
held that the entry of a guilty plea barred subsequent consideration

of a defendant's coerced confession claim so long as the guilty plea
had been based on the reasonably competent advice of counsel.

Moreover, counsel's advice would not be viewed as incompetent
simply because he may have misjudged the admissibility of evidence
under constitutional standards.

18 3

As indicated by Justice Brennan's dissent in McMann, the
Warren Court majority probably would have rejected the McMann
ruling.1 84 But it is far from clear how far beyond McMann the
Warren Court majority would have gone. Justice Brennan suggested
that the defendant's decision to plead guilty should not be controlling unless there was a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of the
objection to the confession. 8 5 Yet Justice Brennan also acknowledged that a guilty plea "is, essentially, a waiver" and that in most
180. Consider also Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture
of ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977). Although Professor Westen takes a somewhat broader view of these cases than I do,
he finds in them, as I do, various limits on the use of procedural forfeitures that
largely have been ignored by the more strident civil libertarian critics.
181. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
182. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
183. The majority in McMann also rejected the argument that counsel could
not have made a competent judgment as to whether to challenge the confession
because he was operating under an unconstitutional procedure for raising that objection. See note 189 infra. The majority concluded that the invalid procedure
was not likely to have had sufficient bearing on counsel's advice to plead guilty
to justify holding an evidentiary hearing. As the Court put it, the influence of
the unconstitutional procedure was "a highly speculative matter in any particular
case and not an issue promising a meaningful and productive evidentiary hearing
long after entry of the guilty plea."
184. The likelihood that a Warren Court majority would have joined the Brennan
dissent is not as clear here, however, as in other areas. Justice Brennan's McMann
dissent was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. 397 U.S. at 775. However,
Justice Black concurred in the Court's opinion. 397 U.S. at 775.
185. 397 U.S. at 781-82.
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instances guilty pleas are "the culmination of a decision-making

process" in which the defendant has taken into account "numerous
factors" besides the state's likely use of evidence now viewed as

unconstitutionally obtained. 186 One of the most important of those
factors, which is present in almost every case, is the expectation that

the defendant will be rewarded by a sentence reduction for his willingness to plead guilty.187 Under these circumstances, it probably
would be most difficult for a defendant who had been assisted by
counsel to establish clearly that his plea was not based on a willingness to trade any constitutional objection to the confession for the
possible benefits of pleading guilty,18 8 and unless he could do that,
relief apparently would not be available even under Justice Bren-

nan's position. Thus, one may question whether, as a practical
matter, the position of the dissent in McMann would have been substantially more protective of the defendant than the majority's posi89
tion.1
186. See 397 U.S. at 780 n.2 & 781-82. The dissent noted that, where state
procedures are adequate to challenge the coerced confession and the defendant was
assisted by counsel, then a
defendant who subsequently seeks to overturn his guilty plea . . .[must] come
forward with a persuasive explanation for his failure to invoke those procedures.
It does not follow, [however,] . . . that a defendant assisted by counsel

can never demonstrate that this failure to invoke the appropriate procedures
was justified. The entry of a guilty plea is, essentially, a waiver, or the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right" . . . . By pleading

guilty the defendant gives up. . .in most jurisdictions, the opportunity to challenge the validity of his confession. . . . [But it] is always open to a defendant
to establish that his guilty plea was not a constitutionally valid waiver, that
he did not deliberately bypass the orderly processes provided to determine the
validity of confessions.
397 U.S. at 781-82 (in part quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))
(citations omitted).
187. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY

§ 1.8 and accompanying commentary (Approved Draft 1968); White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure To Assert a Constitutional Claim at Trial,
58 VA. L. REV. 67, 80-81 (1972). But compare Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969
Term-Foreword: Waiver of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1970).
188. The dissent in McMann argued that the defendant should be given the opportunity to show that he did not voluntarily relinquish his guilty plea objection,
but it acknowledged that it would be "difficult" to establish grounds for relief "without any corroborated evidence," such as a supporting statement of defense counsel.
397 U.S. at 788. Counsel thus would be put in the "unenviable position where,
if he can recall his reasons and they are good, he is hurting his former client,
and if he can recall his reasons and they are bad, or even not very good, he is
impugning his own professional competence." Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20,
24 (9th Cir. 1966).
189. Under the dissent's analysis, McMann presented a somewhat easier case than
most for arguing that the guilty plea was not based on a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment of the defendant's coerced confession claim in return for the possible
benefits of pleading guilty. At the time the defendant entered his plea, New York
followed an unconstitutional procedure in submitting the issue of voluntariness to
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It also should be noted that, while the Court in McMann tied

the plea's validity to the competency of counsel, it did not define
competency by the very loose "farce and mockery" standard com-

monly applied by lower courts. 190 Instead, it measured competency
by the more rigorous standard of whether counsel's advice was

"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases."''
Moreover, in Blackledge v. Perry' 92 and Menna v. New
the jury without a prior judicial determination of that issue. See Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964). The majority held that the likely influence of that procedure
was too speculative to justify overturning the plea. See note 183 supra. The dissent
argued, on the other hand, that the bearing of the unconstitutional procedure may
well have been crucial in establishing the lack of an intentional abandonment of
a known right. It reasoned that "even the most expert appraisal and advice by
counsel necessarily had to take into account" the New York procedure for raising
objections; counsel could not reasonably have been expected to discount that procedure as subject to constitutional challenge since the procedure had been upheld
by the Supreme Court in an earlier case. 397 U.S. at 782-83. And since the procedure imposed such a significant obstacle to excluding coerced confessions as to
be unconstitutional in itself, counsel's evaluation of the strength of defendant's coerced confession claim was very likely to have been too skewed to amount to an
intelligent relinquishment of the constitutional objection.
The usual case would differ from McMann in that counsel would have been
dealing with constitutional precedent that was either valid or subject to anticipated
change; there would be no reason why counsel could not have made a full evaluation
of all constitutional objections in determining that defendant's interests were better
served by entry of a guilty plea. Defendant's position under those circumstances
would be much the same, as a practical matter, following either the majority or
dissenting positions in McMann. If it is established that counsel completely ignored
the prevailing precedent, defendant would have a claim that he did not have the
reasonably competent advice of counsel and the plea would be subject to attack
on that ground under the McMann majority position. Under the dissenters' approach,
the defendant would succeed on the ground that there had not been a knowing relinquishment of the underlying objection. If it is established that counsel merely misjudged the strength of his case, the defendant probably would have as much difficulty
in showing the lack of a waiver under the dissent as he would the existence of
incompetency of counsel under the majority. In judging both the competency of
counsel and the presence of waiver, courts have tended to distinguish between counsel who were completely ignorant as to the relevant law and counsel who were aware
of the law, but may have misjudged somewhat its strength as applied to the facts
in the particular case. Compare United States ex rel. Henderson v. Brierly, 300
F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968);
and People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963)
(failure to recognize obvious constitutional objection amounts to incompetency), with
Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Plummer,
171 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1959); and People v. Washington, 41 -Ill. 2d 16, 21, 241
N.E.2d 425, 428 (1968) (erroneous judgment does not negate waiver or establish
incompetency). But cf. People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr.
782 (1969).
190. See Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. LJ. 811,
819 (1976); Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,
54 MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1241 n.325 (1970) (collecting citations).
191. 397 U.S. at 771. Approximately half of the state courts and a majority
of the federal courts of appeals have now rejected the "mockery" test and adopted
a standard similar or identical to the McMann holding as the basic test for determining competency of counsel in cases involving trials as well as guilty pleas. See
Bazelon, supra note 190, at 819.
192. 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974).
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York, 193 the Burger Court held that the McMann ruling does not bar
subsequent challenges to guilty pleas on various non-evidentiary antecedent constitutional violations, even where the defendant had
been assisted by competent counsel.' 94 A voluntary guilty plea does
not constitute a forfeiture of claims that, had they been raised in the
original proceeding, could not have been "cured" by remedial procedures taken by the prosecution. Thus, claims that challenge the trial
court's basic authority to proceed, such as an alleged double jeopardy
violation 95 or an alleged vindictive reprosecution violating due process, 196 may be advanced even though the defendant initially pleaded
guilty.
The two other major cases recognizing 'the loss of a constitutional
objection without a knowing and intelligent waiver are Tollett v.
Henderson9 7 and Francis v. Henderson.9 8 As in McMann, the
Warren Court probably would have reached a different result in both
cases.' 99 Here again, however, the difference in approach probably
would have had little practical significance, at least if Tollett and
Francis are limited to the rather special type of constitutional issue
raised in both of these cases.
In Tollett the Court held that a guilty plea could not be attacked
collaterally even though counsel had allowed defendant to enter the
plea without exploring the possibility that the indicting grand jury was
unconstitutionally selected. Relying upon McMann, the Court noted
that the defendant had not established that "his attorney's advice to
plead guilty without having made inquiry into the composition of the
grand jury rendered that advice outside the 'range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. '"200 Some may view this

ruling as removing all teeth from the "incompetent counsel exception" recognized in McMann. However, Tollett dealt with a special
type of constitutional claim, and the opinion is tied to that type of
claim. The majority emphasized that "[o]ften the interests of the
accused are not advanced by challenges [like grand jury discrimina193. 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975).
194. See Westen, supra note 180, at 1219-26, 1234-38.
195. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975).
196. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 31 (1974).
197. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
198. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
199. In Tollett, Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. See 411 U.S.
at 269 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Francis, with Justice Douglas no longer on
the Court and Justices Marshall and Stevens not participating, only Justice Brennan
dissented. See 425 U.S. at 542.
200. 411 U.S. at 268.
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tion] that would only delay the inevitable date of prosecution."'20

1

Rather than raise an issue that would yield little even if successful,
competent counsel could well find it advisable to look directly to the
potential benefits to the accused of a plea of guilty. Accordingly,
a more rigorous standard might well be applied in judging the competency of counsel who failed to explore possible constitutional ob-

jections more likely to affect the outcome of a case.2°2
Francis is another case involving a grand jury claim.20 3

Here,

however, the defendant went to trial after failing to raise the grand
jury objection. Under the Warren Court's ruling in Fay v. Noia,20 4
one might have expected that the issue could be raised on collateral
attack, provided defendant's failure to raise the issue at trial had not
20 5
been the product of a "deliberate bypass" of state procedures.
Francisheld, however, that the grand jury claim was barred by the
defendant's noncompliance with a state statute requiring such claims

to be raised before trial and providing that failure to adhere to
that requirement constituted a "waiver" of the claim.20 6

Although

the Court did not discuss the continuing vitality of Fay v. Noia, the
majority opinion in Francis was carefully limited to "the circum201. 411 U.S. at 268.
202. See 411 U.S. at 266-68.
203. At least one critic of the Court has totally ignored this factor. McDonald
describes Francis as if the case had involved discrimination in the selection of a
petit jury. The author states that the case involved a defense lawyer who "did not
challenge the composition of his client's jury," and concludes that there was a forfeiture of the defendant's "fair trial" right without his participation. See McDonald,
supra note 175, at 11.
204. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), discussed in text at notes 97-98 and in note 98 supra.
205. The Fay ruling dealt with a coerced confession, but the opinion frequently
referred to constitutional issues in a general fashion. See, e.g., 372 U.S. at 426
and the quote from Fay in note 363 infra. Moreover, at one point, the Fay opinion
specifically referred to the 'Fifth Amendment grand jury right" as "cognizable in
habeas." 372 U.S. at 413-14. In Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970),
however, the Court left open the question whether "racial exclusion in the selection of the grand jury is open in a federal habeas corpus action." 397 U.S.
at 798. The majority opinion in Parker was written by Justice White, who had
joined the Fay opinion, and who later dissented from the exclusion of search and
seizure claims from habeas review of a state prisoner's conviction in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed in text at notes 359-62 infra. 428 U.S. at 536 (White,
J., dissenting). The portion of the Parker opinion dealing with the grand jury issue
was also concurred in by Justice Black, 397 U.S. at 790, who had also joined the
Court's opinion in Fay. Thus, at least two members of the Warren Court majority
in Pay (a 6-3 decision) had been willing to assume in Parker that Fay did not
necessarily control as to the grand jury issue. Moreover, Justice Black had firmly
taken the position in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (dissenting opinion), that Fay did not apply to all constitutional claims.
206. The Court noted, however, that the claim would not be barred by failure
to comply with a state statute if it was shown that the failure was justified by
"cause" and had resulted in "actual prejudice." 425 U.S. at 542.
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stances of this case," which were largely tied to grand jury objections.207
In discussing the need to give weight to the state's timing requirement, the Court in Francisrelied on cases that involved grand jury
claims and cited arguments related specifically to those claims. 20 8
The function of the grand jury is to determine probable cause, and
where a properly selected petit jury has subsequently found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is hard to argue that the grand jury
would have reached a different result on the probable cause issue
if it had not been discriminatorily selected.2 00 Under these circum-

stances, a court could readily apply a forfeiture rule, barring collateral
attack for failure to raise promptly the grand jury claim, even though
a similar consequence would not be attached to an omission of the
type involved in Fay, where the defendant failed to challenge on
appeal the admissibility of a coerced confession that was crucial
to his conviction.210
207. 425 U.S. at 539. Francisdid not attempt to distinguish Fay, although Fay
was cited as a case recognizing that "considerations of comity and concerns for
the orderly administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forego the
exercise of its habeas power." 425 U.S. at 539. The lack of further discussion
of Fay may be attributable in part to the fact that the justices joining Francis were
divided as to the proper scope of habeas review as to issues other than grand jury
discrimination. See in particular note 205 supra and note 359 infra as to the position of Justice White.
208. See 425 U.S. at 539-41 (relying on Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233
(1973), and Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955)). The statements quoted from
Davis noted that, if defendants were allowed to "flout" time limitations relating to
defects in the institution of the prosecution,
"there would be little incentive to comply with . . . [such limitations] when a

successful attack might simply result in a new indictment prior to trial. Strong
tactical considerations would militate in favor of delaying the raising of the
claim in hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if these hopes did not
materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a
time when reprosecution might well be difficult."
425 U.S. at 540 (quoting 411 U.S. at 241). The quotation from Michel added
that, when grand jury objections are delayed, it becomes difficult for the state to
overcome the prima facie case of the defendant since "'[m]aterial witnesses and
grand jurors may die or leave the jurisdiction, and memories as to intent or specific
practices relating to the selection of a particular grand jury may lose their sharpness."' 425 U.S. at 541 (quoting 350 U.S. at 98 n.5).
209. Cf. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan's dissent in Francis argued that the situation presented there was
exceptional because the defendant had been charged with a felony-murder in a situation where a co-felon was killed. The dissent suggested that a grand jury that had
included blacks might have reduced the charge against the defendant, a 17-yearold black youth accused of robbing a white couple. 425 U.S. at 542, 553-54. Compare Justice Douglas' view of grand jury independence in United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
210. Francis might also be distinguished from Fay on two other, somewhat
broader grounds than the "harmless error" analysis discussed in the text. First, the
objection in Fay, involving the voluntariness of confession, concerned the reliability of
the factfinding process. See note 260 infra. Claims not relating to the innocence
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Looking at the forfeiture cases as a group, they clearly reflect

a retreat from the general philosophy expressed in Warren Court decisions emphasizing that constitutional claims should be lost only by
a knowing and intelligent waiver. However, each of the Burger
Court rulings is fairly limited in scope. Viewed in terms of their
practical impact, the forfeiture decisions constitute a fairly minor de-

parture from the Warren Court's overall achievements in expanding
procedural avenues for raising constitutional complaints. 211 Moreover, the Burger Court has shown a willingness to expand procedural
avenues in at least one area. In Hensley v. Municipal Court212 and
Braden v. 30th Judicial District,213 the Burger Court expanded upon
or guilt of the defendant might be subjected to a more stringent forfeiture standard,
if not excluded entirely from the scope of habeas corpus. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Second, the procedural
costs to the state resulting from the defendant's failure to comply with its rules in
habeas are quite different in the two cases. In Fay, the defendant failed to comply
with procedural requirements relating to the filing of an appeal. If the defendant had
complied with the state's procedural rule and raised his meritorious confession issue
on appeal, his conviction would have been reversed by the state appellate court and
a more prompt retrial would have been held-but a retrial still would have been
inevitable. In Francis, on the other hand, the defendant's procedural default cost
the state the opportunity to avoid a retrial. If the error had been raised as required
under state law, it could have been cured before trial. Cf. Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. at 251-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting a similar distinction advanced
by the government in support of a more stringent forfeiture rule for grand jury
claims in federal courts).
Both of the above grounds may be considered by the Court in the pending case
of Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 529 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,
429 U.S. 883 (1976). Sykes raises the issue as to whether the Fay standard of
deliberate bypass will be applied to the defendant's failure to raise a Miranda objection at trial as required by state law. [After this article was written, see note 1 supra,
the Court decided Sykes and held that the Francis standard, rather than the Fay
standard, applied to petitioner's failure to raise the confession issue at trial. 97 S.
Ct. 2497 (1977).]
211. Consider also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). Estelle adopted
an expansionist view of due process and equal protection in holding that a state
cannot compel a defendant to stand trial before a jury while dressed in prison garb.
The Court also held, however, that the defendant had not been so compelled where
defense counsel had never asked the trial judge to arrange for defendant to wear
civilian clothes. Thus, an objection was viewed as an aspect of the compulsion
element of the constitutional violation. The opinion for the Court did not treat
the issue as one of forfeiture.
A concurring opinion by Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, did view
Estelle as involving forfeiture through an "unexcusable procedural default." 425
U.S. at 513. However, that opinion is unclear as to what factors would render
a procedural default "inexcusable" aside from one illustration that would also constitute a deliberate bypass--"a defendant [who] deliberately . . . forgo[es] objection
to a curable trial defect, even though he is aware of the factual and legal basis
for an objection, simply because he thought objection would be futile." 425 U.S.
at 515 (footnote omitted).
212. 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (defendant at large on personal recognizance pending
disposition of habeas petition was "in custody" for purposes of filing that petition).
213. 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (defendant serving a sentence in one jurisdiction, but
subject of a detainer from a second jurisdiction, can immediately utilize habeas corpus
to challenge the conviction in the second jurisdiction).
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earlier Warren Court decisions and liberally interpreted the habeas
corpus "custody" requirement 21 4 to permit challenges by state de-

fendants not currently incarcerated under the conviction being
attacked.
C.

The Burger Court and Police Practices

So far I have put to one side the Burger Court decisions regulating police investigatory practices. Undoubtedly these decisions have

caused the most concern among civil libertarian critics of the Court.
That concern is not unexpected.

The Warren Court decisions relat-

ing to police practices rank high among those Warren Court decisions
most revered by civil libertarians. Moreover, it is in this area that
the Burger Court most clearly has departed from Warren Court

precedents. The question remains, however, whether these Burger
Court decisions have, as the critics suggest, largely eviscerated the
Warren Court rulings. I believe that this has not been the case to
date, and even those further cutbacks that are most likely to be made
in the future should not have that effect.
1.

IdentificationProcedures

Let us start by considering one of the most clear-cut instances of

Burger Court decisions that departed from the thrust of Warren
Court precedents. In Kirby v. Illinois215 and United States v. Ash, 210
the Burger Court so narrowed the reach of the Warren Court's decision in United States v. Wade217 that the Wade ruling now stands

as a narrow exception to the general rules governing identification
procedures.

218

Wade held that an indicted defendant has a sixth amendment
right to the assistance of counsel when he is placed in a lineup
214. See note 99 supra.
215. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Justice Stewart wrote a plurality opinion joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Powell concurred
separately on the ground that the "Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule" should
not be "extend[ed]." 406 U.S. at 691. Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall
dissented in an opinion by Justice Brennan. 406 U.S. at 691. Justice White dissented separately. See note 225 infra.
216. 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented.
413 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). All references to Wade also encompass the ruling
on lineups in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), a companion case that
applied the Wade standard to a state lineup proceeding.
218. See Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards
Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MiCH. L. REV. 717
(1974); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973).
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identification procedure. Kirby ruled that Wade did not apply to
lineups involving an arrested suspect who had not yet been charged
with an offense.2 19 Technically, Kirby was consistent with both
the precise holding in Wade and the doctrinal grounding of that
holding. Justice Brennan's opinion in Wade had relied upon the
sixth amendment, 220 which applies by its terms to "accused" persons in "criminal prosecutions." In an earlier case, Massiah v.
United States,2" 1 the Warren Court had suggested that a suspect did
not become an "accused" person in a "criminal prosecution" until
adversary judicial proceedings had been initiated against him by the
filing of charges in court. 2 2 Accordingly; the fact that the defendant in Wade had been indicted before being placed in the lineup
could have been viewed, in light of Massiah, as a crucial element
in the case. But the reasoning of Wade, which stressed the accused's need for counsel to eliminate potential unfairness in the
lineup process, was not limited to the situation in which the suspect
had already been charged. 3 Consistent with the Warren Court's
reasoning in Wade, the Court in Kirby could have held that, while
219. Kirby involved a "showup," but the ruling extended to lineups as well as
showups.
220. 388 U.S. at 221, 225-26.
221. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
222. See text at note 93 supra and at note 265 infra. In Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court had applied the sixth amendment to pre-charge
custodial interrogation, but the sixth amendment grounding of that case had been
undercut by later Warren Court opinions that had viewed Escobedo as a decision,
like Miranda, which recognized a right to counsel as a means of vindicating the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-45 (1966).
The majority opinion in Wade relied on both Massiah and Escobedo and did not
note any inconsistency in the treatment of the starting point of sixth amendment
rights in the two cases. See 388 U.S. at 218-26. See also Grano, supra note 218,
at 729-30 (noting other Warren Court decisions that might suggest that the right
to counsel applied before the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings).
223. 388 U.S. at 228-39. However, the opinion for the Court did describe the
"question here" as "whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to
be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before
trial at a post-indictment lineup . .. without notice to and in the absence of the
accused's appointed counsel." 388 U.S. at 219-20 (emphasis added). In addition,
see 388 U.S. at 237, where the Court stated that "for Wade the post-indictment
lineup was a critical stage." Also, the Court noted that the case was one in which
counsel previously had been appointed (although it left open the possible use of substitute counsel where the defendant's regular counsel was not available); ordinarily
an indigent person in a pre-charge lineup would not have a previously appointed counsel since the magistrate would not be in a position to appoint counsel until after
charges were filed with the court. See note 226 infra. The companion lineup case,
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), also involved a post-indictment lineup.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), which was also decided the same day, involved a post-charge showup. Stovall held that Wade would not be applied to lineups
or showups conducted before the date of the Wade ruling.
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the sixth amendment was inapplicable prior to the initiation of
charges, assistance of counsel still was required by due process to
ensure a fair identification procedure. 224 A similar approach was
taken in Miranda, where the Warren Court held that the right to
counsel was necessary to preserve a non-indicted suspect's privilege
against self-incrimination. It seems clear that the Warren Court
majority would have followed that path in the Kirby case, as sug-

gested by Justice Brennan's Kirby dissent.225

It also is clear that

the effect of Kirby is to restrict sharply the practical application of
the Wade ruling, since police ordinarily can arrange for pre-charge

lineups and thus bypass Wade.2 26 Nevertheless, it may well be that
224. In justifying the distinction drawn by Kirby as to the initiation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion stated:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism.
It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For
it is only then that the Government has committed itself to prosecute, and only
then that the adverse positions of Government and defendant have solidified.
406 U.S. at 689.
As I understand Justice Stewart's analysis, it was offered primarily as a justification for utilizing the initiation of "judicial criminal proceedings" as a starting point
for sixth amendment purposes generally rather than as a significant line of demarcation with respect to the suspect's need for counsel at lineups in particular. The
need at lineups would appear to be the same whether or not the prosecution has
begun. The police officer's view as to the probable guilt of an arrested, but still
uncharged, person often will not be substantially different from his view of a person
already charged. In any event, Wade seemed as concerned with "unintended" improper influences at the lineup as with any purposeful manipulation produced by
police attempts to "build a case." See 388 U.S. at 235-37.
Yet, accepting the premise that the need for counsel is often equivalent in the
post-indictment and pre-indictment lineup, it does not necessarily follow that appointment of counsel is constitutionally required in both situations. The sixth amendment, it can be argued, does not provide for counsel at every stage in which counsel's
assistance is helpful. Rather, by its history, language, and function, the amendment
sought to draw a starting point after which counsel's assistance is generally required
as an element of our adversary system. That point, Justice Stewart argues, is the
initiation of judicial criminal proceedings. Before that point, counsel may be constitutionaly required only if essential to the protection of some other constitutional
right, as in Miranda. Kirby obviously concluded that it was not so essential as to be
required to implement the right of confronting the eyewitness at trial. After the sixth
amendment starting point takes effect, however, assistance of counsel need not be
essential to a fair trial to be constitutionally required. Once the judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated, counsel is necessary at all "critical stages" of the proceeding; but a critical stage simply is one in which counsel's assistance will be helpful,
though not necessarily so important as to be required under the more rigorous standard of due process applicable before the sixth amendment takes effect. Cf. Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1970); 399 U.S. at 11 (Black, J., concurring). But
cf. 399 U.S. at 7 (describing the "critical stage" as one where "the presence of counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial"). For another
justification for the "starting point" imposed in Kirby, see note 226 infra.
225. 406 U.S. at 691, 696-700. Justice White, who dissented in Wade, also dissented in Kirby on the ground that Wade and Gilbert "govern this case." 406 U.S.
at 705. Prior to Kirby, most of the lower courts considering the issue had applied
Wade to pre-indictment lineups. See 406 U.S. at 704-05 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting citations).
226. Kirby held that the Wade ruling applies only to lineups conducted after
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the most basic objective of Wade largely continues to be achieved,
even though the Wade ruling today applies to only a small fraction
of all police lineups.
Wade stressed the unfairness of lineup-identification testimony
when, as was usually the case, there was no means of assuring that
the circumstances of the lineup could faithfully be recounted at trial
so that the jury could evaluate the identification in light of any sug-

gestiveness in the lineup procedure. 2

7

The Court also made this point

the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings." 406 U.S. at 688. Most
defendants are arrested without warrants and are placed in lineups prior to their
appearance before a magistrate-i.e., before a formal charge or a complaint has
been filed against them. Where the individual has been arrested pursuant to a warrant, the complaint will have been filed before his arrest, but the lineup still is
likely to be held prior to his first appearance before a magistrate. Arguably, Wade
also would not apply in that situation. Even though a complaint has been filed
in the process of obtaining a warrant, adversary judicial criminal proceedings may
be viewed as being initiated only after the accused is brought before a magistrate
on that complaint. See United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 20-22 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1977)
("judicial proceedings" held to have been initiated where defendant had been arrested,
"arraigned" on a warrant before a magistrate, and committed to jail). This starting
point would make sense from an administrative standpoint because counsel for the
indigent defendant ordinarily would not be appointed until the defendant has appeared before the magistrate.
The English apparently use a similar starting point with respect to counsel at
lineups. The Parade Rules provide that the "suspect should be informed that if
he so desires he may have his solicitor or friend present at the identification parade."
Home Office Circular on Identification Parades 1 10, reprinted in REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMIT-

TEE ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 158, 159 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the DEVLIN REPORT (for the committee chairman, Lord Devlin)].
See also 388 U.S. at 238 n.29 (1967) (noting the English practice as supporting
the Wade ruling). The Devlin Report states, however, that, for the overwhelming
majority of suspects, the solicitor has to be provided by legal aid, and if the "parade"
is arranged "before a suspect is brought before the magistrates," legal aid assistance
most often is unavailable. DEVLIN REPORT, supra 5.39. Accordingly, solicitors
are not provided for many lineups conducted before the defendant's first appearance,
notwithstanding the Parade Rules. The Devlin Report considered but rejected requiring counsel in all such cases:
It is sufficient to say that to ensure that a solicitor, to be paid out of the
Legal Aid Fund, is available whenever the police might reasonably want to
hold a parade, would mean an expensive, and maybe impracticable, extension
of the scheme. We consider it desirable that a suspect should always have
a solicitor representing him at a parade, but the evidence we have had about
the fair way in which parades are conducted by the police and the lack of
complaint about them does not lead us to conclude that it is an absolute necessity.
Id.
227. Indeed, the Court noted in Wade that "[Ijegislative or other regulations,
such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and
unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful
confrontation at trial may . . . remove the basis for regarding the stage as 'critical.'"
388 U.S. at 239 (footnote omitted). Justice Fortas, on the other hand, in a concurring opinion stated that, "[w]hile it is conceivable that legislation might provide a
meticulous lineup procedure which would satisfy constitutional requirements," he did
not agree "with the Court that this would 'remove the basis for regarding the [lineup]
stage as "critical."' " 388 U.S. at 262 n.* (emphasis original).
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in several cases recognizing the defendant's due process right to ex-

clude the results of lineups that were so suggestive as to make a
positive identification "all but inevitable. '2-8 As a result of Wade
and these due process cases, police training in administering lineups
has improved considerably. Unlike the area of search and seizure,
where it is hard to lay down specific rules for police conduct, uniform
lineup procedhres can readily be imposed. Police today make better
records of the lineup and follow regulations that are designed to pro)ride a fairer identification procedure.2 29 These improvements have
been instituted without regard to whether the lawyer is present, and

they are likely to continue even though Kirby eliminates, for most
228. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969). See also Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The standard applied
is whether, under the "totality-of the circumstances," the conduct of the identification
procedure was "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification" as to result in a denial of due process. 388 U.S. at 302.
229. The regulations are designed both to eliminate improper suggestion in lineups and to provide a record of the lineup. For examples, see PROJECT ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RULES:

EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICA-

(1973); Read, Lawyers at Lineups: ConstitutionalNecessity or Avoidable Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 339 (1969); Comment, No Panacea: Constitutional Supervision of Eyewitness Identification, 62 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 363 (1971);
Comment, Protection of an Accused at a Police Lineup, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SoC.
PROB. 345 (1970). Of course, the regulations are limited in their capacity to eliminate suggestiveness, as noted in Levine &Tapp, supra note 218, at 1084 n.32:
As Read's review of various police lineup procedures and the Columbia Journal
of Law and Social Problems' empirical survey of police regulations reveal, Wade
stimulated new efforts to formulate standards meeting criteria of "due process"
and "fairness." In the main these suggested procedures, though by no means
uniformly enforced or of equal caliber, guarantee the right to counsel and respond to the most obvious forms of abusive practice. For example, they typically advise that lineup participants be of generally the same age, sex, height,
weight and race, and some stipulate that they must wear similar clothing. These
regulations have probably somewhat improved the fairness and reliability of
lineup identifications. But they include only the most general references regarding the protection of the accused from suggestive influences, a basic goal of
the Wade decision. . . . For example, one of the best police department standards was adopted in New York City. T.O.P. 318, July 26, 1967. Rule No.
9 stipulates that "no suggestions, direct or indirect, may be communicated to
the witness or victim as to which member of the group is believed to be the
culprit or non-culprit." While such a regulation recognizes the problem of suggestibility, it fails to describe the nature of pre- and post-lineup suggestive effects
or to establish precise guidelines for coping with them.
While the newly developed regulations obviously suffer from such shortcomings and
others, it is unlikely that a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at a
lineup would cure those defects. The steps counsel may take at a lineup are likely
to be limited, and the possible presence of counsel is not likely to provide any further
incentive to develop better regulations. Cf. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
TION

PROCEDURE 209-12 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1974); MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra

note 12, at 620-22; Read, supra at 362-67. The most significant factor will be
the retention of a record that permits counsel at trial to reconstruct the lineup and
call the jurors' attention to elements of suggestiveness, and that record commonly
is available under the new regulations. But see note 231 infra.
The English have placed a similar emphasis upon retention of a record and improved police regulations rather than the presence of counsel. See DEVLIN REPORT,
supra note 226,
5.29-.82, 8.9-.20.
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cases, the possibility that a lawyer will be present.2 '0 I do not mean to
suggest that there is no added protection in having a lawyer

present;231 it should be acknowledged, however, that there has been
substantial progress in achieving the overall objective of Wade and

that this progress is likely to be continued notwithstanding Kirby.
A similar analysis is applicable to Ash,13 2 where the Burger Court
again limited the scope of Wade. Ash held that the Wade right to
counsel did not apply to a photo-identification procedure, even
though the procedure was conducted after the suspect had been indicted. The Court has long held that the sixth amendment requires
counsel only at a "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding, and the

Ash majority found that the photo-identification procedure was not
a critical stage. From the majority's viewpoint, the photo-identifica-

tion process did not contain the same elements that justified the
characterization of the post-charge lineup as a "critical stage' in Wade.
The majority stressed, in particular, that the defendant had no need
for counsel to advise him as to his own conduct since he did not participate in the photo-identification procedure, whereas he would of

course be a participant in a lineup. Also, counsel was not needed
to assist in reconstructing the photo-identification since all the

pictures used3in the procedure would be available for jury examina23
tion at trial.
Admittedly, as Justice Brennan's dissent in Ash noted, defense

counsers presence might be useful in determining whether there was
230. Of course, counsel may still attend even pre-charge lineups under some circumstances. It is not clear from Kirby that the police constitutionally could exclude
counsel who already was present and able to observe the lineup. Cf. J. ISRAEL
& W. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 332-34. Moreover, retained counsel or a public
defender may be invited to attend in key cases. Some prosecutors have suggested
that they prefer counsel to be present since the fact that counsel was present and
failed to object may offset in the jurors' minds any complaints at trial as to the
manner in which the lineup was held. Cf. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROcEDU E, supra note 229, at 210; DEVLiN REPORT, supra note 226, 5.44:
If deadlock is reached [as to proper conditions], the defence should submit
under protest which should be formally recorded. If there is to be challenge
at the trial, it will stand a much better chance of success if it is based on
a point taken at the time than upon one that may be said to have been thought
up after an identification has been made.
231. Counsel may be able to spot improprieties that are not in the record of
the lineup (e.g., comments to the witness), and some counsel may be able to act
aggressively to correct potential suggestiveness before the lineup is held. See Grano,
supra note 218, at 747. Also, it has been suggested that the mere presence of any
outside observer will reduce even unintentional bias. Levine & Tapp, supra note
218, at 1125.
232. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
233. This point was emphasized particularly by Justice Stewart in his separate
concurring opinion, 413 U.S. at 321, but was also stressed in Justice Blackmun's
opinion for the Court, 413 U.S. at 313-17. But compare Grano, supra note 218,
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a manipulation of the identification procedure through gestures or
statements by the police officer to the witness.284 However, the
photo-identification procedure obviously does not offer all of the
same opportunities for manipulation as are offered by a lineup that
is not photographed. Arguably, the "liberal" majority of the Warren
Court would have rejected this distinction and followed Justice Brennan's dissent in Ash. Yet, one cannot ignore the possibility that one
or more of those Justices might have rejected Justice Brennan's position in light of the administrative difficulties presented in applying
the right to counsel to an informal proceeding in which the defendant himself does not participate. 3 5 There may also have been concern as to whether a valid functional distinction could be drawn between a photo-identification conducted before the defendant had
been arrested, which would be acceptable without counsel under an
earlier Warren Court precedent, 236 and the photo-identification conat 761 & n.276 (arguing that ease of reconstruction was only an "afterthought" under
Justice Blackmun's analysis).
The Warren Court had noted in Wade that the "systematized or scientific analysis
of the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair and the like" was not
a critical stage because the accused could reconstruct what occurred at the testing
process through cross-examination. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28
(1967). The Ash opinion recognized that a photo-identification was distinguishable
from such scientific procedures, but concluded that, in light of the ease with which
a photo-identification could be reconstructed, trial confrontation still presented an
adequate substitute where the photo-identification procedure was conducted in the
absence of counsel. 413 U.S. at 315-16.
234. 413 U.S. at 326, 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also
noted other elements of suggestiveness-differences in the background or lighting
of the photographs or features of the persons photographed-that obviously would
be apparent from the record. The dissent's apparent assumption was that the lawyer,
if present, could assist in preventing the use of photographs containing such elements
of suggestiveness. To the same effect is Grano, supra note 218, at 747.
235. This was a position taken by Judge Friendly, who went beyond the Warren
Court in arguing against the admissibility of the showup in Stovall v. Denno, 355
F.2d 731, 742 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion), affd., 388 U.S. 293 (1967),
but nevertheless rejected the extension of Wade to the Ash situation. See United
States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), quoted with approval in Ash,
413 U.S. at 316-17. As Judge Friendly suggested, see 409 F.2d at 899-900, if counsel
were required for a photo-identification procedure, it would be difficult to distinguish
that procedure from other evidence-gathering procedures in which the defendant does
not participate, such as the post-indictment police interview of witnesses, that also
may be manipulated by the police officer through, for example, his gestures, suggestions, or tone of voice. Compare United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92, 101 (D.C.
Cir.), revd., 413 U.S. 300 (1972) (arguing that the interview is distinguishable from
the photo-identification because the prosecutor cannot introduce in direct evidence
the statement given by the witness to the police officer). But cf. California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (confrontation clause is not violated by admitting as
substantive evidence a witness' prior inconsistent statements to a police officer, so
long as the witness testifies at trial and is subject to full cross-examination).
236. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Simmons involved a prearrest, pre-indictment photo-identification of a suspect who was the focus of an investigation. The defendant there did not assert that he was deprived of his right
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Finally, assuming that Ash does represent a de-

parture from the Warren Court's viewpoint, the practical significance
of that departure must be viewed in light of alternative police procedures. If the majority had adopted the position advanced in the
Ash dissent, the police would still have retained considerable

capacity to avoid lawyer participation through other identification
procedures (e.g., the pre-arrest photo-identification and the post-

arrest, but pre-charge, lineup) that still would be acceptable consti37
tutionally without counsel.1
2.

Police Interrogation

Although the Burger Court's treatment of Wade probably con-

stitutes the Court's most substantial restriction of a Warren Court
precedent relating to police practices, the civil libertarian criticism
of the Court has more frequently concentrated on the Court's treat-

ment of another precedent involving police practices, Miranda v.
Arizona.238 The Miranda decision is the most highly publicized of

all the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions, and it is quite
understandable that the civil libertarians look to its continuing

vitality as a bellwether.

In Miranda, the Warren Court required

exclusion of a defendant's statement obtained through custodial interto counsel; he argued only that the identification procedure was so suggestive as
to violate due process. However, even before Kirby, the pre-arrest situation was
generally recognized as not within Wade under even its broadest reading. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1972), revd., 413 U.S.
300 (1973); United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1307 n.3 (3d Cir. 1970). Of
course, one ground for distinguishing the pre-arrest photo-identification in Simmons
from the post-indictment photo-identification in Ash is the absence of any formal
charge in Simmons, but that distinction would not apply to pre-arrest, post-indictment
photo-identifications of defendants not yet in custody. A possible basis for distinguishing that situation might be the need for an immediate identification in the
course of apprehending the defendant, cf. note 237 infra, but not all pre-arrest photoidentifications would require such promptness as to preclude the presence of "counsel" (particularly a "substitute counsel" appointed for that purpose only, cf. United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967)). Still another possibility may be the need
to avoid letting the suspect know that he is being sought, but that factor also would
not be present in many pre-arrest, post-indictment photo-identification situations.
But see Grano, supra note 218, at 771-72.
237. Of course, if the Ash dissent were combined with the Kirby dissent as the
prevailing law, the available alternatives that could be used without counsel would
be limited. One alternative that still would be available, but would present practical
difficulties, is the on-the-scene showup. Prior to Kirby, lower courts generally had
held that prompt on-the-scene identifications were not subject to the right-to-counsel
requirement under even a broad reading of Wade. See Grano, supra note 218, at
732 n.100.
238. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., Berlow, Undercutting Miranda: The Burger
Court Way with Suspects, 224 THE NATION 498 (1976); Hartman, supra note 33,
at 439-40; Miller, supra note 8, at 24 ('The Miranda v. Arizona landmark decision
"); Scheingold, supra note 7.
on the right to counsel is being chipped away. ....

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1373 1976-1977

1374

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 75:1319

rogation unless he had been informed of his constitutional rights and
of the possible adverse use of the statement (the so-called "Miranda
warnings") and had voluntarily waived those rights before making
the statement. Although the value of the Miranda ruling in effectively protecting the suspect's self-incrimination privilege is debatable,
the decision has a symbolic quality that extends far beyond its practical impact upon police interrogation methods.
As noted previously,2 39 a major element of the Miranda decision
-the equal treatment of the indigent-has not suffered at the hands
of the Burger Court. Other aspects of the decision have, perhaps,
been treated less well. Yet, the fact remains that Miranda still is
the law of the land. Moreover, while its ramifications arguably have
been narrowed, the Court has not cast doubt upon its basic premise
that the defendant's right against self-incrimination applies to police
custodial interrogation and not just to judicial compulsion of testimony by the threat of contempt.2 40 The Burger Court decisions
most frequently noted by critics as undermining the Miranda ruling
-Harris v. New York, 2 4' Michigan v. Tucker,24 2 Michigan v.
Mosley,243 and Oregon v. Mathiason2*4-all have accepted that basic
assumption.
Harris permitted the use of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda to impeach the defendant's trial testimony. In the Tucker
case, although the Court dealt with a special situation relating to
retroactive application of Miranda, it clearly raised the possibility that
the testimony of "tainted witnesses"-.e., witnesses who were discovered because of a statement obtained in violation of Mirandawould not be excluded from evidence. 245 In the Mosley decision,
the Court held that a second interrogation session that occurred after
a suspect initially refused to make a statement did not violate
Mirandaunder the facts of that case. In the recent Mathiason case,
the Court noted that not all interrogation conducted in a police sta239. See text at notes 65-84 supra.
240. See 384 U.S. at 459-67. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443
(1974); Kamisar, supra note 4, at 68-76; Unofficial Transcript of Oral Arguments in
Miranda and Companion Cases, reprinted in MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note 12, at 538.
241. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
242. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
243. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
244. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
245. The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, discussed in note 348 infra and accompanying text, generally calls for the exclusion of evidence derived from a constitutional violation. See United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying "fruits doctrine" to evidence obtained from a Miranda violation). But cf.
note 252 infra.
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tion is necessarily "custodial interrogation" (the only type of ques-

tioning subject to Miranda).
While none of these cases adopted the expansive view of
Miranda that the civil libertarians would have preferred, it also is
true that Tucker, Mathiason, and perhaps even Mosley did not significantly detract from the basic Miranda ruling.24 6 The Court's conclusion in Mathiason that the suspect there had not been in "custody"
might well have been reached by the members of the Miranda ma-

jority themselves.247

The suspect voluntarily came to the police

station after a police officer requested that they meet;248 he was im-

mediately informed that he was not under arrest; and he was allowed
to leave following the close of the interview, even though he admitted committing the crime. While Justice Marshall dissented, his

major point was that the Court should go beyond the custodial interrogation situation covered in Miranda and reach other interroga-

tion situations as well. 49
246. This is even more clearly the case as to Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341 (1976), another Burger Court decision sometimes criticized as undermining
Miranda. Indeed, the Warren Court might well have accepted Beckwith. In Beckwith the Court held that full Miranda warnings were not needed since the defendant
was questioned at his home by Internal Revenue Service agents and had not been
placed under arrest. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that Miranda applied since he was clearly the "focus" of the investigation. In holding that Miranda
substituted a new starting point of "custodial interrogation" for the "focus" standard
of Escobedo, the Court adopted an interpretation of Miranda that had been advanced
by such staunch supporters of Miranda as Chief Judge Bazelon (who wrote the lower
court opinion in Beckwith) and Professor Kamisar. See United States v. Beckwith,
510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affd., 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CoNsTrruM oN 335, 339 (ICLE Criminal Law Library 1968).
Justice Marshall concurred
separately in Beckwith on the ground that the partial warnings given by the IRS
agents were sufficient "under the circunstances of this case." 425 U.S. at 348, 349.
Justice Brennan dissented, however, on the ground that the petitioner's "practical
compulsion to respond to questions about his tax returns is comparable to the psychological pressures described in Miranda." 425 U.S. at 349-50.
247. Mathiason was a per curiam ruling, rendered without oral argument, that rejected, as having "read Miranda too broadly," an Oregon Supreme Court opinion excluding defendant's confession. 429 U.S. at 493. In addition to the facts cited in
the text following this note, it also should be noted that the defendant was a parolee
at the time of the interrogation. The significance of that factor under the majority
ruling is unclear. The Oregon Supreme Court's opinion was not based upon defendant's parolee status, and that opinion accordingly did not explore the restraints imposed upon the parolee under local law. Justice Stevens, dissenting on the ground
that the case should not be decided summarily, placed particular stress on the need
for argument to consider the possible impact of the defendant's parole status. 429
U.S. at 499-500.
248. The officer initially asked for a meeting at a convenient place. When the
defendant expressed no preference as to location, the officer suggested they meet at
the station, which was about two blocks from defendant's apartment. 429 U.S. at
493.
249. Justice Marshall noted initially that he did not believe that the record before
the Court permitted an affirmative finding that the defendant was not "'taken into
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Tucker, on the facts presented, also can be squared with
Miranda. The issue before the Court concerned the application of

the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine 250 to the testimony of a witness discovered as a result of police interrogation that had violated

the Miranda requirements, but had been conducted before the
Miranda case was decided. The Court held that, in light of the
special problems raised by the application of Miranda to pre-Miranda

interrogations, 51 it was inappropriate to expand the impact of retroactive application by excluding the witness' testimony as well as the
defendant's statement..25

However, language in Justice Rehnquist's

majority opinion suggests that the Burger Court might not extend the
poisoned-fruits doctrine to the tainted witness even where retroactive
application is not involved. 253 Assuming the Court eventually takes
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way."' 429 U.S. at
496 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). He argued that
further facts were needed as to whether defendant had an "objectively reasonable
belief" that he was not free to leave during questioning. 429 U.S. at 496. But Justice Marshall went on to state that "[m]ore fundamentally," he could not agree that
Miranda had set a stopping point; the Miranda ruling was "limited to custodial interrogations" because the "Mirandacases raised only this 'narrow issue.'" 429 U.S. at
497 (quoting Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 345). Justice Marshall contended that, even if
the defendant were not in custody, the coercive elements were "so pervasive" as to
require some Miranda-type warnings, although not necessarily the full set of warnings. 429 U.S. at 498 & n.3. Justice Brennan, dissenting separately, simply stated
that the case should be set for oral argument. 429 U.S. at 496.
250. See note 245 supra.
251. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), held Miranda applicable to
criminal cases in which trial was commenced after the date of the Miranda decision,
thus including some cases in which the interrogation had been conducted before
Miranda was decided. Compare Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Katz
ruling does not apply to electronic surveillance conducted before Katz even though
the trial commenced after Katz). See also Beytagh, supra note 117, at 1565 (emphasis added):
Had the Court thought more carefully about the consequences of its approach
[in Johnson], it is doubtful that it would have applied these decisions [Escobedo
and Miranda] to cases where trials were begun after they were decided. A
sounder approach, it was soon recognized [e.g., Desist], would have focused on
when violationsof these rules occurred.
252. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the Tucker judgment on the ground that Johnson v. New Jersey, discussed in note 251 supra, did
not make Miranda "applicable to this case" since Johnson involved admission only
of the statement given by the defendant. 417 U.S. at 453, 454. The primary distinction between the concurring opinion and the majority opinion may have related
to the controlling authority of Miranda, aside from retroactivity problems, as to the
exclusion of the witness' testimony. The concurring opinion assumed that Miranda
itself required exclusion of secondary evidence derived from a Miranda violation,
while the opinion for the Court may have assumed that Miranda left that issue open.
See 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 466, 468 n.23 (1974). Justice Douglas dissented, 417 U.S.
at 461, arguing that Miranda applied and required exclusion of the witness' testimony
as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
253. Thus, the Court noted that the police interrogation in Tucker "did not
abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
but departed only from the prophylactic standard laid down . . . in Miranda," and
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that position, 25 4 would it necessarily be inconsistent with Miranda,
especially where the police interrogation was not designed specifi-

cally to obtain the names of witnesses?

Some very "liberal" judges

have acknowledged that the extension of the poisoned-fruits doctrine
to subsequently discovered witnesses who willingly cooperate with
the police is at least a very difficult question.2 55 While the witness

may have been found through the defendant's statement, the possibility always exists that he might otherwise have come to the attention of the police if they had reached the point of methodically tracking down all persons who had even the remotest link to the victim
or the accused.25 6 Indeed, even where the witness could not have

been found by the most intensive investigation, the possibility remains that the witness eventually might have come forward on his

own, perhaps in response to a general police request for assistance.
that the deterrent purposes of exclusionary rules are not served by extending the
reach of the rule where official action was pursued in "complete good faith," as in
the Tucker case. See 417 U.S. at 446-48. Notwithstanding these statements, the
ruling clearly was tied to the "significant" factor that the "officer's failure to advise
respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in
Miranda." 417 U.S. at 447. Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion, argued
that, without regard to retroactivity, the Court should "not extend . . . [Miranda's]
prophylactic scope to bar the testimony of third persons even though they have been
identified by means of admissions that are themselves inadmissible under Miranda."
417 U.S. 460, 461. However, Justice White's opinion was not joined by any other
member of the Court.
254. Lower courts have varied in their view of Tucker as a "signpost" for future
developments. See, e.g., Hudson v. Cannon, 529 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1976)
(panel including then-Judge Stevens) ("We can envisage that the balancing (as performed in Tucker) of the social interest in trustworthy evidence against the needs
for deterrence of improper police conduct might cause the Supreme Court to allow
the admission of third party testimonial fruits of interrogation of an accused in
custody without Miranda warnings in a case where, unlike Tucker, the event occurred
after the Miranda decision," but it is "improbable" that the same view would be taken
as to "statements obtained by an Escobedo type denial of an accused's Sixth Amendment rights."); United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 34-35 & n.9 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976) (Tucker "does not indicate that the Supreme Court is
about to undertake a sweeping reformulation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule," as Tucker was "grounded" on the retroactivity problem presented there); 531
F.2d at 38 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (Tucker as a signpost indicating likely
admissibility of "tainted witness" testimony even where derived from a fourth amendment violation); Rhodes v. State, 91 Nev. 17, 530 P.2d 1199 (1975) (Tucker reasoning suggests admissibility of witness' testimony and physical evidence derived from
Miranda violation that occurred after Miranda decision, provided confession was not
involuntary).
255. Consider the dissent of Judge Mosk in People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541,
558, 450 P.2d 865, 876, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 412 (1969), and the positions taken by
Judge Fuld in People v. Dentine, 21 N.Y.2d 700, 702, 234 N.E.2d 462, 463, 287
N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1967) (dissenting opinion), and People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d
94, 268 N.E.2d 778, 320 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1971). See generally the article by Judge
Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 32 (1967).
256. Cf. People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d 94, 101, 268 N.E.2d 778, 782, 320 N.Y.S.

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1377 1976-1977

1378

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:1319

Mosley is similar to Tucker in that the decision was based on
a rather unusual situation. The Court in Mosley upheld a second
interrogation session after the defendant initially had refused to

waive his rights and speak with officers. In rejecting the defendant's
claim that Mirandaprohibited a second attempt to obtain his waiver,
the Court stressed the particular facts surrounding the second interrogation in Mosley. The second interrogation related to a separate
crime and was initiated by an officer who apparently had not been
aware of the defendant's initial refusal to cooperate. The officer had
given complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second session,

and the defendant in no way indicated that he did not want to discuss
the second crime. 257 Admittedly, Justice White, in a concurring
opinion, advanced an interpretation of Mirandathat generally would
allow repeated attempts to interrogate following an initial refusal, but
his opinion was not joined by any of the other justices.258
Unlike Mosley, Tucker, or Mathiason, Harrisv. New York,2"' the
impeachment case, clearly did impose a significant limit upon the

impact of Miranda.2 0

From the prosecutor's viewpoint, the conse-

2d 39, 45 (1971) (search warrant based on statement of a witness discovered through
an illegal wiretap was not invalid where "it was probable or at least possible that
lawful surveillance of the suspected defendant, without the information acquired by
the wiretap, would have led the police to the witness in any event").
257. 423 U.S. at 104-06.
258. 423 U.S. at 107 (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, dissented. 423 U.S. at 111. Justice Brennan rejected the Court's view of
the facts of the case and its treatment of Miranda, although he did accept the majority's point that Miranda does not impose "an absolute ban on resumption of questioning 'at any time or place on any subject.'" 423 U.S. at 115. The dissent concluded that "[tioday's distortion of Miranda's constitutional principles can be viewed
only as yet another step in the erosion and, I suppose, ultimate overruling of
Miranda's enforcement of the privilege against self-incrimination." 423 U.S. at 112.
259. 401 U.S. 222 (1971), discussed in text following note 244 supra.
260. Harris involved a statement obtained in a situation where interrogation was
not preceded by a warning as to defendant's right to appointed counsel. See 401 U.S.
at 224. In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), Harris was held to permit defendant's impeachment by a statement obtained after he had been warned of his Miranda
rights and had asserted those rights by asking for a lawyer.
There are several limits on the scope of the Harris-Hass rule. The Harris
opinion emphasized that the statement involved there was obtained in violation of
Miranda, but was not claimed to be involuntary. The Court noted that, of course,
the defendant's statements must satisfy "legal standards" governing "trustworthiness"
to be used for impeachment. 401 U.S. at 224. These comments have been viewed as
indicating that involuntary confessions may not be used for impeachment. See J.
ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 285; Oral Argument, Harris v. New York,
quoted in Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 8, at 1206 n.42 (counsel for the state argued
that, although not all involuntary confessions are untrustworthy, involuntary confessions should be treated as a class as inherently untrustworthy and barred from use
for impeachment purposes). Further, Harris permits use of the statement obtained
in violation of Miranda only to respond to possible defense perjury. Thus, the statement may be used only to respond to inconsistent statements in defendant's testimony. If the defendant's direct testimony is consistent with the statement (e.g.,
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quences of a Miranda violation may be softened considerably by the
ability to use the defendant's statement for impeachment purposes.
A major value in obtaining a statement from a defendant, even
where the defendant does not acknowledge commission of the offense, is the discovery provided regarding the defendant's likely trial
testimony.2 6 ' While the defendant may shift somewhat from the explanation in his statement, the statement's availability for impeachment should keep the defendant's testimony close to that original explanation. Of course, if the statement is incriminating, then the
Harrisruling is likely to have even more value from the prosecution's
viewpoint. It may place the defendant in a position where he will
be forced to take the chance involved in not testifying at all. If he
takes the stand, the statement surely will be damaging notwithstanding the judge's admonition to the jury that they can consider the incriminating admissions only as to impeachment and not as substantive evidence.
Harris thus may be quite significant from the prosecutor's point
of view. It is the police, however, who are largely responsible for
determining how Miranda will be applied, and their immediate objectives focus more on justifying a decision to go forward with the
prosecution than on the trial techniques eventually used to win the
case. An admissible incriminating statement is of immense value
in building the prima facie case needed to gain approval of the prosecution. A statement obtained in violation of Miranda, on the other
hand, is likely to be given very little weight in determining whether
a prosecution should be carried forward. The primary emphasis at
this point must be on the adequacy of the prima facie case needed
to get the case to the jury, not on certain tactical advantages that
may be available if the defendant is forced to present a defense.
Thus, from the police viewpoint, Harris does not substantially alter
the impact of a Mirandaviolation.
It thus seems likely that, insofar as police compliance with
Miranda is determined by the officer's calculated evaluation of the
costs of violation, Harris should not influence significantly the offiwhere the direct testimony and statement relate to separate events), the statement
may not be used and the prosecutor may not attempt to render it relevant by interjecting matters relating to the statement on cross-examination. See J. ISRAEL & W.
LAFAvE, supra note 20, at 285-86. Finally, in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),
Harris was limited to impeachment by a statement actually made by the defendant;
the Court held that defendant's post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings
could not be used for impeachment.
261. Cf. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv.
293, 315 (1960).
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cer's decision.262 Of course, Harriscould have a substantial impact
if it led prosecutors and others involved in police training programs

to place less emphasis on compliance with Miranda, since police adherence to Miranda probably is influenced far more by the general
thrust of that training than by calculated cost-benefit evaluations
made by officers in individual cases. I am not aware, however,
of any such change in training programs, and the continuing symbolic
and practical significance of Miranda makes it most unlikely that
Harrisalone would encourage such a change. 2 3
Certainly, even with Harris, the recent cases interpreting Mi-

randa do not justify claims that the Burger Court is turning back
the clock and returning to the limited restraints on custodial interrogation that existed prior to the 1960s.20 4 Such cries are particularly
262. Dershowitz and Ely suggest that officers may adopt the tactic of "try it
legally-if you fail, try it illegally"-that is, give the Miranda warnings and hope
for an admissible statement, but press on to obtain a statement usable for impeachment purposes if a statement is not forthcoming. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 8,
at 1220 n.90. Such a tactic would be most dangerous to the success of the prosecution in light of the currently accepted prohibition against any use of statements that
are involuntary. See note 260 supra and note 283 infra. It is not suggested in even
the more sophisticated instructional material on police interrogation. See, e.g., C.
O'HA A, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 108-58 (4th ed. 1976); C. VAN
METER, PRINCIPLES OF POLICE INTERROGATION (1973); Interrogation and the Miranda
Warnings (film produced by the Institute for Community Development and the School
of Police Administration and Public Safety, Michigan State University).
263. Consider, for example, the limited discussion (or complete lack of discussion) of Harris in typical texts used in police training or criminal justice programs.
See, e.g., A. COFFEY, E. ELDEFONSO, & W. HARTINGER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TIE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND PROCESS 325-35 (1974) (no discussion of Harris);
F. DAY, D. NEDRUD, & M. OBERTO, LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK IN MICHIGAN
(1975) (no discussion); C. O'HARA, supra note 262 (no discussion); G. STOCKEY,
EVIDENCE FOR THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 116-17 (2d ed. 1974) (limited discussion); P. WESTON & K. WELLS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 183-99 (2d ed. 1974)
(no discussion).
264. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), also should be noted. The
Court there indicated that the harmless error rule, see text at note 116 supra, could
be applied to the introduction of an illegally obtained confession. The confession
improperly admitted in Milton had been obtained in violation of Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), discussed in text at note 93 supra and at note 265 infra,
but the Court's opinion suggests that the harmless error rule also would apply to a
statement obtained in violation of Miranda. While Milton has been sharply criticized, see, e.g., Miller, supra note 8, the extension of the harmless error rule to an
improperly admitted confession was based on a Warren Court precedent, Harrington
v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). Harringtonheld (per Douglas, J.) that violation
of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), discussed in text at note 92 supra,
in the admission of a co-defendant's confession damaging to the petitioner constituted
harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence against the petitioner aside from
that confession. Moreover, the dissenters in Milton did not quarrel with extension
of the harmless error rule to the admission of illegally obtained but voluntary confessions. Rather, they questioned the Court's assumption that the particular confession in question was only "cumulative" in light of the other confessions that were
properly admitted in evidence. See also note 266 infra. A Warren Court majority
might well have agreed with the dissenters' view of the facts in Milton but the case
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ill-founded when one recalls that Miranda is not the only major
Warren Court decision dealing with interrogation.

Following the

presentation of charges against the defendant, he also has the protection of the sixth amendment right to counsel.

In Massiah,2 65 the

Court relied upon that right in holding invalid an informant's questioning of an indicted defendant; since the defendant did not know
he was speaking to a police agent, he had no way of knowing that

he had a right (or need) to consult with counsel before making a
statement.2 66 In Brewer v. Williams,28 7 the Burger Court applied
Massiah to a case in which the defendant had been told of his right
to counsel, but there was no clear showing (as the majority viewed
the facts) that the defendant had voluntarily waived that right be-

fore making an incriminating statement. 2 8

The Court's insistence

certainly did not establish a broad precedent that was contrary to the views of the
Warren Court. See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), where Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and Black all agreed to the application of the harmless
error rule to the denial of the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing. The other
major harmless error decision of the Burger Court, Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427
(1972), is similar in significance to Milton.
265. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), discussed in text at notes 93
& 221 supra.
266. Following Massiah, in Milton v. Wainwright, discussed in note 264 supra,
the Court had noted that it need not decide whether a post-indictment, pretrial confession made to a police officer posing as a fellow prisoner had been obtained in
violation of Massiah, since introduction of the confession had constituted harmless
error. 407 U.S. at 372. Justice Stewart's dissent, while disagreeing on the harmless
error point, was especially critical of the Court's failure to recognize the sixth amendment violation. See 407 U.S. at 379-82 (Stewart, J., dissenting). If one accepts the
dissent's premise that the Milton majority stretched harmless error to avoid deciding
the right-to-counsel issue, it appears that, in light of Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct.
1232 (1977), discussed in notes 267-70 inlra and accompanying text, the majority's
difficulty in Milton was not with the continuing validity of Massiah but with its
retroactive application to the Milton trial, which had been litigated six years before
Massiah was decided.
267. 97 S.Ct. 1232 (1977).
268. The Court noted that the strict standard for waiver of right to counsel, as
developed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), was applicable to an alleged waiver of counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings.
97 S. Ct. at 1242. It noted that while the defendant Williams had been informed
of his right to counsel, there was not sufficient indication that he had voluntarily relinquished that right in making an incriminating statement while traveling in a police
car. The Court stressed (1) that Williams had asserted his right initially by obtaining counsel, (2) that he had been advised by counsel not to make statements, (3)
that he had told the officers escorting him that he would tell them the whole story
after seeing counsel upon his arrival at their destination, (4) that one of the officers
nevertheless had made a statement designed to encourage Williams to furnish incriminating information as to the location of his victim's body, and (5) that the officer did not "preface this effort by telling Williams that he had a right to the
presence of a lawyer, and made no effort at all to ascertain whether Williams wished
to relinquish that right." 97 S. Ct. at 1242-43. Justice Marshall in a concurring
opinion, 97 S. Ct. at 1243, suggested the possibility that the officer had intentionally
sought to violate Williams' sixth amendment rights. Justice Powell's concurring
opinion stressed that the officer's statement constituted "a skillful and effective form
of interrogation" in a setting conducive to "psychological coercion." 97 S. Ct. at
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upon applying a most rigorous standard as to the establishment
of waiver certainly indicates that Massiah is "alive and well." Indeed, even the dissenters in Brewer did not question the basic
premise of Massiah.2 69
The true concern of civil libertarians, I suggest, relates not so
much to what the Burger Court has done in the area of police interrogation as to what they fear it might do in the future. In Brewer
v. Williams, twenty-two state attorneys general asked the Court to
overrule MirandaY0° While the Court found no need to reach that
issue,2 71 the dissenting opinions suggested that several of the Justices
might give serious consideration to overruling the Warren Court landmark. Justice Blackmun's dissent, for example, described Mirandaas
1245-46. Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion noted that the police had promised
the attorney that they would not question Williams while escorting him on the trip,
and in Justice Stevens' view the "State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise."
97 S. Ct. at 1247-48.
Dissenting on the waiver issue, Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist, stressed (1) that Williams had repeatedly been informed of his right to
the assistance of counsel and his right not to respond to questioning, (2) that there
had been a considerable lapse of time between Williams' statement and the officer's
suggestion that Williams assist the officer in locating the body of his victim, (3)
that there was a perfectly rational reason for Williams to want to reveal the nearby
location of the body, and (4) that there was no evidence that the officer's earlier request, if it did influence Williams at all, had overborne his free will and had led to
his decision to relinquish his right to counsel in order to assist the officers. See 97
S. Ct. at 1255-58. Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion also contended that a
valid waiver had been established. 97 S. Ct. at 1248, 1249.
269. Although four Justices dissented in Brewer, three (Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and White) joined in dissenting opinions that indicate that they clearly had no
difficulty with Massiah's recognition of a defendant's right to counsel during interrogation. They contended only that the defendant, who was fully aware of that right,
had waived it. See 97 S. Ct. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting); 97 S. Ct. at 1259
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger's dissent concentrated primarily on
the point that per se exclusion of evidence should not be required even if there is
a constitutional violation, and therefore the Chief Justice presumably would not accept Massiah insofar as it automatically requires exclusion of statements obtained in
violation of the right to counsel. See 97 S. Ct. at 1248.
270. Justice Blackmun characterized the request of the states as follows: "The
State of Iowa, and 21 States and others, as amicis curiae, strongly urge that this
Court's procedural (as distinguished from constitutional) ruling in Miranda v.
Arizona . . . be re-examined and overruled." 97 S. Ct. at 1259 (dissenting opinion). Justice Blackmun's reference obviously is to the amici curiae brief of the
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement and the National District Attorneys Association, joined by 21 states. As I read that brief, it does not request that Miranda
be overruled in the sense that Miranda warnings no longer be required, but overruled
only in the sense that a Miranda violation no longer require automatic exclusion of
evidence. The brief suggests that the Court should consider the following factors in
determining whether admission of a confession obtained in violation of Miranda
should require reversal of a conviction: (1) the reprehensible nature of the crime,
(2) the overwhelming evidence of guilt, (3) the fact that a successful retrial will be
"difficult if not impossible," and (4) the fact that "the conduct of the authorities was
not in any way oppressive." See Brief for Amici Curiae at 3-11.
271. 97 S. Ct. at 1239.
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a "procedural (as distinguished from constitutional) ruling." 7 Such
a characterization arguably places Mirandain a more precarious position: to overturn it would not be to reject a basic constitutional ruling, but rather to reject only a previous Court's efforts to devise common law rules to supplement the basic constitutional right. Similarly,
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Brewer suggests a possible basis for
overturning Miranda in arguing that the exclusionary sanction should
not apply to police conduct that produces reliable evidence and is
not egregious. Under this view, if the Miranda warnings were not
needed to ensure the voluntariness of a defendant's statement in a
particular case, failure to give the warnings might not require exclusion of the statement.2 73
Notwithstanding these suggestions in the Brewer dissents, I seriously doubt whether a majority of the Court would be willing to overrule Miranda directly. Even though they may agree that Miranda
was incorrectly decided as an initial matter, the Justices are not likely
to reach out and flatly overrule a prior decision if they determine
that there is no significant law enforcement "need" for such direct
action. The police officers with whom I have spoken generally acknowledge that announcement of the Miranda warnings causes little
difficulty if the warnings requirement is limited to interrogation of
arrested persons at the police station or in similar settings (e.g., a
patrol car). Difficulties have arisen primarily in situations involving
questioning "on the street."274 In those cases, it is difficult to determine at what point the interrogation becomes custodial and thus reOf course, the warnings could be given
quires Mirandawarnings.2 7
routinely in all instances of street contact, but the warnings then
272. 97 S. Ct. at 1259; see note 270 supra. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974), noting that the "protective guidelines" of Miranda are designed to "supplement" the self-incrimination privilege and that "these procedural
safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to ensure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."
273. Cf. George, From Warren to Burger to Chance: Future Trends in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 253, 265 (1976) (advancing a
similar analysis with respect to the exclusion of derivative evidence obtained from a
Mirandaviolation).
274. See generally LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 40 (1968). I include in this category
the interrogation of temporarily detained persons at their homes, place of business,
or even while sitting briefly in a police vehicle. See, e.g., the conflicting approaches
of People v. Pantoja, 28 Mich. App. 681, 184 N.W.2d 762 (1970), and People v.
Gilbert, 21 Mich. App. 442, 175 N.W.2d 547 (1970).
275. See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 579-85 (collecting
cases).
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would often convey the impression that the contact was far more serious than it in fact was.
On the other hand, police can easily identify what constitutes
"custodial interrogation" where that concept is limited to questioning

at the police station or a similar setting.270 Also, in such a setting
the message conveyed by the warnings is not one that concerns the
police: the suspect ordinarily has been arrested and clearly recog-

nizes that his situation is "serious." Indeed, the message of Miranda
is one so frequently repeated in television dramas and actual postarrest procedures that it is something the arrested person has come to

expect. One of the problems the Court must face in reexamining
Miranda is whether it can now tell the police that they need not give
warnings that the American people have come to expect as a standard element of the rights granted to the individual. There appears

to be little value in eliminating such a symbol where, from the viewpoint of efficient law enforcement, the true difficulty with the warnings requirement is simply the lack of a clear and properly restricted
description of those situations in which the warnings must be
given.27 7 That description can easily be established by tying the con276. Of course, there remains an issue as to whether the person is in custody
when he has not been arrested and has appeared at the police station at the request
of the police. *See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977), discussed in
text at notes 247-49 supra. However, this situation, which usually involves interrogation by detectives, can be handled with comparatively little difficulty under current
standards. A police policy of automatically giving the warnings in such cases would
not cause the difficulties that would be presented if patrol officers were required to
give the warnings every time they questioned a suspicious person on the street. Cf.
LAw ENFORCEMENT EDUCATION SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATE OF MAINE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S MANUAL, IV-A6 (1975) (advising

that warnings be given in all "police station or vehicle interrogation" situations unless
"the individual is clearly there voluntarily").
277. Consider in this connection the following comments on lower court applications of Mirandaby Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger:
The seeming anxiety of judges to protect every accused person from every consequence of his voluntary utterances is giving rise to myriad rules, sub-rules,
variations and exceptions which even the most alert and sophisticated lawyers
and judges are taxed to follow. Each time judges add nuances to these "rules"
we make it less likely that any police officer will be able to follow the guidelines we lay down.
Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
It might be argued that the symbolic impact of Miranda constitutes a substantial
basis in itself for overruling that decision even though its application can be readily
handled by the police. This argument would be premised on the claim "that whether
or not the police and prosecutors have actualy been handicapped, the decisions have
contributed crucially to an easy, permissive climate in which responsible elements
have been demoralized and criminals have been encouraged to feel that they could
'get away with it.'" F. GRAAM, supra note 6, at 279. To help eliminate that "permissive climate," the argument would continue, the symbol of Miranda should be
overturned. If the current Court had desired to move in that direction, it certainly
could have done so some time ago. The past approach of a majority of the Court
in dealing with police practices suggests that, in determining whether to retain
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cept of custodial interrogation to questioning of the police-station
2 78
type, such as that involved in Miranda and Brewer.
Of course, the required warning is only one aspect of Miranda.

The prosecution must establish not only that the warnings were
given, but also that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights before
making his statement. As cases like Mosley and Brewer indicate,

it is with respect to proof of waiver that the greatest pressure is likely
to emerge for modification of Miranda.2 70

Yet, considerable leeway

can be granted in this area without overturning the core of the
Miranda ruling.

If the sixth amendment problem had not been in-

volved, the admission in Brewer, for example, could easily have been
Miranda, the Court would be far more concerned with the difficulties involved in administering Miranda than with speculation as to the impact of that decision upon permissive attitudes in society.
It also has been suggested that, even on the pragmatic level, which is the analysis
most likely to interest the Court, a case can be made for eliminating Miranda. This
argument is based on the premise that courts are now spending more time "trying
the police as to whether or not the Miranda warnings had been given" than trying
the issue of guilt or innocence. F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 291, 290-92. The result
of Miranda, the argument continues, is a tremendous backlog of cases, carrying with
it "the high cost of making innocent defendants wait that long for vindication-and
of leaving the guilty ones free to raise their lawyers and bondsmen's fees by committing more crimes." F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 290 (citing comments by Chief
Justice Warren). However, even if one accepts the assumption that the Court's decisions of the 1960s contributed substantially to delay, Miranda is not a primary culprit. Even if Miranda did not exist, many of the same confessions would be challenged on voluntariness grounds. Confessions are so crucial that a defense lawyer
who is considering going to trial will certainly attempt to suppress the confession so
long as some ground for suppression (whether it be involuntariness or Miranda) exists.
278. Accepting this position would not require rejection of Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324 (1969). In Orozco, four police officers, two detectives and two uniformed
officers, entered defendant's boardinghouse room (apparently without knocking) at
4:00 a.m. and immediately proceeded to question him. The majority held Miranda
applicable, discounting the location of the questioning and stressing that the defendant was "in custody." Justices White and Stewart dissented. '394 U.S. at 328
(White, J., dissenting). The special facts in Orozco-the number of officers involved, the time of entry, and the likelihood that Orozco had been startled by their
entry (the majority noted that the officers had been told he was asleep, although the
dissent claimed he was awake when entry was made)-separate Orozco from the
typical case involving questioning in a household or on the street even after the person has been notified of his arrest. In addition, see the state court opinion, Orozco
v. State, 428 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (noting that the house had been
surrounded by a uniformed squad, but not indicating whether Orozco had been aware
of their presence). Also, the questioning in Orozco involved more than a single question aimed at determining whether the arrested person was armed. See People v.
Ramos, 17 Mich. App. 515, 170 N.W.2d 189 (1969); State v. Lane, 77 Wash. 2d
860, 467 P.2d 304 (1970).
Of course, if Orozco is read more broadly to include questioning in any location
after the officer has decided to put the person under arrest (or after the person could
reasonably anticipate he was under arrest), then the Orozco decision would not be
consistent with the limitation upon Miranda suggested in the text.
279. "The issue of waiver under Miranda will, in time, become the most dominant issue." F. ImnAu, J.THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL, & G. STARKMAN, CASES
AND COMMENTS ON CRuMINAL PRocEDuRE 428 (1974) [hereinafter cited as INBAU].
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admitted without overruling Miranda. Defendant Williams' response to the officer's urging that he locate the body of his victim
could readily be viewed as a voluntary waiver by a man who had
been repeatedly warned of his rights and had been subjected to no
more than a short plea for cooperation by the officer's "Christian
burial" speech. 80 If a majority of the Court believes there is a need
to respond affirmatively to law enforcement arguments of the type

presented by twenty-two state attorneys general in Brewer (and it
should be noted that the majority there, in excluding Williams' confession, certainly did not respond affirmatively to such arguments),2 81
it could most effectively meet these demands by holding that the concept of a "voluntary" waiver is not limited to an immediate and spontaneous relinquishment of rights following announcement of the
Miranda warnings. Thus, a waiver would not be invalid simply because the officer briefly urged the defendant to confess, explained the
state of the evidence against him, or offered him a second opportunity
to make a statement after the first was refused.2 8 2 If such a position
were taken, the Court would have met, in large part, the prosecutors'
objections to Miranda. Yet there would be no need to modify most
of the procedural safeguards announced in that case.28 3
280. The reference here is to the officer's request for the defendant's cooperation,
made in the police car while escorting the defendant between Davenport and Des
Moines, Iowa. The officer noted that once snow fell that night it would be difficult
to find the body of the victim, that the victim's parents were entitled to a "Christian
burial for the little girl," and that it clearly would be best to stop and locate the body
during the trip to Des Moines rather than to try to "come back out after a snow
storm and possibly not being [sic] able to find it at all." 97 S. Ct. at 1236.
281. The majority in Brewer adopted a rather rigorous view of waiver as applied
to a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. See note 268 supra and accompanying text. It is possible, however, that the majority might grant the prosecution
more leeway in establishing waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. Cf.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), discussed in the text following note 256
supra.
282. Lower courts generally have held that an explicit, affirmative statement of
waiver is not required. See Bird v. United States, 397 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967); State v. Kremens, 52 N.J.
303, 245 A.2d 313 (1968). However, once the defendant indicates that he does not
want to talk, any attempt to get him to change his mind often has been viewed as
rendering a waiver involuntary. See INnAu, supra note 279, at 437-38 (collecting
cases).
283. Even if Miranda were overruled, it would be far from certain that the police
practice of giving the warnings would be abandoned. Even without Miranda, an important factor in determining whether a confession was voluntary would be whether
the warnings had been given, as many pre-Miranda decisions indicated. See Davis
v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-41 (1966). 'An experienced interrogator would
not be likely to risk reversal by failing to give the warnings, particularly if he were
not prohibited from giving a short "pitch" as to the desirability of "confessing."
Moreover, under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), discussed in text at notes
347-51 infra, the giving of the warnings could serve to offset partially the consequence of an illegal arrest in determining whether subsequent statements are the fruit
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Of course, civil libertarians would be unhappy with this treatment
of the waiver issue, but it would still fall considerably short of the
outright rejection of Miranda that many civil libertarians view as an
inevitable result of the Burger Court's "philosophy." Indeed, a
modification of the waiver requirement is not likely to detract substantially from what may be the most significant feature of Miranda
from a civil libertarian viewpoint-the symbolic impact of the Miranda warnings as a formal recognition of the self-incrimination privilege
of the interrogated suspect.
3.

Search and Seizure

Civil libertarians also have expressed considerable concern over
the Burger Court's treatment of the fourth amendment.2

84

Indeed,

the Court's decisions relating to the constitutionality of searches and
seizures probably have been more sharply criticized than any other
group of decisions involving the regulation of police practices. That

criticism has centered primarily upon two sets of decisions, one defining the substantive standards for determining the reasonableness
of a search or arrest and the other defining the scope of the exclu2 s5
sionary rule adopted in Mapp v. Ohio.
a.

The reasonablenessof a search or arrest. In evaluating the

Burger Court decisions dealing with the substantive standards for
searches and seizures, it should be recalled that the Warren Court
decisions in this area were varied in approach. On the one hand,
the Warren Court refused to adopt expansive interpretations of
the fourth amendment in several major decisions.28 6 In Warden
of the arrest. Finally, the possibility remains that, in reaction to the Court's overruling of Miranda, some state courts might hold that Mirandawarnings are required
by state law. For example, several states have refused to follow Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), discussed in text following note 244 supra and in text
at notes 259-63 supra, and have ruled that statements obtained in violation of
Miranda cannot be used for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16
Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62
(1975).
For a general discussion of state court utilization of state law to broaden rights
beyond the protection recognized by the Supreme Court, see Brennan, supra note 39;
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62
VA. L REv. 873 (1976), reprinted in THE GEORGE MASON LEcTuRFS 873 (The
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation 1976); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in
CriminalProcedure,63 KY. L. REv. 873 (1975).
284. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 33, at 440-42; Miller, supra note 8, at 23;
Scheingold, supra note 7, at 232.
285. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
286. Consider, in addition to the decisions discussed in the text at notes 287-96
infra, the decisions discussed in the text at notes 101-09 supra.
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v. Hayden,2"' for example, the Court rejected the long-standing
interpretation of '2the
fourth amendment as prohibiting searches for
"mere evidence. 8 In Terry v. Ohio,280 the Court rejected the
contention that frisks must be justified by probable cause. Ker v.
California2 o recognized that no-knock entry was permissible where
needed to prevent the likely destruction of evidence.

In McCray

Illinois,29 '

v.
the Court rejected a defense contention that, in challenging the probable cause allegedly supporting the search, it had
the right to discover the name of the anonymous tipster who furnished
information that led to the search. On the other hand, there were
various decisions in which the Warren Court did adopt new, more
rigorous standards for acceptable searches. Several cases rejected
earlier opinions that had deemphasized the need for warrant authorization of a search whenever practicable.20 2 Most notably,
287. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See text at notes 107-09 supra.
288. The "mere evidence" rule prohibited a search for items that had only "evidential value"--i.e., items that were not contraband, fruits of the crime, or instrumentalities of the crime. See 387 U.S. at 300.
289. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also text at notes 104 & 119-22 supra.
290. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). See Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and
Seizures: The Michigan Proposals, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 221, 283 n.244 (1974), and
authorities cited therein as to the scope of Ker.
291. 386 U.S.300 (1967).
292. The Warren Court faced two lines of philosophically conflicting decisions relating to the need for warrant authorization. See Israel, Recent Developments in the
Law of Search and Seizure, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONsTrrurIoN 101, 155
(ICLE Criminal Law Library 1968). One group of decisions suggested that warrant
authorization was required unless the failure to obtain a warrant could be justified
by exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Trupiano y. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948),
overruled in part in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), discussed infra;
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). Another line of decisions, involving primarily warrantless searches incident to an arrest, suggested that warrant authorization was not an essential element
of a reasonable search but was only one of several factors to be considered in determining the validity of a search. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (the test is "not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable"). This group of decisions did not require exceptional circumstances to
justify a warrantless search. Chimel clearly reinforced the former group of decisions
and rejected the latter. Indeed, it overruled both Harris and Rabinowitz. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), also adhered to the former line of decisions in
rejecting the government's argument that the electronic "bugging" of a telephone
booth (see text at note 86 supra) should be sustained by the presence of probable
cause notwithstanding the absence of warrant authorization. The Court found no
justification for creating a "new exception" to the requirement of warrant authorization, and it stressed the additional safeguards provided by submitting the officer's
estimate of probable cause to "detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate." 389 U.S.
at 356.
As will be discussed later, see text at notes 305-08, the Warren Court did not
go so far as to treat prior warrant authorization as an almost absolute necessity that
could be dispensed with only where it was truly impossible to obtain a warrant before
a search had to be conducted. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967),
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Chimel v. California29 3 limited the permissible scope of a warrantless
search incident to an arrest and thereby narrowed one of the most
significant exceptions to the warrant requirement. 294 At the same
time, Spinelli v. United States295 applied stringent standards to the
affidavit submitted on an application for a search warrant, thereby

ensuring that the magistrate had an adequate factual foundation for
determining whether to grant a warrant.2 96

The Burger Court has on several occasions likewise adopted expansive interpretations of the fourth amendment. Thus, United
States v. United States District Court2 97 held unconstitutional war-

rantless electronic surveillance of a domestic group accused of
violence against the government.

The Court held that the substan-

tial governmental interest in a domestic security investigation could
discussed in note 324 infra; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless
search of premises upheld under a "hot pursuit" justification). However, the Court
did view warrant authorization as ordinarily necessary, and it clearly rejected the
view that the Constitution placed no special emphasis on obtaining a warrant. See
also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (noting a strong constitutional preference for warrant authorization and suggesting that "in a doubtful or marginal case" as to probable cause "a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fall"); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961)
(also stressing need for a warrant in the absence of "exceptional circumstances").
293. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
294. Prior to Chimel, the authorization of warrantless searches incident to an arrest was viewed as an exception that came close to swallowing up the general rule
(see note 292 supra) that warrants were required except under exigent circumstances.
See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONsTrrToNAL INTERPRETATION 49 (1969).
Searches incident to an arrest were permitted to extend to the entire premises in
which the person was arrested. Chimel rejected this view and held that the search
incident to an arrest could extend only to the "arrestee's person and the area 'within
his immediate control'---construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 395 U.S. at 763.
295. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
296. Spinelli involved a search warrant for gambling paraphernalia at an apartment that the defendant, a reputed bookmaker, was known to frequent. The Court
held that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient, noting that it failed
to indicate the informant's source of information or the reason the police considered
the informant to be reliable. While independent corroboration placed the defendant
and the two telephone numbers cited by the informant at the apartment, the Court
concluded that there was insufficient information to establish probable cause that the
telephones were used in bookmaking. The affidavit did not establish that the informant had come by his information in a reliable way. Indeed, the affidavit was so
general that it could have described an informant who received his information "from
an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." 393 U.S. at 417. Justices Stewart,
Black, and Fortas dissented. 393 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 393 U.S. at
429 (Black, J., dissenting); 393 U.S. at 435 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice White,
concurring, stated that he thought the decision was inconsistent with Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), discussed in note 304 infra and accompanying text, but
he "join[ed] the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since
a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided Court." 393 U.S. at 429 (White,
J., concurring). Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision.
297. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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not override the traditional fourth amendment standards requiring
warrant authorization of electronic surveillance. In Gerstein v.

Pugh,29 8 the Court required alteration of the pretrial practice in many

states by holding that the fourth amendment required a prompt postarrest review of probable cause by a magistrate where an arrest was
made without a warrant and the arrestee was still in custody or subject to extended restraint. Coolidge v. New Hampshire290 held in-

valid a rather unusual state practice that permitted a state attorney
general to serve as a magistrate for the purpose of issuing a search
warrant.
Decisions such as District Court, Gerstein, and Coolidge do not

reflect the general trend, however.

Viewed as a whole, Burger

Court decisions judging the reasonableness of searches and seizures

generally have refused to adopt new, more rigorous fourth amendment
standards. Indeed, as critics have noted, the Burger Court decisions
tend to grant the police more leeway than did the Warren Court de-

cisions. The difference in the positions of the two Courts is not nearly
as substantial, however, as the sharp criticism of the current Court
might suggest.
In several major areas of search and seizure, it is far from certain
that the often-criticized Burger Court decisions reach a conclusion
contrary to that which the Warren Court might have reached. Thus,
the Burger Court's decision upholding the issuance of a search warrant in United States v. Harris00 arguably may depart from the Warren Court ruling in Spinelli v. United States,.01 but it should be noted

that Justice White, who was one of the five Justices in the majority
0 2
in Spinelli, also joined Harris.1

The divergence between the two

298. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
299. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
300. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
301. 393 U.S. 410 (1969), discussed in notes 295-96 supra and accompanying
text.
302. There was no opinion for the Court in Harris. Chief Justice Burger's opinion was divided into three parts, and no more than four Justices joined any one part.
Justice White joined part HI, which noted that, in determining the informant's probable reliability, the magistrate could give weight to the fact that the informant had
made a sworn statement in which he admitted committing a crime and provided the
police with highly incriminating evidence against himself. 403 U.S. at 583-85.
Neither Justice White nor Justice Stewart joined part II of the Chief Justice's opinion,
which rejected any language in Spinelli that suggested that no weight whatsoever
could be given to the police officer's knowledge of a suspect's reputation as a person
involved in the illegal activity noted by the informant. 403 U.S. at 582. Moreover,
even though part II challenged this one aspect of Spinelli, the Chief Justice's opinion
did not reject the Spinelli result. See 403 U.S. at 581-82. Chief Justice Burger
sought to distinguish the facts of Spinelli and Harris along the lines suggested in
note 303 infra. Two of the concurring Justices, Black and Blackmun, did note in
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rulings certainly is not extensive," 3 and Harris arguably may be
viewed as more consistent with the earlier Warren Court decision
30 4
in Draperv. United States.
separate opinions, however, that they would overrule Spinelli. See 403 U.S. at 585
(Black, J., dissenting); 403 U.S. at 585 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
303. In Harris,the Court upheld a search warrant based on information supplied
by an unknown informant. Unlike Spinelli, however, the affidavit indicated the informant's information had been based on his own observation. The crucial issue was
whether the affidavit also provided sufficient information as to the informant's reliability. While Justices Harlan, Douglas, and Brennan, who were in the Spinelli
majority, dissented in Harris, 403 U.S. at 586 (Harlan, J., dissenting), the affidavit
in Harris certainly gave more information about the informant and his source than
did the total void presented in the Spinelli affidavit. Graham notes that there is a
"heavy hint" in Justice White's concurring opinion in Spinelli that the confidential
informant there might well have been a wiretap. F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 210.
Whether that actually was the case or not, the language of the affidavit was sufficiently broad to permit the government to rely upon a wiretap without revealing that
this was the nature of its informant. That could not have been done under the affidavit in Harris. Similarly, the Court in Spinelli suggested that the anonymous source
there might have relied on no more than an "offhand remark heard at a neighborhood
bar." 393 U.S. at 417. The source in Harris had submitted a sworn statement indicating the source of his information-he had purchased bootleg liquor at the defendant's house within the past two weeks. 403 U.S. at 575.
The distinction between the two cases noted above is ignored by most critics.
They tend to emphasize only the Burger opinion's disagreement with Spinelli, discussed in note 302 supra, as to the treatment of the suspect's reputation and the
opinion's reliance upon the fact that the informant's statement was against his penal
interest. See L Lvy, supra note 8, at 85 (arguing that the Burger opinion, inter
alia, "stood for the proposition that magistrates may accept the word of the police
without conducting an independent evaluation of the worth of their determination
that probable cause exists").
Even if Harris is viewed as inconsistent with Spinelli, it is difficult to consider
Harris a threat to the earlier Warren Court opinion in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964). But see L. LEvy, supra note 8, at 85. Aguilar rejected a search warrant
affidavit that stated only that a credible informant had reported that "'heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at
[specified] premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to provisions of the
law.'" 378 U.S. at 109 (quoting affidavit filed by police officers). The affidavit
did not set forth any reason whatsoever as to why the informant was believed to be
a credible person. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Harris described Aguilar as entirely consistent with Harris, see 403 U.S. at 577-78, but at least one civil libertarian
critic has described the Chief Justice's statement as only a "make-believe" attempt
to root his opinion in past cases. L. LEVY, supra note 8, at 85. Admittedly, Justice
Black noted in Harris that he would overrule Aguilar, 403 U.S. at 585 (concurring
opinion), but that position was not joined even by Justice Blackmun, who would have
overruled Spinelli. 403 U.S. at 586 (concurring opinion); see note 302 supra.
Moreover, in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), decided only a few months
before Harris,the Burger Court had relied on Aguilar in rejecting an arrest warrant
application. While Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black had dissented in Whiteley,
the dissents were based on alternative grounds unrelated to Aguilar. But see L.
LEvy, supra note 8, at 85 (arguing that Harris reflected a sudden shift away from
Whiteley as well as Aguilar and Spinelli).
304. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Draper involved a warrantless search based on information received from an informant. The officer's testimony on a motion to suppress
was held to have established probable cause. While that testimony indicated the informant had been reliable in the past, it also indicated that the officer did not know
how the informant had received his information that Draper would be returning to
Denver by train with several ounces of heroin on one of two specified mornings.
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Similarly, while the Burger Court decisions dealing with probable-

cause searches of automobiles arguably have failed to carry forward the Chimel emphasis upon obtaining warrant authorization
whenever practicable, 0 5 it seems likely that the Warren Court also
would have viewed the Chimel rationale as inapplicable to most
automobile searches. The leading Burger Court decision limiting
the applicability of that rationale for automobile searches, Chambers
v. Maroney, 06 almost certainly would have been accepted by the
Warren Court. Justice Stewart, who wrote Chimel, and Justices

Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, who had joined the Chimel opinion,
all joined the Court's opinion in Chambers. 07

They apparently

had no difficulty with Chambers' extension of the "moving vehicle"
exception to the warrant requirement (an exception that Chimel

had not challenged) to uphold the warrantless search of an automobile
conducted after the driver had been arrested and the automobile had
been removed to the police station. 08 Only Justice Harlan conIn terms of its failure to describe the informant's source and to provide substantial
independent corroboration, the testimony in Draper provides little more than the
Spinelli affidavit. There was, however, more information in Draper concerning the
identity of the informant and his reliability in the past.
305. See note 294 supra. Professor George argues that "the authoritative status
of Chimel . . . has been largely destroyed" by various Burger Court decisions.
George, supra note 273, at 258. Indeed, he suggests that "[firom an analysis of the
Burger Court decisions over the past two years, it becomes evident that Chimel totters, and probably will soon collapse." Id. at 263. Professor George relies heavily
on some of the cases discussed in the text at notes 306-45 infra, such as the waiver
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), discussed in text at
notes 334-35 & 340-44 infra; the automobile-search cases, discussed in text at notes
305-16 infra; the ruling on search of the prisoner's clothing in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), discussed in note 308 infra; and the stop-and-frisk decision in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), discussed in text at notes 31722 infra. It is my position, as the remainder of this subsection of the article indicates, that Chimel stands largely unrestricted in the area to which it was meant to
apply. Chimel has been undercut only if one assumed that the guiding principle of
Chimel would be extended and rigorously applied in areas outside the search of a
dwelling or business establishment, and, as subsequent opinions joined by members
of the Chimel majority indicate, there is considerable doubt that such an extension
was ever intended. Thus, my analysis of how the automobile cases relate to Chimel
is largely applicable as well to the other cases cited by Professor George. See, e.g.,
note 308 infra.
306. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
307. See note 311 infra, however, as to limitations on the scope of Chambers subsequently suggested by Justices Marshall and Brennan.
308. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), the Court noted that
the fourth amendment must be construed "as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile. . . where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought." Carroll upheld a warrantless search of an automobile on this "moving vehicle theory," but the car and driver there had not been placed in police
custody. Accordingly, there was considerable doubt prior to Chambers as to whether
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tended that such an extension was improper since temporary im-

mobilization of the car would afford police ample opportunity to
obtain a warrant before beginning their search."'
Of course, Chambers, in turn, served as the foundation for Card-

well v. Lewid- 10 and Texas v. White, 1 ' two cases that arguably
Carrolljustified a warrantless search of a car after the driver was arrested and the
car seized. However, Chambers sustained such a search under the "moving vehicle"
exception. The Court indicated that the car still belonged in the moving vehicle
category because the arrested driver (if released) or his agent could demand return
of the car before the police could obtain a warrant. The majority rejected the contention that, "because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained."
399 U.S. at 51. It noted that "[flor constitutional purposes," there is "no difference
between. . . seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to
a magistrate and .. .carrying out an immediate search without a warrant." 399
U.S. at 52.
A somewhat similar consideration of alternatives probably explains the Court's
decision in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), upholding the warrantless seizure and subsequent scientific examination of clothes taken from the defendant
ten hours after he was arrested and placed in jail. Although there was time to obtain
a warrant in that case, if the defendant had sought to obtain his immediate release
upon bail, the police would have been placed in a position where the choice would
have been, as in Chambers, between immobilizing him or seizing his clothing and
conducting a warrantless search. However, this justification appears to be more
theoretical, and less substantial, than the similar arguments advanced in the context
of the automobile search conducted in Chambers, see Israel, supra note 290, at 24344, and, as Justice Stewart's dissent in Edwards indicates, the Warren Court probably
would have sided with the dissent there. Edwards' deviation from the Chimel philosophy is of limited practical significance, however, since general searches of the prisoner's clothing ordinarily would be allowed in any event as part of the jail inventory
search. See note 337 infra and accompanying text.
309. 399 U.S. at 55 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Justice Harlan was the only dissenter in Chambers as to the validity of the search.
310. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Cardwell upheld the warrantless seizure and impoundment of the arrestee's automobile, found in a parking lot. A subsequent examination of the exterior of the car revealed that a tire matched a tire impression
made at the scene of the crime and that a paint sample taken from the car did not
differ from foreign paint found on the victim's car. Justice Blackmun's plurality
opinion concluded that (1) the examination of the outside of the car was not an invasion of privacy such as the search warrant requirement was designed to protect and
(2) the seizure and impoundment of the car was justified by its potential mobility,
a conclusion justified along lines similar to Chambers. The plurality opinion rejected
the contention that Chambers was distinguishable because the officers were aware of
the evidentiary value of the car for some time before the arrest and seizure were
made. It noted that the police still had a need to act promptly when they did and that
"no case or principle" suggests that "the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent
circumstances [is] foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment." 417 U.S. at 595. Justice Powell concurred in the result on the ground that
the issue could not properly be raised on habeas corpus. 417 U.S. at 596. See also
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed in text at notes 359-63 infra.
Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, 417 U.S. at 596 (Stewart, J., dissenting), argued that the case approximated Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1970), discussed in notes 312-15 infra and accompanying text, rather than
Chambers.
311. 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). White involved the search of a car at
the police station following the driver's arrest for a recent attempt to pass fraudulent
checks. The majority opinion upheld the search on the authority of Chambers. Jus-
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further expanded the scope of the moving vehicle exception. Cardwell, in particular, may have undercut the Court's analysis in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,312 which suggested that the Chambers
exception was limited to cases involving an unanticipated stopping
of an automobile. 13 But Coolidge, it must be remembered, was not
a Warren Court decision but rather was a 1971 decision in which
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was supported by only three other
Justices.3"4 Admittedly, Justice Stewart's opinion in Coolidge might
tice Marshall's dissent, 423 U.S. at 69, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that
Chambers was distinguishable since the arrest in White took place at 1:30 in the
afternoon and there was no showing that an immediate search on the scene would
have been impracticable. Once the search was unnecessarily delayed, they argued, a
warrant was needed. The dissenters stressed that the arrest in Chambers had been
made during the middle of the night, and therefore it would have been impracticable
to search the car at the scene of the arrest. While this point was noted in Chambers,
it certainly was not crucial to the majority's analysis. The Carroll case, on which
Chambers relied, also involved an afternoon search. See also note 315 infra.
312. 403 U.S. 443 (1970). Coolidge held invalid the search of an arrestee's
automobile without proper warrant authorization. Coolidge involved several factors
that distinguish it from Chambers: (1) the police had ample time before the seizure
to obtain a warrant-they had known for some time of the need to seize the car and
had actually obtained a search warrant (which proved invalid); (2) the car was not
stopped while being driven on the highway (as in Chambers) but was found in the
defendant's driveway; (3) the police had taken special precautions to control access
to the car-it was placed under police surveillance until it was eventually towed, and
the defendant's wife was told not to use the car (she then left the premises); (4) the
search involved a thorough scientific examination of the car's interior, a search that
was more intrusive and required more time for preparation than the search in Chambers. The second distinction above was not applicable to Cardwell, and the first had
considerably less force as applied to that case.
313. The plurality opinion in Coolidge had distinguished Chambers on the following ground:
And surely there is nothing in this case to invoke the meaning and purpose
of the rule of Carroll v. United States-no alerted criminal bent on flight, no
fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband
or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not
even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile ...
Since Carroll would not have justified a warrantless search of the Pontiac
at the time Coolidge was arrested, the later search at the station house was
plainly illegal, at least so far as the automobile exception is concerned. Chambers . . . is of no help to the State, since that case held only that, where
the police may stop and search an automobile under Carroll, they may also
seize it and search it later at the police station.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 462.
314. The discussion of Chambers in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion, see note
313 supra, was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Justice Harlan
concurred on the ground that a "contrary result in this case would. . . go far toward
relegating the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to a position of little
consequence in federal search and seizure law, a course . . . opposite to the one we
took in Chimel." 403 U.S. at 492. Of course, Justice Harlan had dissented
in Chambers, although the remaining members of the Coolidge majority had joined
the Chambers ruling. See note 309 supra. Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, dissented in Coolidge on the ground that Chambers
controlled. 403 U.S. at 493 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White's
dissent, also joined by the Chief Justice, argued that the plain view doctrine sustained
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have received majority support from the Warren Court of the
1962-1969 period, but, even under that assumption, Cardwell is the
only one of the automobile search cases that clearly would have been
decided differently by the Warren Court.3 15 Certainly, the Cardwell
decision standing alone cannot be viewed as a dramatic departure

from the Warren Court's position in Chimel, once Chambers is accepted as a valid exception to that position.3 16

The Burger Court's decision in Adams v. WilliamsM7 presents
similar difficulties in assessing its relationship to Warren Court precedent. Adams extended the Terry v. Ohio3 18 ruling on frisks to up-

hold forcible stops based on reasonable suspicion. Moreover, it did
so where the individual's suspicious activity related solely to possessory offenses (narcotics and weapon possession), rather than to a
the seizure of the car and the subsequent searches. 403 U.S. at 510 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
315. The White decision, as indicated by Justice Stewart's concurrence in the majority opinion, most likely would have been viewed as acceptable to a Court that followed Chambers. The grounds advanced in Justice Marshall's dissent in White, 423
U.S. at 69, discussed in note 311 supra, could readily be rejected by an analysis consistent with Chambers. Indeed, Justice Marshall's arguments were inconsistent with
the explanation of Chambers found in Coolidge. That explanation stressed that
Chambers was a case in which the police did not have an opportunity to obtain a
warrant before they seized the car. They therefore could have conducted a warrantless search immediately upon seizing it, and thus were allowed to conduct a delayed
warrantless search at a later point. The key to this explanation was the authority
to conduct the warrantless search at the time the car was stopped, see note 313 supra,
and Justice Marshall's dissent appeared to acknowledge that such authority existed
in White as well.
316. A similar difficulty is presented in evaluating United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976), in light of Chimel's emphasis upon obtaining a warrant where practicable. Watson held that a police officer did not have to obtain an arrest warrant
prior to making an arrest in a public place even though he had ample opportunity
to obtain the warrant. The warrantless arrest can be distinguished from the warrantless search on several grounds that might have been acceptable to the Warren Court.
Those include the mobility of individuals (cf. Chambers), greater police experience
in evaluating probable cause to arrest, the absence of any complicated issue as to the
scope of police intrusion (such as is presented in household searches), and the traditional acceptance of warranfless felony arrests. The Watson ruling was accepted by
Justice Stewart, 423 U.S. at 433 (concurring opinion), who wrote Chimel, Coolidge,
and Katz v. United States, discussed in note 292 supra, three of the major opinions
holding searches unconstitutional for police failure to obtain valid search warrants.
However, Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in Watson. 423 U.S. at 433
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Watson's relationship to the warrant requirement also must be evaluated in light
of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), where the Court held that a state must
provide a prompt post-arrest review of probable cause by a magistrate if the arrested
person is subjected to extended restraint following his arrest. While not as substantial a safeguard as a pre-arrest review of probable cause, the Gerstein hearing
does limit somewhat the damage that can be caused by an arrest based upon a police
officer's overly expansive view of probable cause.
317. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
318. 392 U.S. 1 (1968), discussed in notes 104 & 119-22 supra and accompanying text,

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1395 1976-1977

1396

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:1319

forthcoming crime of violence as was suspected in Terry. Adams
also held that the reasonable suspicion needed for a stop and frisk
had been established when a person known to the officer approached
the policeman on the street and reported the possessory offense but

did not provide further corroboration.

19

Notwithstanding the vig-

orous dissents of Justice Douglas (who had also dissented in

Terry) and Justices Brennan and Marshall (who had joined
Terry),320 it is certainly arguable that a Warren Court majority would
have agreed with Adams. Justices Stewart and White, who joined
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry, also joined in the Adams
decision, and the Adams case fits sufficiently within the basic rationale advanced in Terry to suggest that the remainder of the Terry
majority might have reached a similar result. Although the Terry
opinion did not rule on forcible stops, it posed an operating proce-

dure that certainly suggested their validity. 21 Similarly, the Terry
rationale is in no way inconsistent with basing reasonable suspicion
on information supplied by third persons without substantial corroboration by the officer's own observations. 2
More clear-cut deviations from the philosophy of the Warren
Court arguably are found in several recent cases that permitted
searches without requiring probable cause. In South Dakota v.
Opperman,2 3 the Court upheld warrantless inventory searches of im-

pounded automobiles. Opperman was based on a Warren Court
3 24
precedent, Cooper v. California,
but it is most unlikely that the
319. Adams also upheld use of a limited search in a form other than a frisk. The
officer in Adams, having received information that a weapon was being carried in
the suspect's waistband, apparently reached directly into that area and removed the
gun. 407 U.S. at 145. Neither the majority nor the dissent appeared to have any
difficulty with the officer's use of this procedure as opposed to a frisk.
320. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Adams suggests, however, that he
now has misgivings as to the wisdom of Terry. He now views "the delicate balance
that Terry struck" as "simply too delicate, too susceptible to the 'hydraulic pressures
of the day."' 407 U.S. at 162.
321. There was no forcible stop in Terry prior to the initiation of the frisk, and
the Court noted that it was not deciding "the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or
interrogation." 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. Nevertheless, it was generally assumed that,
as a logical corollary to Terry, the investigative stop also would be accepted on less
than probable cause. See 392 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring); 392 U.S. at 34
(White, J., concurring); LaFave, supranote 274, at 62-68.
322. See LaFave, supra note 274, at 76-77, anticipating an interpretation of reasonable suspicion similar to that accepted in Adams. Cf. In re Boykin, 39 I11.2d
617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968) (where assistant principal told police an anonymous informant had identified student as possessing a gun in school, officer's search of student's pocket and seizure of gun was "reasonable").
323. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
324. 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Cooper upheld the warrantless search of an automobile
that police had seized and retained pending forfeiture proceedings.
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Warren Court would have so extended Cooper.32' In United States
21 the Burger Court upheld
v. Robinson3 26 and Gustafson v. Florida,1
full searches of the person incident to a traffic arrest. Arguably, the

Warren Court would have agreed with Justice Marshall's dissent in
Robinson, which contended that no more than a frisk for weapons
should be permitted since the officer clearly cannot expect to find
328
evidence of the traffic offense on the person of the arrestee.

Here again, however, the majority's position had substantial foundation in earlier opinions.329 Indeed, the majority opinions in Robinson and Gustafson may reflect a lesson suggested in several Warren
Court opinions---the need for flat, simple rules that can easily be

applied by police officers.830

Arguably, the Warren Court would

325. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas dissented
in Cooper and certainly would not have extended the majority's ruling. 386 U.S. at
62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, who was part of the five-Justice majority in Cooper,dissented in Opperman. 428 U.S. at 384 (joining Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White, who did not participate in Cooper, also dissented in Opperman.
428 U.S. at 396 (statement of White, J.). In Cooper, because of the possible forfeiture proceeding, see note 324 supra, the police had a special obligation, as the majority there saw it, to maintain custody of the car pending eventual determination of
any such proceeding. As Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in Opperman, a similar special "possessory interest" of the police was not present in Opperman. 428 U.S. at 377 n.2.
326. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
327. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
328. 414 U.S. at 250-52. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Douglas and
Brennan.
329. Although the Court had not previously considered a traffic case, various previous opinions, including Warren Court opinions, had noted, without limitation, that
the police had authority to search the person of the arrestee incident to an arrest. See
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 225 (citing various prior opinions). Thus,
in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Warren Court had stated: "When
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use . . . ." 395
U.S. at 762-63. Of course, one might argue that traffic cases should be treated separately, as several lower courts had done, see 414 U.S. at 245-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (collecting cases), or that the right to conduct a full search for weapons should
be reconsidered in light of Terry's acceptance of the frisk, see note 104 supra, but it
is difficult to view Robinson and Gustafson as a departure from precedent, including
lower court precedent. But see L. LEvy, supra note 8, at 109-15.
330. [O]ur more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises
from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether
or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search
of the person incident to a lawful arrest. . . . A police officer's determination
as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested
is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in
the search.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. See LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr.
REv. 127; Howard, supra note 283, at 898 ("After Robinson the Supreme Court of
Oregon, although aware of the criticisms that had been leveled at Robinson, nonetheless chose to follow it [under its state constitutional provision]. The simplicity

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1397 1976-1977

1398

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:1319

have found such an approach inappropriate where used to extend

police authority, but it should be noted that Justice Stewart, who
wrote Katz3 ' and Chimel,3 32 two of the leading "liberal" search-and-

seizure opinions of the Warren Court, also joined the Robinson majority and concurred in the result in Gustafson.3
Justice Stewart also wrote for the majority in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,334 another case that arguably deviates from the policy of

the Warren Court through its generous interpretation of a doctrine
(search by consent) that validates searches without probable cause.
Schneckloth ruled that, in establishing voluntary consent to a search
following a street stop, the prosecution need not show that the individual had been, made aware of his right to refuse to consent.

The Warren Court presumably would have imposed a heavier burden on the prosecution, as urged in the dissenting opinions of Justices

Marshall and Brennan.33 5
Assuming that the decisions in Opperman, Robinson, Gustafson,

and Schneckloth do depart from the approach of the Warren Court,
how significant are these decisions in altering the protection of
of the Robinson rule was one reason for its acceptance; no one would have difficulty
comprehending it.").
Warren Court decisions which placed a similar emphasis upon "flat" rules include
Miranda, Wade, and Chimel (to the extent Chinel rejected a case-by-case analysis
of the acceptability of a warrantless search based on the likelihood a relative or
friend would destroy evidence if the officer delayed the search to obtain a warrant).
On the Warren Court's general tendency to adopt such rules, see note 83 supra.
331. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), discussed in text at note 86
supra, adopted an analysis of fourth amendment coverage that emphasized the protection of individual privacy rather than the invasion of property rights and thereby extended the fourth amendment to a variety of nontrespassing surveillance techniques,
including the electronic surveillance involved in that case. See MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 209-18. Katz probably stands along with Mapp and
Chimel as one of the three major expansionist decisions of the Warren Court in the
search and seizure area. See generally Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of
the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. C. REv. 133.
332. See text at notes 293-94 supra.
333. In Robinson the officer was required by police department regulations to
take the traffic offender into custody. 414 U.S. at 221 n.2 (citing D.C. Metropolitan
Police Dept. Gen. Order No. 3, series 1959 (April 24, 1959)). In Gustafson, the
officer apparently had discretionary authority to release the offender upon issuance
of a traffic ticket. See 414 U.S. at 260. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266, appeared to question the constitutionality of permitting
a custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense in a situation where the offender most
likely would have appeared in court upon issuance of a citation. The concurring
opinion noted "that a persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the
custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," but since petitioner had "fully conceded
the constitutional validity of his custodial arrest," the search of his person should be
accepted as incidental to that arrest. 414 U.S. at 266-67.
334. 412 U.S. 218 (1973), discussed in notes 340-44 infra and accompanying text.
335. See 412 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J.,dissenting); 412 U.S. at 277 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also dissented, 412 U.S. at 275.
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privacy afforded by the fourth amendment? Although all four permit searches without probable cause, they might not substantially
broaden the search authority of the police beyond that which the
Warren Court would have accepted. In Robinson and Gustafson,
for example, it must be remembered that the dissenters would have

permitted an automatic frisk of the arrested person, although not a
full search."3 6 Moreover, as the dissenters also acknowledged, if the

arrestee did not obtain his prompt release on station-house bail, he
would have been subjected to an inventory search of his person (al-

though the dissenters would not have permitted an inventory search
so thorough as to examine the contents of the cigarette package that

contained the contraband seized in Robinson).3 7

Finally, it also

should be noted that Robinson and Gustafson apply only where the
traffic stop involves a full-custody arrest, and Justice Stewarts concurring opinion in Gustafson leaves open the possibility that the

fourth amendment might not permit full-custody arrests for all traffic
violations.3a 8
336. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 267 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissenters
would permit an officer to frisk an arrestee without any special basis for believing that
the person was armed and dangerous. Compare this concept with Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), discussed in notes 104 & 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
The dissenting opinions in Robinson and Gustafson did not indicate whether
the dissenters would extend the rationale of that opinion to other offenses. There
are, of course, various crimes besides traffic offenses as to which evidence is not
likely to be found on the person of the offender. That is the case even for some
rather serious offenses (e.g., embezzlement, serious assault), especially where the
arrest takes place some time after the completion of the crime. See LaFave, supra
note 330, at 138-41. For many of these offenses the arrestees also are no more
likely to be carrying weapons than traffic offenders, although the seriousness of
the offense may give them more incentive to flee than traffic offenders. If a frisk
adequately protects the officer incident to a traffic arrest, one could argue it also
would be adequate incident to many other arrests, particularly in the misdemeanor
category. Yet the dissents in Robinson and Gustafson refer only to traffic offenses,
and the lower court opinions relied upon were also limited to traffic offenses. See
also LaFave, supra note 330, at 152-55 (noting a possible justification for separate
treatment of traffic offenders based upon the need to deter "pretext" traffic arrests).
337. 414 U.S. at 258 n.7. Most lower courts have upheld inventory searches
as a part of the booking process, which often occurs before it is determined whether
the individual can post station-house bail. See MODERN CR1MINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note 12, at 330.
338. See 414 U.S. at 266, discussed in note 333 supra. Consider also LaFave,
supra note 330. Under the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code, traffic offenders ordinarily
are released upon issuance of a citation unless they commit certain specified offenses
(e.g., drunk driving) or present some reason for assuming they might not respond
to the citation (e.g., have no evidence of identification). See NATIONAL COMM.
ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE AND MODEL

TRAFFIC ORDNANcE § 16-203-206. In addition, see People v. Wohlleben, 261 Cal.
App. 2d 461, 67 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1968); MIcH. COMP. LAws §§ 257.727-.728 (1910

& Supp. 1977).
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The potential impact of Opperman is similarly limited by issues

left open in the majority opinion.

The inventory search involved

there extended only to the interior of the automobile and an un-

locked glove compartment. It is uncertain whether the same standard would be applied to a locked glove compartment or trunk. Although the car in Opperman was itself locked, it generally is much

easier for someone to break into a locked car than into a locked trunk
or glove compartment, and the police might have greater justifi-

cation for removing all valuables from those areas that are readily
accessible once the door locks are bypassed. 3
Like Robinson and Gustafson, the Schneckloth ruling on consent

searches also was based upon a "street situation"--the noncustodial,
on-the-street stop of an automobile. The Schneckloth majority held
that, in such a situation, 40 the prosecution does not have to establish that a driver, in granting his consent, was aware that he
had a right to refuse the officer's request to search the car. In
particular, the majority ruled that the police need not give warnings similar to those required by Mirandabefore requesting consent.

It should be noted that the majority opinion does not relieve the
prosecution of the burden of showing that the consent was volun339. The Court in Opperman emphasized that the expectation of privacy in an
automobile was "significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." 428
U.S. at 367. It noted that, in part, this diminished expectation was a product of
extensive governmental regulation of automobiles which includes such elements as
periodic inspection and licensing. 428 U.S. at 368. Thus, in the case before it, the
item seized was found in an unlocked glove compartment that was accessible to any
person gaining entrance to the car, 428 U.S. at 376 n.10, and was "a customary place
for keeping documents of ownership and registration." 428 U.S. at 372. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted that the police officer in Opperman had testified that locked trunks were not searched. 428 U.S. at 380 n.6. Justice Powell
stated in this connection that "[u]pholding searches" of the type involved in Opperman "provides no general license for the police to examine all the contents of such
automobiles." 428 U.S. at 380.
Justice -Powell also emphasized that the inventory search was conducted automatically pursuant to police regulation and did not rest on the exercise of discretion
by the individual officer. 428 'U.S. at 380 & n.6. Certainly any attempt to single
out a particular car for a more extensive inventory search would be highly suspect
under both the opinion for the Court and Justice Powell's opinion. Yet simply
as an administrative matter, where the keys are not available-as in Oppermanit ordinarily would not be feasible to attempt to unlock the trunks of all impounded
cars. Unlocking doors is a different matter since they are easier to open and often
are unlocked anyway in the process of towing the car.
340. The Schneckloth opinion specifically stated that the Court's ruling was limited to a noncustodial situation. 412 U.S. at 248. Also, the Court's rationale was
based in part on the impracticability of requiring a warning in a noncustodial situation. See 412 U.S. at 231-33. A considerably different approach might be adopted
where custody added to the pressure placed upon the individual who consented to
the search. See Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951). This distinction is missed in the sharp criticism of Schneckloth in L. LEvy, supra note 8, at
99-101.
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tary.a41 Neither does it render the driver's knowledge an irrelevant

factor in determining voluntariness.3 42

The dissents by Justices

Brennan and Marshall rejected the contention that the driver's

awareness of the right to refuse to permit the search could be assumed, but, at the same time, neither dissent would have required
that the police necessarily inform the driver of his right to refuse
to give consent. 43 The practical significance of the distinction between this position and that of the majority is difficult to determine.

It is not clear, for example, whether the dissenters would permit the
prosecution to establish knowledge by showing simply that the officer's phrasing of the request in itself suggested a right to refuse
(e.g., where the officer said, "Will you give me your permission to
search?").

3 44

341. The majority noted:
Mhe State concedes that "[wihen a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent
to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."...
The precise question in this case, then, is what must the prosecution prove
to demonstrate that a consent was "voluntarily" given.
412 U.S. at 222-23.
342. The majority specifically stated that "knowledge of the right to refuse to
consent is one factor to be taken into account" in determining the voluntariness
of the consent. 412 U.S. at 227. The exact role of the defendant's knowledge
is not entirely clear, however. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion contended that
the Court "reject[s] even the modest proposition that, if the subject of a search
convinces the trier of fact that he did not know of his right to refuse assent to
a police request for permission to search, the search must be held unconstitutional."
412 U.S. at 285. While there are isolated passages in the majority opinion that
support Justice Marshall's view, the basic thrust of the opinion did not go so
far. The major point of the majority was that, as in the application of the voluntariness standard to confessions, the Court must look to the totality of the circumstances;
there accordingly is no single factor that must be established by the government.
In particular, "the government need not establish . . . knowledge as the sine qua
non of an effective consent." 412 U.S. at 227. The Court also noted, however,
that the ultimate issue, as in the confession cases, is whether the consent was coerced,
considering, inter alia, the~personal "characteristics" of the individual consenting.
See 412 U.S. at 226. Among these personal characteristics, of course, is the individual's state of mind. If the individual can convince the trier of fact that he honestly
believed that he was required by law to accept the requested search, then his consent
would not be voluntary. In sum, as I read Schneckloth, the individual's mental
state may establish a lack of voluntariness; the Court was unwilling, however, to
adopt a position that assumed that such a mental state existed unless the prosecutor
specifically negated it by establishing that the individual was aware of his right
to deny consent.
343. See 412 U.S. at 286 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 412 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that the prosecution could establish
knowledge in several ways, including an affirmative demonstration of knowledge by
the consenting person's response at the time the search took place, or his past experience. See 412 U.S. at 286.
344. Justice Douglas' separate dissent suggests that he would not accept such
phrasing as adequate proof: "'[U]nder many circumstances a reasonable person
might read an officer's "May I" as the courteous expression of a demand backed
by force of law."' 412 U.S. at 275 (quoting lower court opinion, 448 F.2d 699,
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No doubt, when decisions like Opperman, Robinson, and Scheckloth are added to decisions like Cardwell, the overall thrust of the
Burger Court decisions is to grant the police far more flexibility than
a civil libertarian is likely to view as acceptable. Yet the Court's
approach is not so substantially different from that taken in many
Warren Court decisions as to be characterized as a major departure
from the Warren Court's standard. Admittedly, there is a more substantial departure when the comparison is limited to the position
taken by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Fortas, and Goldberg. But, for much of the Warren period,
no more than four of these Justices sat together, and they could not
count on the ready support of Justice Black, who often opposed an
expansionist view of the fourth amendment. 34" As a result, the Warren Court decisions in this area reflected a varied approach that was
perhaps more "conservative" than its approach in other areas. The
Burger Court's fourth amendment decisions accordingly come closer
in approach to the Warren Court rulings than do the decisions involving other police practices, where the addition of Justice Black gave
the Warren Court majority greater leeway.
b. The scope of the exclusionary rule. As noted above, the
civil libertarian critics also have expressed concern as to the Burger
Court's treatment of a second aspect of the fourth amendment, the
application of the Mapp v. Ohio346 exclusionary rule. So far, the
Burger Court has done very little to restrict the Mapp ruling itself,
which required the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence
only at the criminal trial. Indeed, in Brown v. Illinois,347 the Court
specifically rejected an invitation to limit sharply the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, which determines the reach of the exclusionary
rule in the trial setting.348 In Brown, the Court rejected the contention that the giving of the Mirandawarnings automatically purged
701 (9th Cir. 1971)). Of course, there are many variations of "May I," with some
more suggestive than others that the individual has a right to refuse.
345. See generally Landynski, In 'Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment,
45 FORD AM L. REv. 453 (1976).
346. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
347. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
348. This doctrine requires exclusion of secondary evidence that, although not
produced directly by a constitutional violation, is derived from that violation. It
may encompass, for example, evidence that is located as a result of information
obtained through an unconstitutional search, arrest, or interrogation. See Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), discussed in text at notes 250-56 supra. It also
may encompass, as was argued in Brown, evidence produced by a defendant because
of pressure resulting from a prior constitutional violation. See J. ISRAEL & W.
LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 263-81.
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the taint of an illegal arrest, thereby permitting the admissibility
of any subsequent confession of the arrestee to be judged without
regard to the illegal arrest.3 49 The Court also made clear that
Wong Sun v. United States,35 a Warren Court decision first holding
an incriminating statement inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal arrest, was not limited to the facts of that case, which involved a state-

ment made almost contemporaneously with the arrest.35'

On the other side, the Burger Court has rejected attempts to extend the exclusionary rule outside of the criminal trial, and it has
overturned Warren Court precedent permitting a habeas corpus
challenge to a conviction resulting from a trial in which illegally
352
seized evidence was admitted. In United States v. Calandra,
the Court held that the Mapp rule did not extend to grand jury

proceedings, and a witness therefore could not object to grand
jury questioning based on information obtained through a fourth

amendment violation.3 53 While Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Douglas dissented, 354 it is not clear that the majority's position would
have been rejected by the Warren Court. That Court had accepted in other contexts Justice Black's view that the Court should
be most reluctant to impose new legal limitations on grand jury proceedings since such limitations tend to cause delay and impede the
grand jury's performance as a safeguard against unjust prosecu3 5
tions. 1

349. Lower courts had divided on this issue, and in Brown the Illinois Supreme
Court below had adopted the "automatic purging" concept. People v. Brown, 56
Ill. 2d 312, 317, 307 N.E.2d 356, 358 (1974); see 422 U.S. at 597, 603. In addition,
see Gonzales v. State, 429 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (adopting automatic
purging concept).
350. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study
in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 482 (1963).
351. Wong Sun also involved a forced entry, which had been stressed by some
lower courts. See, e.g., Lacefield v. State, 412 S.W.2d 906, 908-09 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1967) (reading Wong Sun very narrowly).
352. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
353. In Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), the Burger Court had
held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that a grand jury witness could challenge
questions based on information obtained through an illegal wiretap.
354. 414 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
355. In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), Justice Black wrote the
opinion for the Court, holding that an indictment was not subject to challenge under
the fifth amendment even though it was based entirely on hearsay evidence. Costello
stressed that permitting such objections would cause delay and was inconsistent with
the traditional view of the grand jury as "a body of laymen, free from technical
rules," acting as a shield against unjust prosecutions. 350 U.S. at 362. In Lawn
v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958), a unanimous Court extended Costello to
reject challenges to an indictment based upon unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
Of course, Calandra involved an objection by a witness rather than by a defendant. But consider Justice Black's view as to a witness' rights in In re Groban,
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In United States v. Janis,350 the Burger Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to an IRS assessment proceeding (a civil

action) where the illegal search had been conducted by local police.
Here, as Justice Stewart's dissent indicates, 57 it is very likely that
the Warren Court would have reached a different result. A major
function of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional searches
by denying police the use of illegally seized evidence,"", and the

Janis ruling arguably might offer a counter-incentive to engage in
such searches.

However, Janis certainly should produce no more

than a slight dent in the deterrent impact of the rule, since the primary concern of police remains the obtaining of criminal convictions,
not possible IRS assessments.
A similar conclusion might be advanced with regard to Stone v.
Powell.159 Here the Court clearly narrowed the exclusionary rule's

scope but still left substantially intact its general effectiveness as a
deterrent device. Stone held that, for all practical purposes, a fourth
amendment objection could not be utilized to challenge collaterally
a state conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The majority ruled that a federal court could not consider a habeas claim
that unconstitutionally seized evidence was used at the petitioner's
trial unless the petitioner had not been afforded an opportunity for
"full and fair litigation" of his claim in the state courts.3 01 Stone
352 U.S. 330, 346-47 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting), where he offered the following
justification for the grand jury "practice of examining witnesses . . . in secret without the presence of the witness' counsel":
They [the grand jurors] bring into the grand jury room the experience,
knowledge and viewpoint of all sections of the community. They have no axes
to grind and are not charged personally with the administration of the law.
No one of them is a prosecuting attorney or law-enforcement officer ferreting
out crime. It would be very difficult for officers of the state seriously to abuse
or deceive a witness in the presence of the grand jury.
352 U.S. at 346-47. Both the majority and dissent in Groban agreed, albeit in
dictum, that the witness had no constitutional right to have counsel present with
him while testifying before a grand jury. But cf. United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 584 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the witness had a
constitutional right at least to have counsel present for consultation outside the jury
room).
356. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
357. 428 U.S. at 460. Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented in lanis.
428 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
358. In Mapp the Court stated that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is
to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.'" 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). See also note 120 supra and
text at notes 388-95 infra.
359. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented in
Stone. 428 U.S. at 502 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
360. 428 U.S. at 494.
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rejected several Warren Court decisions that had considered fourth
amendment claims on habeas petitions.8 61 Moreover, the Stone ruling arguably was inconsistent with the reasoning, though not the

holding, of Fay v. Noia,86 2 one of the most celebrated opinions of
the Warren era.

Although Fay dealt with a collateral challenge to

a conviction based on a coerced confession, the Fay opinion certainly
suggested that federal habeas corpus should be available to challenge

3 68
collaterally a state conviction on any constitutional error.
The Burger Court obviously is concerned about the sharp in-

crease in habeas petitions since Fay and is seeking to restrict the
scope of that opinion. 6 4 Like Stone, Francis v. Henderson,'6 5 dis867
cussed earlier, 66 also narrowed the scope of collateral attack.

From a civil libertarian viewpoint, the significance of decisions like
361. See 428 U.S. at 518-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Most
of those cases had not discussed the use of habeas review to raise fourth amendment
claims, see 428 U.S. at 481 n.15, but the issue was squarely presented in Kaufman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), a case involving the habeas review of a
federal prisoner's conviction. Justice Black wrote a vigorous dissent in Kaufman
that was later followed in Stone. See 394 U.S. at 231 (Black, J., dissenting), quoted
in 428 U.S. at 490.
362. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), discussed in text at notes 97 & 204 supra and in
notes 98 & 205 supra and accompanying text.
363. Consider, e.g., 372 U.S. at 409:
The course of decisions of this Court from Lange [Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163 (1873)] and Siebold [Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879)]
to the present makes plain that restraints contrary to our fundamental law, the
Constitution, may be challenged on federal habeas corpus even though imposed
pursuant to the conviction of a federal court of competent jurisdiction.
Fay also indicated that the only permissible ground for restricting such a habeas
challenge would be the petitioner's deliberate bypass of the constitutional claim in
the state courts, not simply the state's provision of a full and fair opportunity to
raise the claim. See note 98 supra.
364. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, .412 U.S. 218, 260 & n.14 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring); Burger, Post Conviction Remedies: Eliminating Federal-State Friction, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 148 (1970).
365. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
366. See notes 203 & 206-09 supra and accompanying text, note 199 supra, and
text at notes 204-05 supra.
367. Arguably, Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972) (per curiam) (deliberate
bypass where counsel misused state procedure notwithstanding judicial warning as
to his error), and LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973) (per curiam) (factual
hearing unnecessary where state trier of fact applied correct constitutional standard
but did not specifically indicate those facts credited or discredited in reaching its
decision), may also be viewed as part of a Burger Court initiative to restrict habeas
corpus. See George, supra note 273, at 272. But both cases dealt with fairly technical aspects of habeas procedure that do not have a significant practical impact,
and they are offset by other decisions, such as Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411
U.S. 355 (1973), discussed in note 212 supra and accompanying text, and Davis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), discussed in note 368 infra, that expand
habeas review. But note Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975). Moreover, the
majority opinions (and the dissents) in both Murch and LaVallee are tied to the
rather special facts in each.
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Francis and Stone depends in large part on the importance of federal
habeas review in achieving full recognition of the particular constitutional right in question. With respect to Stone and the fourth
amendment, that significance should relate primarily to the degree
to which federal habeas review strengthens the deterrent impact of
the exclusionary rule beyond the deterrence that flows from the
rule's application in the state courts.30 8 While people may disagree
as to the precise significance of such federal habeas reinforcement,
it surely has a comparatively minor bearing upon the rule's overall
effectiveness as a deterrent. 69
The elimination of a federal collateral challenge based on the
fourth amendment hardly is significant enough to suggest to police that
the fourth amendment can be ignored. The primary focus of the police
is on the everyday application of the exclusionary sanction by state
courts. Of c6urse, if the elimination of federal collateral attack led
state trial courts to eviscerate fourth amendment standards, that

stance probably would lead police, in turn, to pay considerably less
attention to the fourth amendment. It seems most unlikely, how368. With respect to the possible impact of Stone upon other functions of the
exclusionary rule, consider text at notes 377-87 infra. Civil libertarians also may
be concerned with the creation of a potential inequality arising from different treatment of defendants presenting the same fourth amendment claim. Thus, Justice
White, in his dissent in Stone, 428 U.S. at 536-37, raised the hypothetical of two accomplices whose identical claims were rejected by the state court. The first defendant
failed to seek United States Supreme Court review, while the second sought such review and had his conviction reversed. The result, without habeas corpus, is that only
the second would have his conviction reversed, even though the two have identical
claims. Of course, such "inequality" is a common occurrence with respect to nonconstitutional issues and is a necessary product of the need to draw an end to litigation at some point. See, e.g., Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). But note Davis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), a Burger Court decision accepting an expansive view of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) that would permit collateral challenges based
upon post-appeal changes in the interpretation of the applicable substantive criminal
law.
369. The majority in Stone emphasized the limited impact of its ruling upon
the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule, 428 U.S. at 493, relying substantially
on the analysis advanced in Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1964). The thrust of that argument is that there
is a de minimis additional deterrent effect provided by applying the exclusionary
rule upon collateral attack as well as at trial. Justice Brennan's dissent relied primarily on the language of the habeas corpus statute, which refers generally to persons
held in custody in violation "of the Constitution." Justice Brennan found misplaced
the majority's reliance upon prior rulings recognizing judicial discretion to refuse
to consider claims that otherwise fit within the statutory reference to constitutional
claims. See 428 U.S. at 502. The dissent responded only briefly as to the impact
of the majority's ruling upon the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule. 428
U.S. at 510. That response rested primarily on earlier dissents that had challenged
the majority's treatment of deterrence as the primary function of the rule and had
emphasized the need for keeping the "courtroom door" completely closed to "evidence
secured by official lawlessness." See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 35557 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ever, that the Stone decision will encourage many state trial courts
to vitiate the fourth amendment. The limited number of federal

habeas reversals of state convictions suggests that a state trial judge
with an inclination to ignore the fourth amendment is likely to be

concerned primarily with reversal by a state appellate court, not by
a federal habeas court.37 0 And the restraining influence of state appellate review should remain substantially intact notwithstanding
Stone. Admittedly, Stone may have some impact upon those state
appellate courts that have "liberalized" their views to fit that of the
370. While the number of federal habeas challenges varies considerably even
among states of comparable size, the ratio of habeas challenges to state appeals
is quite low. In Michigan, which has a fairly typical rate of habeas challenges,
there are approximately 10 appeals for every habeas petition filed. See 1975 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DRECTOR OF THE ADMINIsTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS 356 (1976) [hereinafter cited as U.S. COuRTS] (287 state prisoner petitions); 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE COURT ADMNISTRATmON OF MICHIGAN
12 (approximately 2,750 criminal appeals filed, with 2,400 appeals as of right).
Moreover, even in those states that produce a substantial number of habeas petitions,
such as Texas, the number of petitions still is too low to alter substantially that
ratio. See U.S. CoURTs, supra at 356 (approximately 750 annual habeas filings
from Texas). Equally significant, the percentage of "reversals" on habeas review
is quite low as compared to appellate review. Such relief is provided nationally
in less than 5% of habeas petitions presented to federal courts. See Shapiro, Federal
Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. REV. 321, 333-34 (1973);
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1041
(1970). The percentage of reversals by a state appellate court, on the other hand,
usually ranges from 12-20%. See, e.g., ADMINsTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE MARYLAND
COURTS, 1974-75 ANNUAL REPORT 70-71 (1976) (reversal rate of 16%); 1974 Annual Report (Michigan Court of Appeals), 72 Mich. App. xiii, xix (1976) (reversal
rate of approximately 16%).
Of course, the significance of appellate review, particularly with respect to search
and seizure claims, obviously will vary from state to state. Thus, a comparative
study of issues raised on appeal in Illinois, New Jersey, and Nebraska showed that
illegal search and seizure claims were raised in approximately 50% of all criminal
appeals (27% of all appeals) in Illinois, in about 10% of all criminal appeals (5%
of all appeals) in New Jersey, and in 6% of all criminal appeals (3% of all appeals)
in Nebraska. During the same period, illegal search and seizure was the second
most frequent ground for reversal in all appellate cases (i.e., civil and criminal)
in Illinois and the fourth most frequent ground in New Jersey, but it did not result
in any reversals in Nebraska. See D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS, STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIs OF VOLUME, 140-41 (Natl. Center for State Courts 1974).

Yet even in states like Nebraska where search and seizure claims are not frequently presented on appeal, it seems likely that appellate court review still will
provide as substantial a backing for the fourth amendment as habeas review. This
likelihood may be suggested -by Stone v. Powell itself. One of the two cases presented in Stone came from Nebraska. While the federal district court, on habeas
review, disagreed with the Nebraska Supreme Court, the opinion of the state court,
though perhaps erroneous, treated the search and seizure issue with care. Its extensive discussion certainly did not suggest a disrespect for such issues or an unwillingness
to follow Supreme Court precedent. See State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d
480 (1972). Indeed, in upholding the search in a case arguably presenting exigent
circumstances, the state court specifically noted that its opinion "should in no wise
be interpreted by law enforcement officers as a relaxation by this Court of the rules
laid down for us in Mapp and Ker." 188 Neb. at 741, 199 N.W.2d at 488.
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federal circuit court of appeals in their area, 71 but such shifts in position are likely to be far too subtle to have any dramatic impact on
trial court (or police) practices.
Taken together, the impact of Calandra, Janis, and Stone upon
Mapp appears to be roughly similar to the impact of Mosley, Tucker,
and Mathiason upon Miranda:1 2 while the Burger Court has re-

fused to extend the Mapp ruling, neither has it cut back significantly
upon the scope of that ruling. Indeed, as with Miranda, the intensity

of civil libertarian criticism probably relates less to what the Court
has done with the Mapp decision than to what the critics fear it will

do in the future.371 Chief Justice Burger has suggested that perhaps
Mapp simply should be overruled.3 7 4

He appears to stand alone,

however, in suggesting total abandonment of the exclusionary rule.
A more likely possibility is the modification of Mapp suggested by
Justice White in Stone. There, Justice White urged that unconstitu371. In the course of a seminar on Fay conducted as part of the National Conference on Appellate Procedure (Natl. Center for State Courts, March 4, 1975),
several state appellate judges stated that their courts gave special weight to the opinions of the federal court of appeals that would eventually be "reviewing" decisions
from their state via habeas corpus. Some of these judges suggested that they would
follow an opinion of the federal court even though disagreeing with it, at least whero
Supreme Court review was unlikely. One state appellate judge indicated that in
his view the federal court of appeals had become, through habeas corpus, the supreme court of his state, and he treated it as such. He stated that he would not
reject a claim and force the defendant to go the habeas route simply because the
federal court of appeals was more liberal in its interpretations of the Constitution
than he would be. Cf. Williams v. Estelle, 416 F. Supp. 1073, 1081 (N.D. Tex.
1976).
Compare the position of former Chief Judge Weintraub of New Jersey, directing
the New Jersey courts to ignore what he viewed as an improper interpretation of
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, as noted in Kamisar, When Wasn't There a "Crime Crisis," 39 F.R.D. 450,
462 (1965).
372. See notes 242-58 supra and accompanying text.
373. Consider Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandra:
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "close[d] the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in violation of Fourth
Amendment rights." . . . The door is again ajar. As a consequence, I am left
with the uneasy feeling that today's decision may signal that a majority of
my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door still further and
abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases ....
414 U.S. at 365 (in part quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 654-55).
374. In Stone, Chief Justice Burger noted the need for "overruling this judicially
contrived doctrine--or limiting its scope to egregious, bad-faith conduct." 428 U.S.
at 501 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
The Chief Justice had previously suggested that the rule should not be totally
abandoned until some "meaningful alternative could be developed to protect innocent
persons aggrieved by police misconduct." 428 U.S. at 500 (noting the position taken
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)). He concluded in Stone that the "continued existence of the rule, as
presently implemented," would only inhibit "the development of rational alternatives." 428 U.S. at 500.
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tionally seized evidence need not be excluded where the officer who
seized the evidence was "acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing laws" and had "reasonable grounds for

[that] belief."375 While it appears that Justice White may have the
support of three other Justices for adopting this modification, the
presence of the additional vote needed for a majority opinion is
Let us assume, however, that Justice White's
highly speculative3. 7
view does prevail. From the viewpoint of the civil libertarian, how

much will have been lost? I suggest that the wound will be primarily
to the civil libertarian's pride, not to the primary function of the exclusionary rule.
Of course, if one views the exclusion of evidence as an appropri-

ate personal remedy for the person whose privacy has been invaded
by an illegal search, then Justice White's approach has the basic de-

fect of leaving some injured defendants without a remedy. But the
Court traditionally has justified the exclusionary rule on two other
375. 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White specifically noted
that he would not overrule Mapp. 428 U.S. at 538. The modification of Mapp
suggested by Justice White approximates in several respects the highly publicized
proposal in ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2 (Prop.
Official Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE]. It is unclear,
however, whether Justice White would accept all of the Model Code provisions. The
Model Code provides for exclusion only where the illegality in obtaining the evidence
was "substantial." PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra § 290.2(2). A violation is automatically deemed "substantial" if it was "gross, wilful and prejudicial to the accused."
PR-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra § 290.2(3). Willfulness exists "regardless of the
good faith of the individual officer if it appears to be part of the practice of the
law enforcement agency or was authorized within it." PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE,
supra § 290.2(3). Where a violation does not fall within the "automatic" category,
it still may be deemed substantial upon consideration of all of the surrounding circumstances, including: (1) the extent of the officer's deviation from lawful conduct,
(2) the extent to which the violation was willful, (3) the extent to which privacy
was invaded, (4) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent future violations,
(5) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered,
and (6) the extent to which the violation itself restricted the defendant's ability
to raise the motion to suppress or present other defenses. PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE,
supra § 290.2(4).
376. Justice Powell has expressed some sympathy for a modification of the type
urged by Justice White. See Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1247 n.3 (1977)
(concurring opinion), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609-12 (1975) (concurring in part). Justice Rehnquist's joinder in Justice Powell's partial concurrence
in Brown suggests that he too might be receptive. Justice White's position certainly
should have the support of Chief Justice Burger as a route preferable to retaining
Mapp intact, although perhaps not as desirable to him as overruling Mapp. See
note 374 supra. The opinions of Justices Blackmun, Stewart, and Stevens have not
directly spoken to the issue, so any predictions as to their positions must be based
on speculative assumptions drawn from the general philosophy reflected in their respective opinions. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun's comment that "the fourth amendment
supports no exclusionary rule." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 404 U.S. 443, 510
(1971) (dissenting opinion). See also Allen, supra note 8, at 397-98.
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Those rationales are the deterrence theory noted

above 3 78 and the theory that exclusion is necessary to maintain "the
imperative of judicial integrity"a 7P--that courts cannot, consistent
with their duty to uphold the Constitution, condone constitutional violations by permitting the fruits of those violations to serve as the
basis for criminal convictions. 38 0 When the exclusionary rule is
viewed in light of these theories, Justice White's proposal does not

seriously undermine the rule's basic functions, although it certainly
does not strengthen the rule.
First, accepting arguendo the judicial-integrity rationale, 88 1 Jus377. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REv. 665, 668-71 (1970). While the majority and dissenting opinions in
cases such as Calandra and Stone have disagreed as to the weight to be given to
the two rationales of "deterrence" and "judicial integrity," neither has argued that
the exclusion of evidence is required as reparation for the invasion of privacy suffered
by the defendant. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 n.24 (1976); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-63 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975); 422 U.S. at 55162 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But cf. Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The
Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 281
(1974) (arguing that Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), originally viewed
admission of illegally seized evidence as an integral aspect of the violation of the
individual's fourth amendment rights, and the Court should return to that analysis,
recognizing the exclusion of the evidence as a "personal right").
Although Mapp also cited the fifth amendment prohibition against compulsory
self-incrimination in adopting the exclusionary rule, that prohibition apparently was
accepted as a foundation for the rule only by Justice Black. See Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Landynski, supra note
345, at 463-79. In any event, any fifth amendment foundation was undermined
by the Court's limitation of the self-incrimination provision to testimonial disclosures,
see text at notes 110-12 supra, and the newly advanced analysis of the self-incrimination aspects of subpoenas requiring production of documents, see Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), discussed in note 175 supra.
378. See note 358 supra and accompanying text.
379. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960)).
380. 367 U.S. at 657-60. See also the majority and dissenting opinions in United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974); Allen, supra note 10, at 537.
381. The validity of this theory has been challenged on various grounds, including: (1) courts in other countries have ably maintained their judicial integrity without an exclusionary rule; (2) the integrity rationale supports the exclusionary rule
by bootstrapping argumentation since a court ordinarily would not knowingly be
accepting the fruits of police illegality-the illegality of the acquisition of evidence
being a collateral issue under the general rules of evidence-if the exclusionary rule
did not force it to examine the source of the evidence; (3) the imperative of judicial
integrity is equally damaged where the court permits an obviously guilty man to
go free because of an unintentional blunder by the constable; and (4) the imperative
of judicial integrity is not affected if the evidence is accepted and some alternative
remedy applied to the illegality. See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 54041 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); and the various articles collected in
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 189,
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tice White's proposed modification would hardly place the Court in

a more precarious position in maintaining that integrity than do various current rulings that also allow unconstitutionally seized evidence
to be used in judicial proceedings.3 82 Consider, for example, the
Warren Court ruling in Alderman v. United States,3 8 3 which held that
a defendant lacks standing to object to the admission of evidence
unconstitutionally seized from a third person. 8 4 Under Walder v.

United States,3 3 an early Warren Court opinion, unconstitutionally
seized evidence also could be used under some circumstances for
impeachment purposes.3 88

If the trial court's failure to exclude

382. The Court in Stone stated that
[a]lthough our decisions often have alluded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," . . . they demonstrate the limited role of this justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular context Logically extended
this justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his assent. Cf.
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment
of the standing limitations on who may object to the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings need not abate when the
defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Similarly, the interest
in promoting judicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974). Nor does it require that the trial court exclude such evidence from
use for impeachment of a defendant, even though its introduction is certain
to result in conviction in some cases. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954). The teaching of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative
evidence.
428 U.S. at 485 (citation and footnotes omitted).
383. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
384. The Court in Alderman specifically considered the impact of its ruling upon
the effective operation of the exclusionary rule, but in doing. so it referred only
to the deterrent aim of the rule. See 394 U.S. at 174-75. The only dissenter on
the denial of third-party standing, Justice Fortas, noted both the deterrent and judicial
integrity functions of the rule. 394 U.S. at 204-05 (dissenting in part and
concurring in part). But he did not advocate acceptance of third-party standing
as a general principle. Rather, he argued that a person at whom a search was
directed should have standing to object to the illegal seizure of evidence introduced
against him even though that evidence was illegally seized from a third party.
385. 347'U.S. 62 (1954).
386. In Walder the defendant testified that he had never handled narcotics at
any time in his life. The prosecution then was allowed to impeach him by reference
to a heroin capsule that had been illegally seized in defendant's presence two years
earlier. The Supreme Court upheld the impeachment, noting that the defendant
could not turn "the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession
was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction." 347 U.S. at 65. Unlike Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), discussed in notes 260-63 supra and accompanying text, the illegal search in Walder
had been committed in investigating an earlier offense rather than the offense for
which defendant was currently charged. This factor has been cited to support the
contention that the likelihood of impeachment as permitted in Walder is too remote
to undercut the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule. On the other hand,
whether the illegality was undertaken in investigating the current offense or some
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illegally seized evidence threatens its integrity by creating the "taint
of [judicial] partnership in official lawlessness, '3 7 it does so as

readily under Alderman and Walder as under Justice White's proposed modification of Mapp. Indeed, that proposal, unlike Alderman, would at least draw distinctions according to the type of illegality and ensure condemnation of purposeful police illegality.
The impact of Justice White's proposed modification upon the

deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is more troublesome. As
even the most ardent supporters of the Warren Court acknowledge,
the exclusionary rule has obvious limits as an effective deterrent device.388 The key to the rule's effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I
believe, in the impetus it has provided to police training programs
that make officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and emphasize the need to operate within those limits. 8 9 Jus-

tice White's exclusionary standard is not likely to result in the
elimination of such programs, which are now viewed as an important
aspect of police professionalism. Neither is it likely to alter the tenor
of those programs; the possibility that illegally obtained evidence
may be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely to encourage police

instructors to pay less attention to fourth amendment limitations.80 °
past offense, essentially the same difficulties are presented with respect to the judicial
integrity rationale. See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and
Shepardized,56 CALIF. L. REv. 579, 633-36 (1968).
387. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
388. Supporters of the exclusionary rule commonly note that, although the rule
may not be the best of all possible devices for ensuring compliance with the fourth
amendment, it is the best known available remedy. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911
(1955); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State
and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1145-58 (1959). Still others argue
that the shortcomings in deterrent effect should not be controlling because the exclusionary rule has alternative foundations apart from police regulation. See, e.g.,
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 377 (arguing that the rule reflects a personal right
to exclusion of evidence).
389. S. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME COURT 87-88 (1976)
(noting a difference in police attitudes produced by "time and education"). Cf.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) (emphasis added):
Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, we have assumed that
the immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials
from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard
it. More importantly, over the long term, this demonstration that our society
attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to
encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.
390. I must confess that I have no empirical support for this prediction aside
from conversations with persons engaged in police training programs and the remote
analogy presented by the treatment of Harris v. New York in training programs,
see notes 262-63 supra. It has been suggested that an outright overruling of Mapp
would be treated by police as "a practical suspension of the constitutional rules as
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Finally, Justice White's proposal should not encourage officers to pay
less attention to what they are taught, as the requirement that the
officer act in "good faith" is inconsistent with closing one's mind
to the possibility of illegality. 9'
I have considered so far the deterrent impact of the exclusionary
rule only insofar as it serves what Professor Andenaes describes as
a "general preventive effect."3'92 Arguably, the exclusionary rule
also may have a significant impact as an immediate threat that deters
illegal conduct in a particular case. Although we have come to place
less reliance on special deterrence as a justification for imposing
criminal sanctions, 393 perhaps the Benthamite mode 3 94 makes sense
as applied to the exclusionary rule, since the officer presumably op-

erates in a less emotional, more rational fashion than most criminal
offenders.3 9 5 Still, assuming that the rule does have a "special deterrence" effect, Justice White's proposed modification of the rule

should not substantially alter that impact in those instances where
it is most likely to be significant.
Where the officer recognizes that a search is clearly illegal, the
to lawful arrest, search, and seizure." Kamisar, Mondale on Mapp, Civ. LIB. REV.,
Feb.-March 1977, at 62, 64. Justice White's modification is considerably different
in quality, however, and should have a considerably different symbolic impact.
391. Since earlier opinions had been viewed as indicating that the Court might
hold the exclusionary remedy inapplicable to all nonwillful violations of the fourth
amendment, see Allen, supra note 8, at 397-98, Justice White's opinion in iStone
is particularly significant in its requirement that the officer have a reasonable basis
for his good-faith belief that he is acting legally. This limitation should restrict
the possibility that "ignorance of the law" will suddenly become a per se excuse
for illegality. Consider in this regard the pre-Stone analysis of Professor Allen:
It seems clear that the Court is moving, or has already moved, to a view
of the exclusionary rule that would restrict its operations to situations in which
the police are found to have acted willfully or at least negligently. In the
case of the police, it appears that ignorance of the law is to become an excuse.
The difficulties of establishing the knowledge and purpose of the police, the
likely tendency of the police to risk more because of these difficulties, and
questions about the will of many lower-court judges to enforce the rules as
intended, give rise to grave doubts about the viability of the Court's new position.
Id. at 398.
392. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 949 (1969).
393. See, e.g., H. PACKER, Tnm LIMItS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39-45
(1968); F. ZMINo & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 75-77 (1973); Weiler, The Reform
of Punishment, in CANArnN LAw REFORM COMMSSION, STUDIES ON SENTENcING
123-36 (1974).
394. See H. PACKER, supra note 393, at 40-41; F. ZIMRING & G. HAwINs, supra
note 393, at 75.
395. Yet, even assuming that police officers as a group operate in a manner
that would hold high prospects for special deterrence, see generally F. ZIMPING &
G. HAwINws, supra note 393, at 96-128, there remain the special difficulties produced by the indirect quality of exclusionary sanctions as well as by the variables
(guilty plea, quality of counsel, etc.) that affect its enforcement. See Oaks, supra
note 377, at 720-27.
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special deterrence effect should not be diluted, since the officer also

should recognize that the fruits of the search will be excluded under
Justice White's proposal.39 The proposal is far more likely to have
a bearing on those cases in which the officer views the legality of

the search as a close question. In such a borderline case, the officer might proceed with the search on the ground that there is a good

chance that the evidence will be admitted under Justice White's
standard even if the search eventually is found to be illegal.
Whether officers are likely to make such careful calculations is questionable. But assuming they do, will the officer's decision to proceed
with the search in such borderline cases constitute a substantial
change from current behavior? Even under the current Mapp rule,
are not officers likely to proceed in cases they recognize as border-

line, particularly where they are concerned that the evidence may
not be available for seizure by the time they cure any potential legal
difficulties?

If the officer is astute enough to -recognize the border-

line nature of the search, he also should be astute enough to know
that in a truly borderline case the issue of illegality of the search

is likely to be compromised in the plea negotiation process, so that
396. Some argue that the very presence of a significant exception, even one limited to reasonable, good-faith searches, will offer encouragement to police officers
who refuse to accept the fourth amendment as a legitimate restriction on police
behavior. Cf. 48 ALI PROCEEDINcS 376-90 (1971) (debate over an earlier version
of the Model Code provision described in note 375 supra). However, as the socalled "dropsy cases" indicate, avenues for devious officers to attempt to evade the
law already are plentiful. See Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 THE NATION 596
(1967) (noting a marked increase after Mapp of claims by officers that the suspect
dropped contraband in open view as the officer approached the suspect); Comment,
Effect of Mapp v. Ohio in Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases,
4 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87 (1968) (statistical analysis). The strategic position
of an officer who is willing to lie to avoid exclusion of evidence is not likely to
be enhanced substantially by providing one additional issue as to which he may
commit perjury. Cf. People v. Berrios, 321 N.Y.2d 884, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.
2d 884 (1971) (concluding that shift in burden of proof was unlikely to deter perjured "dropsy" testimony).
Justice White's proposed modification also is not likely to enhance substantially
the position of the lower court judge who is inclined to admit illegally seized evidence at all costs. There are few cases where the' facts are so clear that such
a judge cannot fit them within a pattern that will make the search reasonablb. Of
course, there may be some judges who will not manipulate their factual findings
but will be ready to classify searches as nonegregious, good-faith violations. But
such rulings will be subject to review, just as are the current rulings of those judges
that stretch the concept of reasonableness in upholding searches under current
precedent. As discussed at note 433 infra, assumptions that a significant portion of
trial judges may be inclined to ignore or subvert the exclusionary rule are not supported by hard data or amateur sociological analysis. See also S. WASBY, supra
note 389, at 86-89 (reporting on interviews in southern Illinois and western Massachusetts and noting differences in the perspectives of defense counsel, judges, and
police as to judicial attitudes and actions in dealing with suppression claims).
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some prosecutorial benefit will be obtained from the search in any
event.
Justice Brennan has raised still another objection to Justice
White's approach: that it could retard the development of search
and seizure law. In close cases, Justice Brennan suggests, the state
and federal courts will not bother to decide whether the search was
illegal, but simply will admit the evidence on the basis of the officer's
good-faith effort supported by his reasonable belief as to the validity
of the search.197 It is not clear, however, that Justice White's proposal would permit a court to follow that approach in deciding fourth
amendment issues. The trial court readily could be required to determine whether there was, in fact, a violation of the fourth amendment before it begins to examine the officer's good faith. Justice
White's approach, like the American Law Institute's similar proposal
for modifying Mapp,3 98 apparently requires consideration of the "extent of [the officer's] deviation from lawful conduct"; 99 the Court
could readily hold that, to evaluate that factor, the trial court initially
must determine how the 00requirements of the fourth amendment
4
apply to the case before it.
In sum, the Burger Court has not yet modified Mapp as applied
to the criminal trial. Moreover, if it should do so, the most likely
modification-Justice White's approach-can hardly be described as
a threat to the very heart of the rule.
Looking to the area of police practices as a whole, the Burger
Court decisions certainly provide a more substantial basis for civil
libertarian criticism than the Court's decisions in other areas of criminal procedure. Yet, even in this area, when one considers decisions
402
such as Gerstein,401 United States v. United States District Court,
and Brewer 93 and notes the limited scope of decisions such as Mos397. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554-55 (1975) (dissenting opinion). Justice Brennan was responding to the possible adoption of a standard that
looked to willfulness of the violation alone, without regard to reasonableness of the
officer's mistake. He also noted that, under such a standard, consideration
would not be given to the "adoption and enforcement of regulations and training
procedures concerning searches and seizures by law enforcement agencies." dee 422
U.S. at 556 n.15. However, Justice Whites approach apparently would permit consideration of such training in judging whether the officer had a reasonable basis
for his action.
398. PRE-AURAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 375, § 290.2. See note 375 supra.
399. PRE-ARAiGNmENT CODE, supra note 375, § 290.2(4) (a).
400. See note 375 supra.
401. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), discussed in text at note 298 supra.
402. 408 U.S. 297 (1972), discussed in text at note 297 supra.
403. Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977), discussed in text at notes 26773 supra.

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1415 1976-1977

1416

Michigan Law Review

ley40 4 and Schneckloth,

°5

[Vol. 75:1319

it seems to be stretching the record to say

that the Court has followed a definite pattern of "looking at defendants' rights as narrowly as possible without overruling past decisions."40 6 Certainly, statements of utter despair concerning the removal of constitutional restraints upon police can hardly be justified
by the Court's decisions to date. Much of that despair undoubtedly

relates to anticipated decisions, but here again, based on reasonable
expectations, the critics' concerns appear overstated. While it remains
possible that the current majority will overrule Miranda and Mapp, the
Court's recent decisions, and the opinions of the individual Justices,

suggest an approach more likely to be directed toward modifications
that will not undermine the basic strength of either Miranda or
Mapp.
IV.

THE BURGER COURT IMAGE

Where then does this analysis leave us when we review the
record of the Burger Court as a whole? Even the most zealous civil

libertarian, I suggest, cannot properly characterize the Court's decisions as reflecting an absolute, or even consistent, opposition to an

expansionist interpretation of the Bill of Rights' guarantees. Neither
can the Court properly be charged with having destroyed, or even having seriously threatened to destroy, the basic legacy of the Warren
Court. The selective incorporation doctrine and the concept of
equal treatment of the indigent remain firmly implanted in the gov-

erning law. Similarly, in determining the scope of individual Bill
of Rights' guarantees, the Court has followed the expansionist ten-

dencies of the Warren Court in several areas. Decisions like Arger41 0
Waller,411 and Taylor412
singer,4 0 7 Faretta,0 8 Morrissey,40 9 Ashe,

404. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), discussed in text at note 246
and in notes 257-58 supra and accompanying text.
405. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), discussed in text at note
334 and in notes 340-44 supra and accompanying text.
406. Oelsner, Supreme Court's Year Is Marked by Changes in Patternsof Voting,
N.Y. Times, July 4, 1977, at 1, col. 4-5, & at 28, col. 1-2 (quoting Prof. Gerald
Gunther).
407. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), discussed in text at note 74
supra and in notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
408. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), discussed in text at notes 12930 supra.
409. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), discussed in text at notes 13133 supra.
410. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), discussed in text at notes 15961 supra.
411. Wailer v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), discussed in text at note 162 supra
and in note 163 supra and accompanying text.
412. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), discussed in note 138 supra and
accompanying text.
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are fully in keeping with the Warren Court tradition. In other areas,
the Court's decisions may not have gone as far as the Warren Court

would have gone, but they are not far behind.

The Barker deci-

sion, 413 for example, may not be as far-reaching as the civil libertarians would have liked, but it has put pressure on the states to make
substantial legislative efforts to guarantee a speedy trial to defen41 4
dants.
Of course, the Burger Court decisions do not move entirely in
one direction. There are various cases in which expansionist interpretations have been rejected, and in the area of police practices the
Burger Court clearly seems intent upon cutting back upon, though
not necessarily overruling, some of the key Warren Court decisions.
Yet, taken as a whole, the Burger Court record certainly does not
suggest that the Court values effective law enforcement over all
else.4 15 Indeed, its decisions consistently reject an approach that
would permit the state to override the interests of the accused when416
ever such action could be supported by a rational state interest.
413. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), discussed in notes 164-68 supra
and accompanying text.
414. Speedy trial provisions have been adopted in the last few years in several
states.

See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN.

§ 2945.71 (Page Supp. 1976); IND. R.

CIuM. P. 4; MIcH Cr. R. 789, PA. R. Cnm. P. 1100. Most of these provisions
are based upon ABA standards and might have been adopted even if Barker had
not been decided. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL. (Approved Draft 1968). Yet, both

Barker and the adoption of the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174
(Supp. V 1975), apparently have spurred more serious consideration of the ABA
standards in the past few years.
415. Professor Scheingold sees in this "mixed bag of decisions" an effort by the
Burger Court to protect individual rights that are not basic elements of the adversary
process while confining or contracting those rights that rest primarily upon the adversary system. Scheingold, supra note 7, at 231-33. He suggests, for example, that
"the Burger Court is blurring the distinction between prosecution and trial by providing administrative safeguards for the plea bargain while shaping the trial itself into
something of an administrative hearing." Id. at 233. Contrary to Scheingold's
thesis, many of the Burger Court decisions extending civil liberties can be viewed as
relating primarily to the promotion of the adversary system of justice. See, e.g.,
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), discussed in note 175 supra; Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), discussed in text at notes 140-43 supra; Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), discussed in text at notes 131-33 supra; Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), discussed in text at note 74 supra and in notes 75-76
supra and accompanying text; Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), discussed
in note 416 infra.
416. A Court accepting that approach would not have found a constitutional
violation in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), for example. The Court
there held invalid a state requirement that the defendant must either take the stand
before his defense witnesses testify or forgo his right to testify. The state here
had a significant interest in thwarting perjury by requiring that the defendant testify
without the benefit of first having heard the testimony of his supporting witnesses.
An interest of the same type justifies the universally accepted rule of trial practice
that permits the exclusion from the courtroom of all witnesses who have not yet
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A Court that started from Judge Learned Hand's assumptions that
"the accused has every advantage" at trial and that the primary defect in the current process is the "archaic formalism and watery senti-

ment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime"41
recognized in such
surely would have rejected the defense claims
4 20
41 9
cases as Wardius,418 Faretta, and Brooks.

The civil libertarian critics also must take into account the fact
that the issues presented to the Burger Court have a somewhat different quality than many of the issues presented to the Warren
Court. Although the Warren Court had to treat close questions in
several of its most prominent decisions, it also dealt with a significant
number of cases that were rather easily resolved once it was decided
that the particular constitutional provision applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 2

The Burger Court has not

had the opportunity to "bolster" its record in the protection of civil
liberties with many cases like Pointer v. Texas,422 Duncan v. Louisi42

ana,4 23 Klopfer v. North Carolina,424 and Benton v. Maryland.

Of

course, even if one discounts such decisions, the remaining Warren
Court decisions obviously show a more substantial leaning toward an
expansive interpretation of individual safeguards than do the Burger

Court decisions, particularly in the area of police practices. But the
weakness in the Burger Court's record from a civil libertarian's point
of view may exist only as compared with the performance of the
Warren Court. Even there, the current Court's record is quite comparable to the record of the Warren Court before 1962, when Justice
Goldberg replaced Justice Frankfurter. 426 The Burger Court certestified during a trial. The Court held, nonetheless, that the state regulation (1)
imposed an improper burden on the defendant's fifth amendment right to remain
silent by forcing him to make a decision as to the relinquishment of that right
before his other witnesses had testified, and (2) deprived defendant of due process
since requiring him to make an early decision as to testifying thereby deprived him
of the right to counsel's assistance based upon a full evaluation of the case. The
Brooks decision was not governed by any closely related precedent or specific language in the Constitution. A Court that was willing to accept any state regulation
based on a rational interest would have had little difficulty in accepting the Tennessee rule.
417. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
418. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), discussed in note 175 supra.
419. 422 U.S. 806 (1975), discussed in text at notes 129-30 supra.
420. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), discussed in note 416 supra.
421. See text at notes 33-38 supra.
422. 380 U.S. 400 (1965), discussed in text at note 27 supra.
423. 391 U.S. 145 (1968), discussed in text at note 26 supra.
424. 386 U.S. 213 (1967), discussed in text at note 25 supra.
425. 395 U.S. 784 (1969), discussed in text at note 23 supra.
426. See note 1 supra. Consider in this connection the following decisions of
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tainly has made far greater advances in protecting the interests of

the accused than were made by the Vinson Court, even when appropriate weight is given to the narrow and scarce precedents upon
the Warren Court during the 1953-1961 terms of the Court: Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128 (1954) (due process not violated by admission of evidence obtained
through unconstitutional searches conducted in obvious disregard of their illegality);
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) (person subpoenaed to testify in fire marshal's
investigation of the cause of a fire has no constitutional right to be assisted by
counsel notwithstanding potential self-incrimination problem); Delli Paoli v. United
States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) (where appropriate instructions given, defendant was
not denied a fair trial by introduction of his co-defendant's confession, which contained incriminating references to the defendant), overruled in Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), discussed in text at note 92 supra; Lawn v. United
States, 355 U.S. 339 (1957) (indictment not subject to challenge even if based in
part on evidence obtained through a constitutional violation); Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464 (1958) (although defendant was acquitted on a charge of robbing
three persons on the same occasion, due process did not bar a second charge of
robbing a fourth person on the same occasion), overruled in Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436 (1970), discussed in text at notes 159-61 supra; Ciucci v. Illinois, 356
U.S. 571 (1958) (separate prosecutions and convictions for each of four murders
committed at the same time does not violate due process); Thomas v. Arizona, 356
U.S. 390 (1958) (defendant was not entitled to habeas hearing on coerced confession
claim where confession was made 20 hours after lynching attempt); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (criminal contempt not within the sixth amendment
right to a jury trial), overruled on this point in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357
U.S. 504 (1958) (refusal to permit petitioner to consult his counsel while being
questioned by police did not itself violate due process), overruled in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed in text at note 238 supra; Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958) (exposure to federal prosecution does not authorize
refusal to answer on fifth amendment grounds where the state has provided immunity), effectively overruled by extension of immunity in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commn., 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), discussed in note 304 supra; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1958) (health inspection
of home not subject to fourth amendment requirements), overruled in Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), discussed in text at note 87 supra; Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (successive federal and state prosecutions for robbing the same bank did not violate due process); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960) (upholding search incident to arrest allegedly made for deportation purposes upon an immigration agency warrant); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458
(1961) (federal court may not enjoin use in state criminal trial of evidence obtained
by wiretapping in violation of federal act), underlying premise rejected in Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), discussed
in text at note 151 supra; Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), discussed in text
at note 113 supra and in note 138 supra; Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962)
(grand jury and petit jury were not biased notwithstanding extensive pre-indictment
publicity); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) (dictum suggesting that electronic interception of conversation in visiting room of jail did not come within the
fourth amendment).
There were of course many decisions during the same period that were applauded
by civil libertarians, including many not as well publicized as Mapp. See, e.g., Reck
v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). The cases cited in the paragraph above are listed
only to show that, at least during this early period, there were a substantial number
of decisions of a type that generally would not be supported by civil libertarians.
Indeed, in almost all of the cases noted above, Justices Black and Douglas dissented,
and in most they were joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan.
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which the Vinson Court could build. 427 Moreover, while civil libertarians have called our attention to several state courts that recently

have imposed more rigorous limitations on police or prosecutors pur427. Consider, for example, the following decisions of the Vinson Court: Carter
v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (denial of assistance of counsel did not violate
due process under' the Betts v. Brady standard, which is discussed in note 36 supra);
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947) (same as Carter); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947) (upholding intensive warrantless search of four-room apartment
as incident to arrest made in the apartment living room), overruled il Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), discussed in note 306 supra and accompanying
text; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (upholding the use of a specially
selected "blue ribbon" petit jury panel); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)
(prosecution and judicial comment on defendant's failure to testify does not violate
due process), overruled in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), discussed in
text at note 91 supra; Bute v. ,Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (in the absence of
any special showing of need, the Betts rule did not require that the trial judge make
inquiries as to the possible assignment of counsel prior to acceptance of a guilty
plea); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) (double jeopardy does not bar
a retrial following appellate court reversal though the reversal is based on insufficiency of the evidence at the original trial); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(evidence seized by state officers under circumstances that would invalidate such
a seizure under the fourth amendment need not be excluded from state proceedings),
overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74, 78-79 (1948) (evidence seized by state officers under circumstances that would
violate fourth amendment admissible in federal courts), overruled in Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950) (habeas review
denied where defendant had not sought review by United States Supreme Court following state court ruling), overruled in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), discussed
in text at notes 97-98 supra; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (warrantless search of desk, safe, and filing cabinets permitted incident to arrest), overruled in Chimel v. California, discussed in note 306 supra and accompanying text;
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950) (defendants charged with communist
conspiracy to overthrow the government were not denied sixth amendment right to
impartial jury by the presence of substantial numbers of government employees on
the jury panel, whom the trial court refused to excuse for cause); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (witness before grand jury waived her privilege against
self-incrimination when she acknowledged possession of Communist Party records,
and she could not subsequently claim the privilege when asked to identify the person
to whom records had been given); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (affirming state ruling as to the voluntariness of the confession of a 38-year-old Mexican
farmhand who could neither speak nor write English and who confessed after interrogation for an hour or two each day over a four-day period); Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181 (1952) (prosecutor's refusal to admit counsel during interrogation did
not invalidate subsequent confession where petitioner had not requested counsel);
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (post-indictment electronically recorded conversation between defendant and undercover agent did not violate fourth
amendment); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475-76 (1953) (although illiterate defendant in capital case had confessed after being held five days without being
charged, a finding of voluntariness was supported by the absence of physicial coercion or "less painful duress" and evidence that defendant had been warned of selfincrimination consequences); Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 482-87 (1953) (habeas
review of defendant's coerced confession claim not available where state court had
refused to consider defendant's appeal because his papers were filed one day late),
overruled in Fay v. Noia, discussed in text at notes 97-98 supra; Brock v. North
Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953) (due process not violated by mistrial granted when
prosecution witnesses unexpectedly refused to testify at trial); Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952) (in light of Wolf v. Colorado, discussed supra, wiretaps illegal
under the federal statute will not be barred from a state criminal proceeding in
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suant to state constitutions,42 8 the fact remains that the Burger Court
is ahead of most state courts in protecting civil liberties, as illustrated

by the significant change in state practice required by decisions like
Argersinger,429 Ashe, 430 Waller,431 and Morrissey.43 2
There remains the contention that the harsh civil libertarian criticism of the Burger Court is justified not so much by what the Court
has done, but by what it has said. Even when defense claims are

upheld by the Burger Court, it is argued, the opinions raise questions
33
that encourage state court evasion of the Court's own decisions;

the absence of a specific congressional directive), overruled in Lee v. Florida, 392
U.S. 378 (1968); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) (jury may make basic
determinations as to voluntariness of confession where directed to disregard the confession if they find it involuntary), overruled in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 369
(1964), discussed in text at note 95 supra. In addition to the cases cited as overruled, many of the other decisions cited above would be decided differently today in
light of subsequent decisions. Thus, Bute and Carter would be superseded by Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), discussed in text at notes 36-37 supra; Stroble
and Brown by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed in text following
note 64 supra; and Brock by Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), discussed
in text at notes 148-52 supra and in notes 149-50 supra.
In several of the cases noted above, the Vinson Court had ample precedent to
reach a contrary conclusion. Consider, e.g., Harris v. United States, discussed supra,
in light of United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). In almost all of the
Vinson Court cases discussed above both Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
There were, of course, other decisions during the Vinson period that extended the
rights of the defendant. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). The decisions cited above are listed only to show that the Vinson Court's record of decisions
opposed by civil libertarians generally exceeds that of the Burger Court, even when
one takes into consideration the need to measure the Court's starting point in terms
of prior precedent.
428. See Brennan, supra note 39; Wilkes, supra note 283; Wilkes, supra note
8. It should be noted, however, that most of those state courts considering the question have decided against adopting standards under their own constitutions that are
more protective of defendants than particular Burger Court rulings like Robinson
and Harris. See Howard, supranote 283, at 895-98.
429. See notes 75-76 supra and text at note 74 supra.
430. See text at notes 159-61 supra.
431. See text at note 162 supra; note 163 supra and accompanying text.
432. See text at notes 131-33 supra; O'Leary & Hanrahan, Law and Practice
in Parole Proceedings, 13 CRtM. L BULL. 181, 194-97 (1977) (noting that the number of states providing Morrissey hearing rights before Morrissey ranged from over
30 as to one right to less than five as to another).
433. Civil libertarians sometimes assume that lower court judges, viewed as a
class, are naturally unreceptive to defense claims. Consider, e.g., the view of Professor Amsterdam:
Let there be no mistake about it. To a mind-staggering extent-to an extent
that conservatives and liberals alike who are not criminal trial lawyers simply
cannot conceive-the entire system of criminal justice below the level of the
Supreme Court of the United States is solidly massed against the criminal suspect. Only a few appellate judges can throw off the fetters of their middleclass backgrounds-the dimly remembered, friendly face of the school crossing
guard, their fear of a crowd of 'toughs," their attitudes engendered as lawyers
before their elevation to the bench, by years of service as prosecutors or as
private lawyers for honest, respectable business clients-and identify with the
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considerations are balanced so neatly that each case appears limited
to its facts; and doubts never before entertained are expressed about
the future course of precedent.4 3 4 These qualities undoubtedly are

found in several of the Court's leading opinions, but almost all of
those are opinions dealing with Mapp, Miranda, and Fay.43 5 Other
opinions, such as Argersinger and Morrissey, clearly look toward
criminal suspect instead of with the policeman or with the putative victim of
the suspect's theft, mugging, rape or murder. Trial judges still more, and magistrates beyond belief, are functionally and psychologically allied with the police,
their co-workers in the unending and scarifying work of bringing criminals to
book.
Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 792.
It is difficult to challenge such generalizations except with other generalizations
that are equally lacking in hard data to support them. Each person must, in the
end, make a judgment largely based on the judges and courts with which he is familiar. Relying on that perspective, I find Professor Amsterdam's characterization deficient at several points. First, a great many judges who can recall the friendly school
guard can also recall the tales of their sons, daughters, nephews, and nieces about
the unnecessary "hassle" they received from police in the course of a traffic stop,
a police visit to a noisy party, or even a marijuana bust. The difficulties that police
encountered in the 1960s frequently altered the attitudes not only of teenagers and
college students, but of their parents as well. Skepticism as to police efficiency,
motive, etc., spread beyond those immediately involved and obviously included a significant group of those "middle-class" lawyers who are now on the bench. Second,
the bench itself, at least in the large cities, comes from a far more diversified background than Amsterdam acknowledges. On the benches of the two primary trial
courts in the Detroit area-Wayne County Circuit Court and Detroit Recorder's
Court-we have not only former prosecutors and business lawyers of middle-class
backgrounds, but also former public defenders, defense lawyers, and lawyers who
grew up in the ghettos of the city. Perhaps Detroit may be somewhat atypical,
but defense lawyers in other large cities have told me of similar diversity among
the judges in their cities. Third, insofar as these judges are functionally allied with
anyone on a day-to-day basis, it is not so much with the police as the prosecutor
and the public defender or defense "regulars" who appear in their courtrooms. Obviously the pressure of high volume may lead some judges to want to "push past"
preliminary motions and "get to the case." Also, many may take the position, perhaps correctly, that as between a defendant and a police officer, the defendant is
more likely to lie, having a greater interest in the outcome. This is not the equivalent, however, of the almost inevitable bias that Amsterdam suggests. The substantial rate of defense success on suppression motions in narcotics cases, as documented
in cities like Chicago and Washington, certainly suggests that a fair portion of judges
in many overburdened courts will quickly dispose of matters against, as well as for,
the police. See Oaks, supra note 377, at 681-89.
434. For a further exploration of these qualities, see Allen, supra note 8, at
397.

435. A more consistent posing of serious doubts as to future trends is found
in the concurring and dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger, particularly with
respect to Mapp and Miranda. See, e.g., Justice Burger's dissent in Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1977). Civil libertarian critics too often assume that
the positions of Chief Justice Burger will eventually be reflected in the rulings of
the Burger Court. See, e.g., Scheingold, supra note 7. The Chief Justice today
no more reflects the view of a majority of the Justices than did Chief Justice Warren
in the period from 1958-1962. While Chief Justice Burger frequently is in the majority, his views are obviously distinct from those of the majority on many issues.
See, e.g., Justice Burger's dissents in Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. at 1248; Brooks
v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. at 613; Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 460.

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1422 1976-1977

June 1977)

The Burger Court

1423

further extension of constitutional guarantees. Moreover, in several
cases, the prospect of future rejection of Warren Court decisions has
been stressed primarily by dissents, usually by Justice Brennan, pre-

dicting the Court's eventual expansion of a minor exception to a War436
ren Court ruling into a total rejection of the earlier precedent.

Civil libertarians and lower courts must recognize that Justice
Brennan's cries of "wolf' have come forth so frequently that some
Justices in the majority apparently have decided simply to ignore

them.437 The absence of a response does not necessarily mean that
Justice Brennan is accurately predicting the majority's intentions.
Of course, while the style of the Burger Court opinions on the

whole is not negative, it also is not very positive. Opinions that
openly balance interests on both sides and rely upon multifaceted
standards do not "glorify" individual rights or even boldly call to the

public attention major civil liberties issues. In this respect, the Burger Court lags far behind the Warren Court. The Warren Court
opinions brought to the attention of the American people the impor-

tant lesson that the observance of procedural safeguards is a significant indicator of the strength of our liberty. They spoke clearly and
436. See, e.g., the opinions quoted in notes 258 & 373 supra; Justice Brennan's
dissents in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976), and United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544 (1975). Compare the separate opinion of Justice Marshall
in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 430 (1976), quoted in note 175 supra.
437. Consider, e.g., the lack of direct response to Justice Brennan's dissents in
the following cases, particularly with respect to Justice Brennan's suggestions as
to the scope of the majority's rulings: Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)
(Stewart, J.); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (Stewart, J.); United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.). But compare Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Stone v. Powell:
The dissent characterizes the Court's opinion as laying the groundwork for
a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds ....
then at least [for many]. . .

."

It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel

reinterpretation of the habeas statutes," as a "harbinger of future eviscerations
of the habeas statutes," as "rewrit[ing] Congress' jurisdictional statutes . . . and
[barring] access to federal courts by state prisoners with constitutional claims
distasteful to a majority" of the Court, and as a "denigration of constitutional
guarantees [that] must appall citizens taught to expect judicial respect" of constitutional rights.
With all respect, the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is misdirected. Our
decision today is not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as
authority for litigating constitutional claims generally. We do reaffirm that
the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right, and we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule when sought
to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus proceeding.
In sum, we hold only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule
on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a showing that the
state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that
claim at trial and on direct review. Our decision does not mean that the federal
court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that the application of the
rule is limited to cases in which there has been both such a showing and a
Fourth Amendment violation.
428 U.S. 465, 494 n.37 (1976) (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent, 428 U.S. at 502)
(emphasis original).
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strongly on the need to keep law enforcement itself under the rule

of law. As a result, the legitimacy of law enforcement practices bethan a concern only to the
came a subject of public debate rather
38
4

readers of Commentary or Harpers.

The Burger Court opinions, while obviously less helpful from the
viewpoint of civil libertarians, still are not without potential value for
their cause.

Today, the public appears to be far more concerned

438. As others have suggested, the most significant legacy of the Warren Court
may be the long-range consequences that flowed from its direction of public attention
to major civil liberties issues rather than the particular resolutions of those issues
imposed in its decisions. See Allen, supra note 10, at 539; F. GRAHAM, supra note
6, at 289. The impetus provided by the Court's general emphasis on protecting
the rights of the individual contributed substantially to various reforms in the criminal justice process that have benefited the accused. For example, the decisions of
the Warren Court, combined with the pressures resulting from racial confrontations,
called our attention to the need for a higher degree of police professionalism. We
came to recognize that police training involves more than teaching people to shoot
straight, that we must devote substantial resources to police training, and that we
must recruit our police from all groups in the community. Decisions of the Warren
Court also contributed, I believe, to a higher degree of professionalism among lawyers
in the criminal justice field. Those decisions presented criminal law as an area
of intellectual and social challenge, and this, in turn, induced more able lawyers
to enter that field, particularly in the offices of public defenders and prosecuting
attorneys.
The Warren Court's decisions also led to a reexamination of the role of legislation
in the criminal procedure area. Various distinguished professional groups, such as
the American Bar Association, American Law Institute, and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, offered model codes or standards for
adoption through legislation or court rules. Their proposals did not always indicate
whole-hearted support of particular Warren Court decisions, but they certainly reflected a general concern for the rights of the accused and urged expansion of those
rights in many areas, such as pretrial discovery. In the past several years, these
proposals have borne fruit through the revision of codes of criminal procedure and
of court rules in several states. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-101 to 1055
(1975); ArASKA R. CRIM. P.; MiNN. R. Calm. P. See also SHEPARD's CIMINAL
JUSTiCE CrrATIONS (compiling court citations to the ABA Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice).
The Warren Court decisions also contributed, though perhaps less directly, to
the reexamination of the relationship between substantive criminal law and the civil
liberties costs of enforcing certain types of criminal statutes. That reexamination
has been partially responsible for the movement to reduce the penalty for possession
of marijuana to a light fine. Marijuana clearly has been the Vietnam of the criminal
justice system. Whether the marijuana laws are right or wrong, the fact remains
that they were enforced only at a significant cost in terms of illegal searches, pretext
arrests, and other violations of the Constitution. Along the same lines, the movement towards decriminalization of public drunkenness should relieve somewhat the
congestion of the lower courts, which, in turn, should permit more careful treatment
of other types of minor offenses.
Finally, there is the impact of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) and its budget of approximately $800 million per year. Many of the new
programs in the criminal justice system that have been most helpful to the accused
(e.g., release-on-recognizance programs, diversion programs, defense-lawyer training
programs) have been financed, at least originally, by LEAA grants. While the
LEAA probably would have been established in any event, certainly the Warren
Court decisions played a significant role in arousing the political pressure that ensured that the LEAA funds would not be spent solely for improved police hardware.
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about controlling crime than protecting the rights of suspects. 43 9
Polls suggest that many people favor measures designed to "crack

down" on crime, including some measures that would limit the rights
of the accused.440

The Burger Court opinions suggesting possible

future restrictions of Mapp or Miranda have been used by supporters
of such conservative measures to promote their public acceptance.

But neither the record of the Court nor the tenor of its majority
opinions, taken as a whole, really supports a broad movement towards restricting the protections afforded the accused. Many civil
libertarians might be well advised to examine the current Court's
record carefully and to push aside the fact that Richard Nixon ap-

pointed four members of the current court.441 If they did so, they
might find that their true interests lie in dropping their wholesale
attacks on the Burger Court and in attempting instead to attract public attention to the various decisions of that Court that stress the continuing need to safeguard the basic rights of the accused.
439. Arguably, civil libertarians also have failed to take into account differences
in prevailing public attitudes in comparing the Burger Court and the Warren Court.
Thus, it has been suggested that, if the Warren Court had been operating in today's
more conservative climate, it would have done far less for civil liberties than it
did during the 1960s. It should be noted, however, that, in the late 1960s, the
temper of public opinion respecting the control of crime was not that dissimilar
from the temper of public opinion today. If one assumes, as I have done earlier,
see text following note 126 supra, that the Warren Court did not retreat from its
civil libertarian outlook toward the end of Chief Justice Warren's term, then it is
hardly clear that it would have done so if that climate had persisted for a more
substantial portion of its tenure. Compare Allen, supra note 10, at 538-39.
440. See, e.g., MICHIGAN OFFICE OF CURMINAL JUSTICE PROGPAMS, THE MICHIGAN
PUBLIC SPEAKS OUT ON CBIME, 40-43, 56-59, 62 (5th ed. 1977); Arizona State Legislature Criminal Code Commission, A Study of Opinions and Attitudes Relative to
Crime and Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTIC SYSTEM RESEARaCH 196, 252-53,
302-03, 499-500 (1974); NEWSWEEK, March 8, 1971, at 39. The Michigan study
suggests that public opposition to "liberal" rulings actually has increased over the
past few years. That study asked the following question over a five-year period:
"Do you agree or disagree that the courts have gone too far, in making rulings
which protect people who get in trouble with the law?" The response has moved
from 58% "agree," 30% "disagree," and 12% "don't know" in 1973 to 78% "agree,"
15% "disagree," and 7% "don't know" in 1977. See MICHIGAN OFFICE OF CRIM-,
INAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra at 56.
441. Mr. Nixon obviously is not a favorite among civil libertarians. See, e.g.,
Westin & Hayden, Presidents and Civil Liberties from FDR to Ford: A Rating by
64 Experts, Cw. LIB. REv., Oct.-Nov. 1976, at 9, 11 (Nixon ranked worst president since 1933 by 53 out of 59 raters, with the remaining six raters ranking him
as the second-worst). There is a tendency among some civil libertarian critics to
assume that any Justice selected by Mr. Nixon is bound to be antagonistic to civil
liberties, especially since the former President so openly acknowledged that his appointments were designed to reverse the trend of the Warren Court in the criminal
procedure area. See, e.g., L LEvY, supra note 8, at 12-25, 43-60; Miller, supra
note 8, at 23. But compare Howard, Discussant's Remarks: Is the Burger Court
a Nixon Court?, 23 EM6RY LJ. 745 (1974); Mason, supra note 7.
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